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Editors’ Introduction
This special section focuses on genocide and related mass violence in Latin America.
Clearly there is a long history of genocide of indigenous peoples, from the arrival of
Columbus and other conquerors to the present day. Perpetrated first by European
colonial powers, particularly Spain and Portugal, genocidal activities continued
in postcolonial settler states following the revolutions of the nineteenth century.
Government shifted from Europe to local Euro-American, as well as in some cases
indigenous, elites, who shared economic and thus political power with imperialist
international actors—including, in many cases, the United States and some of
its large corporations. Human-rights abuses continued. In the second half of the
twentieth century, the Cold War–era National Security Doctrine, as well as statespecific tensions and agendas, played out in various Latin American contexts in
a new round of repression, genocide, and other forms of mass violence. The Guatemalan Genocide of the 1980s and systematic killings and general military repression
under dictatorships in Chile and Argentina in the 1970s and 1980s are perhaps the
best-known cases, but others abound.
The goal of this special section is to add to the growing literature on genocide
and mass violence in Latin America through scholars working within Latin American societies. The pages that follow contain what the editors believe is a substantive
step toward a new understanding of the dynamics of genocide and related mass violence in Latin America, past and present, as well as analyses of the responses from
within those societies to their history and the social and institutional forces toward
mass violence. This contribution is especially timely, with world attention focused
recently on Spain’s attempt to try Augusto Pinochet and current trials of alleged perpetrators of mass violence in Argentina. Crucial to efforts at transforming Argentina,
Chile, Guatemala, and other affected states and societies is a clear and honest engagement with the human-rights abuses in both the recent and the distant past—an
engagement that includes discussions of the complex issues of historical memory:
ideas about the ways the past can or should be represented; views on the use of
different concepts such as ‘‘genocide,’’ ‘‘crimes against humanity,’’ ‘‘civil war,’’ and
‘‘mass violence,’’ and the consequences for historical memory of using this or that
term in a given context; and more. We hope that the articles in this special section
will contribute to this process.
No study of genocide in the western hemisphere should begin anywhere but
with the attempted annihilation of indigenous peoples that forms the basis of EuroAmerican states and societies and has been an ongoing project of small and large,
weak and powerful settler states from Canada to Argentina. ‘‘Discussing Indigenous
Genocide in Argentina: Past, Present, and Consequences of Argentinean State Policies
toward Native Peoples’’ by Walter Delrio, Diana Lenton, Marcelo Musante, Mariano
Nagy, Alexis Papazian, and Pilar Pérez, presents research findings on the genocide
of indigenous peoples of Argentina that has been largely edited out of the Argentine
national narrative in a manner similar to that of other American settler states.
The historical details in this article alone make it an important contribution to the
literature, but the authors’ analysis of how these historical details have been
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excluded from public understanding of Argentine history and identity represent a
tremendous addition. An important accomplishment of the authors is to highlight
the role of denial of the Argentine state as the agent of destruction of indigenous
peoples in the past as a way of rationalizing the choice not to direct state resources
and commitment to help stabilize and reconstitute indigenous groups in the face
of debilitating poverty and marginalization in the present. Based on an ignoring of
Argentine agency in the past, the contemporary situation is misrepresented as an
unfortunate but unavoidable natural progression, rather than as a social problem
that can be addressed through public policy and for which the Argentine state and
society have ethical and legal responsibility.
To support this rethinking of the destruction of indigenous peoples, Delrio
et al. make a compelling case for seeing it as genocidal. Of special interest for those
noticing cutting-edge trends in genocide research will be the authors’ discussion
of the separation of male and female indigenous people as a means of preventing
indigenous births and displacing full indigenous progeny with those of mixed race—
another illustration of the concept of ‘‘life force atrocity’’ presented by Elisa van
Joeden-Forgey in Genocide Studies and Prevention 5:1 (April 2010). It is also noteworthy that the forcible transfer of indigenous children to European contexts—for
instance, as domestic servants—was extensive and systematic in the last quarter of
the nineteenth century, predating similar processes in twentieth-century Australia,
Canada, and the United States.
For those familiar with the history of US genocide of Native Americans, it is
striking to see a parallel process in Argentina, corresponding in terms of time and
methods. But what is also noticeable in the Argentine case that is relatively absent
from the US context is the prominence of critical condemnations of and speculations
about the implications of Argentine treatment of indigenous peoples. Print media
outlets as well as political leaders recognized the process for what it was and publicly
challenged it. While it is difficult to see how anything could increase our moral
repugnance at the commission of genocide, this evidence shows that genocide was
carried out by an aware society that operated through conscious choice and with
knowledge of the results of those choices—not through the vague ‘‘natural’’ process
that Delrio et al. refute. At the same time, this history of resistance to genocide
represents an important alternative narrative of Argentine national identity that
can provide a basis for reconfiguring that identity today in line with recognition
of past harms against indigenous peoples and a commitment to justice, political
participation, and support for community reconstitution.
This intervention that places genocide of indigenous people at the center of
human-rights discourse with respect to Argentina is crucial at a moment in Argentine
history when that history is itself being publicly and critically examined. Whatever
the benefits of the current effort to assess ethical and legal responsibility for the
mass human-rights abuses of the 1970s and 1980s, if the process of reformulating
Argentine national identity in line with genuine respect for human rights—a process
that most societies in the western hemisphere, including the United States, have not
undergone—ignores genocide of indigenous peoples, the result will simply substitute
one falsifying narrative for another. Delrio et al. present analyses both of the current
more active denial meeting the growing assertion of genocide as the correct characterization of what indigenous peoples have suffered and of the issue of reparations
that is the emerging next step beyond an accurate appraisal of history. Their discussion of the importance of the term ‘‘genocide’’ even in indigenous communities makes
an important contribution and opens a new line of thought in ongoing debates about
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the proper use and definition of genocide. It is our hope that this important work, as
well as other similar studies, will play the role it should in contemporary Argentine
national self-reflection and that it will support efforts toward long-term justice and
group reconstitution for indigenous peoples in Argentina and beyond. The article’s
treatment of the role of homogenizing thinking even in the contemporary reparations
debate provides important insight into how the conceptual elements of genocide have
material consequences even in its long-term aftermath and underline the fact that
properly addressing the impact of genocide requires engaging conceptual as well as
material harms and forces.
The wealth of historical data and intellectual insight in Delrio et al.’s article
includes a very interesting but unstressed detail that will be of great interest to
many scholars of genocide. It has now become widely known that the Entente powers
used the term ‘‘crimes against humanity’’ in their 1915 statement to the Young Turk
perpetrators of the Armenian Genocide, and recent scholarship has found that the
term seems to have been used even in the 1890s. Delrio et al. have found a public
use of the term to characterize the Pozo del Cuadril massacre of the Ranquel people
in Argentina in 1878.
Our second and third articles document systematic and extensive state violence
against Argentine citizens by the authoritarian regime of the 1970s and 1980s.
Mario Ranalletti’s ‘‘Denial of the Reality of State Terrorism in Argentina as Recent
Past Narrative: A New Case of ‘Negationism’?’’ presents a novel discussion of
negation of the historical realities of this mass violence in a backlash movement by
apologists for the military regime, whose members are now facing historical as well
as legal accountability. These negationists, some of whom belong to a new generation
whose view of this period is mediated through historical narrative rather than direct
experience, seek to rewrite the history of state violence in Argentina; they have
developed a new narrative that presents state violence as a defensive reaction
against forces destabilizing Argentina. Militarist nationalism is an assumptive foundation of this new narrative.
Exposing the manipulations of this narrative, which systematically ignores clear
evidence of state-initiated oppression and mass violence, is not only important for
Argentina but presents a useful model for other cases. This is clear from the
approach taken by Ranalletti, who uses the specific French strain of Holocaust negationism and scholarly analysis thereof as a framework to approach the emergent
phenomenon in Argentina. While there are differences between the cases, the contextual similarities, including the relationship to socially dominant Catholicism, are
substantial. This analysis will at once resonate for those engaged in similar struggles
of historical truth against negation that are tied to conflicts over militarization and
democratization, such as Turkish negation of the Armenian Genocide and Japanese
negation of the Nanjing Massacre and the ‘‘comfort women’’ system, and provide an
entry point into the Argentine case. It will also support future comparative work on
these cases of negation and the issues of long-term justice and societal rehabilitation
that are at stake.
Ranalletti’s focus on negation of recent Argentine state violence resonates with
Delrio et al.’s excavation of genocide of indigenous peoples and the embedded and
normalized denial of that historical reality in Argentina today. Ranalletti’s exposure
of the very public and explicit attempts to negate historical reality and refashion
the Argentine national narrative in line with forces of militarism and violence may
help contemporary Argentinians to gain awareness of the subtler forces of denial of
indigenous genocides, while Delrio et al.’s focus on the latter may help those who
135

Genocide Studies and Prevention 5:2 August 2010

would otherwise dismiss negation focused on the 1970s and 1980s as a marginal
phenomenon to appreciate its potential depth and the danger it poses. These authors
have opened up an important line of inquiry, and future research might examine the
historical and cultural connections between and the overlapping of these two negationist forces, one publicly contested, the other normalized into invisibility.
As our title suggestions, prevention of genocide and related mass violence is a
priority of this journal and of the organizations that sponsor it. As important as it
is to develop accurate understandings of historical cases and their ongoing legacies,
outstanding justice issues, and so forth, and to present information on and analyses
of ongoing cases to support and even spur intervention, prevention is the key to
breaking the long and, unfortunately, apparently interminable cycle of genocide in
human life. Yet prevention is in many ways the most difficult social and political
task, and developing strong scholarship on prevention is equally challenging.
Theorists must engage in complex analysis of trends based on past events and the
social and political context(s) of cases of concern just to create a basis for their
work. This work often requires both speculation about future processes and counterfactual reasoning based on past cases of genocide and past events in the society or
societies under direct consideration. It also involves high-stakes judgment calls
based on unavoidably insufficient data.
In ‘‘The Opposition Front against Compulsory Military Service: The Conscription
Debate and Human-Rights Activism in Post-Dictatorship Argentina,’’ Santiago Garaño
takes up the challenge of preventing mass violence in a penetrating and insightful
manner that provides a framework for future scholarship. In this article Garaño
does three important things. First, he recognizes that conscripting young men coming
of age in Argentina into the military up to 1995 really meant applying forces of social
construction to mold these young men into militarist and nationalist servants of
military-state structures rooted in a long history of mass human-rights violations
and violence against Argentine citizens. Integrating young men into the Argentine
military meant reproducing a repressive state apparatus and perpetuating humanrights violations. (Lurking behind this treatment is the role of geopolitical powers,
especially the United States, in supporting this militarism and nationalism and
in forcing onto the western hemisphere itself an international structure in which
military conflict and power are the dominant modes of exercise of sovereignty and
social cohesion.) Second, he identifies resistance to compulsory military service in
Argentina as an important act of prevention of mass violence that sought to break
the chain of socialization of young men into the militarist and nationalist Argentine
state narrative. Garaño respectfully presents the self-aware resistance of parents
who refused military service for their sons as social resistance based in the family—
which is quite different from dominant models in North America and Europe, where
formal political and community organizations dominate. Third, he focuses attention
on a key but often ignored aspect of the militarization of young men: not just an
appeal to but the manipulation and molding of their masculinity to integrate
it into the nationalist project. In recent decades, ground-breaking feminist and
other scholarship has shown how central sexual violence is to war and to one-sided
mass violence, particularly genocide, and how closely this violence is tied to the
masculinities promoted and imposed by military indoctrination and life. Military
cohesion and motivation are in part a function of shared misogyny and acts of
violence against women and girls. Following feminist authors who have advocated a
change in the socialization of men and boys, especially in a military context, Garaño
emphasizes the importance of this change for Argentina.
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Garaño’s article complements the work of Ranalletti in a meaningful way.
It is precisely the negationist recasting of the history of militarist-nationalist
human-rights abuse by the Argentine state as a positive social force in defense
of human rights that obscures the real intent and meaning of integrating youth
into the military: ‘‘good citizens’’ are manipulated into supporting this militarist
nationalism for good, even ethical, reasons. The exposure accomplished by these two
articles in tandem provides the accurate information that those acting on ethically
decent motives need to translate their good intentions into a positive, human-rightspromoting result.
Argentine state violence in the 1970s and 1980s forms the backdrop for both
Ranalletti’s and Garaño’s articles. Some view this violence as genocidal, while others
link it to genocide as a closely related form; for them, there is no question that these
two articles fall squarely within the purview of Genocide Studies and Prevention. But
even those who do not recognize this violence as genocidal or as on a continuum with
genocide will, we hope, appreciate why we believe these articles have such an important role to play in scholarship on genocide. The first links practices of negation in
Argentina to Holocaust negationism—and, by extension, to denials of many other
cases of genocide and related mass violence. The second presents an important case
of possible genocide-prevention efforts and a model for other projects of genocide
prevention. The fact that recent negationism aimed at increased nationalist militarization of Argentina did not prevent the reopening in 2005 of trials of alleged
perpetrators of state terror and has not reinvigorated the tradition of state violence
today may in part be due to resistance to compulsory military service through the
broad anti-militarization movement Garaño describes, among many processes of
resistance.
Our first article provides important historical context for this third article as well.
While Garaño treats the contemporary struggle over militarism and nationalism
in Argentina, which has its origins in part in the nineteenth-century nationalizing
project of genocide that is the foundation of the contemporary Argentine state, Delrio
et al.’s important work helps us to comprehend how deep the roots of today’s militarist
nationalism penetrate into the subsoil of Argentine history and identity. Argentine
state-sponsored mass violence in recent decades can be seen as the long-term effect
of 19th Century genocide.
As is perhaps clear from this introduction, a limitation of this special issue is
the focus on Argentina. While not intentional but a function of submissions, it is
beneficial in presenting a very complex overall treatment of mass violence in that
country. At the same time, we hope that future general issues of GSP will work
from this important first step and will include work on various states and societies
in Latin America—from Guatemala and El Salvador, through Colombia and Brazil,
to Uruguay and Chile—from scholars in Latin America.
Daniel Feierstein, Professor of Sociology and Genocide Studies, Universidad Nacional
de Tres de Febrero and Universidad de Buenos Aires
Henry Theriault, Professor of Philosophy, Worcester State College, Massachusetts
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For a long time the historiographical and anthropological narrative in Argentina
contributed to a double assumption that is nowadays strongly grounded in citizens’
common sense. On the one hand, the extinction of Indigenous peoples is vaguely
dated to a period from the Spanish conquest to the military campaigns known as
the ‘‘conquest of the desert’’; on the other hand, such extinction is simultaneously
interpreted as a ‘‘natural’’ process in universal history. Argentine state policies
were thus naturalized. It is frequently assumed that this set of natural processes
might have left only individual ‘‘descendants,’’ in place of political entities. Therefore, modern Argentine society would be the outcome of a European ‘‘melting pot’’
in which the Indigenous component is absent. We postulate that physical elimination, concentration practices, deportation, enslavement, identity cleansing of
children, and cultural destruction constitute mechanisms of homogenization that
add up to conceptualizing policies toward Indigenous peoples in Argentina as
genocide. Ethnic politics following the military campaigns were based on the
assumption of the near-‘‘extinction’’ of those peoples. Federal and provincial
governments constructed their policies on the basis of considering Indigenous
peoples as ‘‘survivors,’’ ‘‘the final remains of an ending culture,’’ ‘‘the few left,’’
and so on, omitting to name the causes of that supposed extinction. Our focus in
this article is on current cultural policies that announce intercultural, plurality,
and diversity goals while at the same time aiming to limit the margins of Indian
political autonomy. We propose that this genocidal project is linked inextricably to
the constitution and organization of the Argentine national state.
Key words: genocide, Argentina, Indigenous peoples, state policies, conquest of the
desert
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For a long time the historiographical and anthropological narrative in Argentina contributed to state a double assumption that is nowadays strongly grounded in citizens’
common sense. On the one hand, the extinction of Indigenous peoples over a period
of time is vaguely dated from the Spanish conquest (mid-sixteenth century) to
the military campaigns known as ‘‘Conquest of the Desert’’ (1878–1885). On the
other hand, such extinction is simultaneously interpreted as a ‘‘natural’’ process in
universal history, considering civilization’s forward movement over ‘‘less civilized’’
societies. Argentine state policies were thus naturalized. It is frequently assumed
that this set of natural processes might have left only single ‘‘descendants,’’ in place
of political entities. Therefore, modern Argentine society is said to be the outcome of
a European ‘‘melting pot,’’ in which the Indigenous component is absent.
The political and cultural homogeneity of the country constituted a political goal
for the governing class in the nineteenth century. Although Indigenous peoples were
not the only focus, the policies implemented with respect to them are paradigmatic
and exhibit this trend categorically. In Part 1 below we analyze the military campaigns
of 1878–1885, which ended with Indigenous political autonomy, postulating that
physical elimination, concentration practices, deportation, enslavement, identity
cleansing of children, and cultural destruction constitute mechanisms that add up
to conceptualizing this political process as genocide.
The ethnic politics produced by the military occupation were based on the
assumption—widely spread in citizens’ ‘‘common sense’’ through Argentina’s educational policies—of the near-‘‘extinction’’ of Indigenous peoples. As will be developed
in Part 2 below, both federal and provincial governments constructed their policies
from a conceptualization of Indigenous peoples as ‘‘a few survivors,’’ ‘‘the final remains
of an ending culture,’’ and so on. On the one hand, this omitted naming the causes of
this supposed extinction. On the other hand, these policies of invisibilization enabled
various forms of repression such as land expropriations, potential forced labor, and,
at the same time, massacres like those at Napalpı́ (1924) and La Bomba (1947).
An analysis of the constitution of a now public arena of debate on Indigenous
genocide is addressed in Part 3. In this debate, the Indigenous peoples’ agency challenges the limits of recognition and re-emergence by making visible the genocidal
social practices of the past and their symbolic realization through time. Furthermore,
these groups denounce not only the original intent of extermination but also the
mechanisms of enslavement and expropriation that followed military subjection.
The focus is on current cultural policies that announce intercultural, pluralist,
and diversity-related goals while at the same time aiming to limit the margins of
Indigenous political autonomy.
The genocidal project is inextricably linked to the constitution and organization
of the Argentinean national state and to its expansion of land jurisdiction over Indigenous territory by the late nineteenth century. In fact, the military campaigns of
occupation on the southern frontier (Pampa and Patagonia, 1878–1885) and on the
northern one (Chaco, 1884–1917)1 were executed with certain continuity of criteria,
agencies, and actors. In addition, the realization of these campaigns boosted the
political careers of persons and groups and eventually shaped the state’s organization. In this way, later Argentineans inherited a state and a society built upon an
elimination objective that was aimed, in particular, against the cultural ‘‘Other,’’
and as a result the survivors of this genocidal project could be incorporated as a
labor force.
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1. Argentina’s Indigenous Policies as Genocide
The collective research project on which the authors of this article have been
working 2 aims to rebuild the historical process of subjugation and incorporation of
Indigenous peoples into the Argentine state. Entangled in the same public debate
that we discuss in Part 3, we were pushed to acknowledge the existence of an
original intent of elimination that has enabled further normalization policies aimed
at the Indigenous peoples of Argentina. This led us to frame the description of the
process within a conceptual field that enables us to define it as a genocidal project.
Therefore, we decided to read the process through the definition of genocide proclaimed in the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (UNCG) of 1948.3
According to the UNCG, ‘‘genocide’’ means
any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.4

The sections that follow analyze various facts—and their genocide intent—in the
process of the ‘‘Conquest of the Desert’’ as a recurrent pattern in Argentine state
policies toward Indigenous peoples between 1878 and 1885.

(a) Killing Members of the Group
‘‘Not a single Indian crosses the Pampas where many tribes used to live.’’ 5 With
these words General Julio A. Roca, by then president of Argentina, highlighted
genocide as one of his administration’s achievements. As on other occasions, the
republic’s policies toward Indigenous peoples showed a violent and exterminatory
side, related to the aim of emptying strategic territories and replacing the Native
population with a European one. Although the national heroes of the War of
Independence at the beginning of the nineteenth century had referred to Indigenous
peoples as ‘‘brothers’’ or ‘‘fellow citizens,’’ these feelings of unity and empathy began
to turn, by the late nineteenth century, into expressions of condemnation for their
genealogical imperfection and effective policies of land expropriation. Some of the
most important theorists of the republic expressed their desire to eliminate the
Native population. The ‘‘Conquest of the Desert’’ (Pampa and Patagonia, 1878–
1885) and ‘‘Campaigns to the Green Desert’’ (Chaco, 1884–1917) extended through
time as a permanent state of war of varying intensity. During these campaigns, the
killing of Indigenous people on the ‘‘battlefield’’ or their extermination was a constant possibility as a consequence of the ‘‘state of exception’’ 6 that enabled the armed
forces to execute prisoners and families in the name of the ‘‘rights of civilization.’’ 7
We will go over some cases below.
An example is the slaughter known as ‘‘Pozo del Cuadril.’’ In November 1878, in
a frontier expansion encouraged by the cattle breeders of the Pampa area, a group
belonging to the Ranquel people approached the city of Villa Mercedes, with which
they had early social and economic bonds. This group approached to collect their
‘‘rations,’’ the outcome of a peace treaty signed with the federal government three
months earlier. These ‘‘rations’’ were the compensation negotiated with the state
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for the reduction in sheep-herding, hunting, and agricultural land for the tribes.
Nonetheless, Colonel Rudecindo Roca, military commander of Rio Cuarto (near Villa
Mercedes), betrayed and attacked them, taking many of them prisoner. At least sixty
male prisoners were shot dead in a barnyard; the women and children were sent to
Tucumán as forced laborers. This incident was reported and debated in the press,
especially in El Pueblo Libre (Córdoba) and La Nación (Buenos Aires), whose editors
qualified it as a ‘‘crime against humanity.’’ 8 La Nación emphasized that this was not
an isolated event and that impunity for such crimes could become a normal and
extended practice during the coming military campaigns. La Nación then predicted
that victims would not be only the Indigenous warriors but also elders, women, and
children.
La Nación’s warnings anticipated facts that have been retold within Indigenous
narratives across communities in Pampa and Patagonia since the campaigns began.
The late Catalina Antilef, a Futahuao resident of Chubut province, remembered her
grandmother’s life experiences:
Oh, how should I tell you . . . My granny used to say that they escaped from the war,
poor thing, she used to cry, she used to mourn when she remembered . . . they were
taken to a place where they killed them all, they were from different places, [and]
those who escaped came here. May God keep us from living that again.9

Such killings, described through collective memory, have frequently appeared
in official records as the outcome of ordinary combat. An example is the ‘‘battle
of Apeleg,’’ which in fact consisted of a sudden and outrageous attack against an
Indigenous camp at sunrise. On February 1883, Commander Nicolás Palacios
attacked Chief Inacayal’s camp; only two soldiers were killed on the battlefield,10
while more than 100 Indigenous people, among them women and children, were
murdered. The survivors were first marched more than 1,200 km and concentrated
in Valcheta, then later deported to Buenos Aires.

(b) Causing Serious Bodily or Mental Harm to Members of the Group
When the military campaigns in Pampa and Patagonia ended (by 1885), all the
Indigenous survivors were concentrated under military control. Regardless of whether
they had surrendered spontaneously or continued fighting against the army, after
their defeat they were enclosed and deprived of access to their former resources.
For adult men, the army was their first destination and probably their last. They
were known as ‘‘Indigenous auxiliary troops’’ or ‘‘squadrons of Indian friends.’’
Although these divisions had existed since the colonial period, they grew notoriously
during the 1880s, when desertion by criollo11 soldiers increased.
In various communities of Pampa and Patagonia, narratives of the ‘‘grandparents’ times’’ talk about material and non-material losses (possessions, persons,
sacred places, peace, etc.) as well as about displacements toward specific places
such as Retiro, Valcheta, and Choele Choel. Some of these places are also mentioned
by other sources, such as the memoirs of Salesian priests, the diaries of the region’s
new inhabitants, and military reports. People were concentrated, for example,
at Castro Fort12 by February 1884, at Chichinales13 beginning in 1885, and at
Valcheta14 —all in what is now the province of Rı́o Negro.15 There were also, according to Father Milanesio, more than 20,000 Indians concentrated near the Andes, in
the current province of Neuquen.16
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The way the prisoners were treated, and especially the dismembering of families,
was a subject of scandal in those days. At the National Congress in 1884, Senator
Aristóbulo del Valle stated,
We have taken families from the savages, we have brought them to this center of
civilization, where every right seems to be guaranteed, and yet we have not respected
for these families any of the rights that belong, not only to civilized men, but to
humanity: we have enslaved the men, prostituted the women, we have torn the
children away from their mothers, we have sent old men to work as slaves anywhere.
In a word, we have turned our backs and broken all the laws that govern the moral
actions of men.

Del Valle denounced the fact that every new campaign turned women and children
into the spoils of war, and he accused the public opinion of complicity.17
At the same time, the press periodically reminded the public of the miserable
living conditions of the subjugated. A Buenos Aires newspaper described their
disgraceful journey:
Here come the Indian prisoners with their families, most of whom were marched here
or carried on carts. The desperation, the crying does not stop, children are taken away
from their mothers because they are given away as presents in their presence, despite
the cries, the screams and the begging that, with their arms aiming at the sky, these
Indian women shout. In that human scenery, the Indian men cover their faces, some
look down hopelessly, the mother holds her child against her breast, the Indian father
steps in front, in despair to protect his family from the progress of civilization.18

One concentration camp frequently mentioned by the survivors’ descendents
is Martı́n Garcı́a Island, which at least since 1872 was used for the gathering and
distribution of Indigenous prisoners. This island, located in the middle of the River
Plate, was used as a prison (not only for Indigenous people) until the mid-twentieth
century. According to information from official files, it was in 1879 that the major
influx of Indigenous prisoners arrived.19
The elevated death rate, as well as a variety of illnesses suffered by the Natives
who were deported to the island, account for physical and mental harm as well
as degrading living conditions. It is important to underline that these prisoners
were transferred to the island not as criminals—as many other prisoners were—but
as ‘‘Indigenous people.’’ It was their social condition, and not any individual reason,
that led to their imprisonment.
The deportees were, in many cases, families. Once on the island, they were
separated and catalogued according to their sex, age, working capacity, and military
competence.20
Parish records are an invaluable source in studying Martı́n Garcı́a Island
because they include the personal identities of those who were concentrated there
or sent to their final destination. For example, from the baptismal records we can
deduce that more than 800 Indigenous persons were baptized on the island between
January and November 1879. Most of them came from Pampa and Patagonia, and
others from Chaco.21 Most of the baptisms were performed in articulo mortis (at
the point of death). The death records show that at least 234 Indigenous prisoners
died of smallpox in less than five months. In October 1878, the island’s doctor
warned the authorities about the condition of 148 newcomers:
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undoubtedly they come already infected . . . heavy work would only weaken them . . .
they are weak because they are underfed, the sadness that they carry, the moral
despondency, they feel the loss of the desert . . . and besides the illnesses spreading,
all of this suggests that they will be inoperative at work.22

The concentration, deportation, and redistribution policies were partly a response
to the increasing requests for laborers by provincial elites. In the province of
Tucumán, the excessive exploitation of the enslaved workforce, composed of Indians
captured in the Pampas and Chaco, merited the intervention of a government
bureaucrat in charge of the defense ‘‘of the poor and minors.’’ 23 The provincial historical archives hold the record of the inspection of only one sugar refinery, El
Colmenar.24 This inspection documented that Engineer Colombres suggested that
he did not know the statutory contract and therefore he did not pay the workers or
give them food or dress them properly; that through the translators the inspector
learned that most of the Indigenous workers had run away,25 especially the men;
that smallpox had killed the rest; that some workers were ill during the inspection;
and that women had been beaten up, and at least one of them had died as a result.
The inspector observes that the Indian women were dressed ‘‘in the outfit they wore
in their huts.’’ Not only had the businessman failed to fulfill his duty, the inspector’s
report also suggests that the forced redistribution of Indians was failing to cover its
vaunted ‘‘civilizatory’’ aim26 (see section (c) below).
This episode suggests at least three things. First, there existed a certain, though
erratic, governmental will to regulate and inspect the Indian prisoners’ working
conditions. Second, the lack of official communication of the regulations implied the
naturalization of slave treatment. Third, although the inspectors announced further
inspections, these were not carried out; nor was there any official response to these
reports.27

(c) Deliberately Inflicting on the Group Conditions of Life Calculated to
Bring About Its Physical Destruction in Whole or in Part
The deportations created conditions of exile and overcrowding in hostile and unknown
territory, under newly imposed practices and unsanitary conditions that put deportees
at high risk of death from infectious disease. Thus, in addition to practices that
severely harmed the physical and mental integrity of the Natives, relocation and
concentration also condemned them to probable physical destruction.
Simultaneously, the Indigenous concentration camps of the late nineteenth
century aimed to discipline and ‘‘prepare’’ those who were supposed to become part
of ‘‘civilization,’’ as well as to send an effective message of totalitarian discipline to
society as a whole.28 The conception of the Indigenous population as worthy of condemnation to forced labor followed from their being driven into a state of exception
derived from the genocidal plan. This process drew a line between the Indigenous
population and the immigrant population, who did not share the same status. The
exceptionality of the Natives may even be understood as a disciplinary practice for
the immigrants. Nonetheless, our hypothesis is that the inhuman exploitation conditions, the trauma of war and expropriation, defeat, exile, the division of families, and
the loss of social and cultural referents caused a much larger number of deaths than
the war itself.
On 29 October 1885, the newspaper La Razón asked, ‘‘How many of the Indians
distributed are left in the sugar refineries? Almost none . . . Long and sad stories

143

Genocide Studies and Prevention 5:2 August 2010

were told in reference to the Indians that stood among us, until the disappearance of
all of them has finished their mourning.’’ 29
Finally, the population that remained in Pampa and Patagonia after the military
campaigns of 1878–1885 suffered continual instability with respect to access to the
land. The communities that persisted after the campaigns were spatially scattered
and surrounded by growing privatized spaces (see Part 2 below). The ban on access
to land, combined, up to the present day, with the Indigenous populations’ condition
as non-qualified rural laborers, ensured the unlimited enrichment of ranchers and
landowners.

(d) Imposing Measures Intended to Prevent Births within the Group
Policies aimed at limiting reproduction within Indigenous groups are evident
through several practices. Although some groups within the Catholic Church actively
resisted the division of families, the military agency encouraged the separation of
men, women, and children as a moral and tactical means of dissuasion and repression. Thus, the army’s first action following the imprisonment of Indigenous groups
was to classify and separate the captured persons. Sometimes, some of those persons
met again at their destinations, but most never heard of one another again.
Even accepting that gender-based separation was a disciplinary measure, it is
important to contextualize the governing generation within the trend of political
thought at the end of the century toward social Darwinism and eugenics. There are
numerous testimonies on this matter. In previous decades, Charles Darwin had
mentioned, in his memoir of his trip through Pampa and Patagonia, that the soldiers
of Governor Rosas would rather kill young Indian women because ‘‘they have many
children.’’ 30 National congressman Manuel Cabral provoked a scandal in 1900 when
he stated that ‘‘we should take people to mix the Indigenous people and bring to
an end the primitive race . . . what we want is to suppress savage peoples from one
generation to the next.’’ 31
Cabral’s formula leads us to a related subject: forced or induced marriage and its
outcome of mixed races.32 Thanks to widespread imagery of white women captured
by the Indians, the kidnapping of Indigenous women as trophies of war was concealed or justified as a necessity of war. Alfredo Ebelot, a famous engineer, expressed
his disappointment in the lack of military professionalism demonstrated by the fact
that Indigenous women and children ‘‘accompanied’’ ‘‘White’’ soldiers. Their presence
distanced the National Army from the ideal of a ‘‘civilizatory’’ (European) army.33
Other witnesses, such as Commander Prado, disguised the rape of women as a
legitimate choice:
After [the battle] Colonel Villegas told us: ‘‘This is the way I like it. You have behaved
as soldiers of the 3rd [Company]. As a reward, you will have 48 hours of rest, and
each one of you will receive a horse from the ones taken from the Indians. And
regarding the Indian women, see which one wants to live with you.’’ None of them
refused.34

Suffering division from family and community was a common destiny for those
young men who were compelled to join the army or the navy during their reproductive years. To mention one example, in June 1879 General Roca, the minister of war,
gave the order to ‘‘separate 150 Indians from the [Martı́n Garcı́a] Island to join the
navy . . . you should choose them young and healthy and therefore they should be
checked on by a doctor.’’ 35
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(e) Forcibly Transferring Children of the Group to Another Group
‘‘She used to tell me everything, she cried, then she started again, my grandmother . . .
she was a girl when they took her. The first to come were those who took the children
away.’’ (Catalina Antilef, Futahuao, Chubut)36

The forced transfer of Indigenous children to different sectors of Argentinean society
has been a constant, from the military campaigns, as a massive practice with respect
to prisoners, until recently, in a far more dispersed but regular fashion.
By the late nineteenth century, there was a great demand for young women and
children to work in domestic service for high-society families in Buenos Aires and
other cities. For example, the army’s General Inspection and Command received
and delivered to Martı́n Garcı́a Island numerous requests, such as ‘‘an Indigenous
family with one woman and two children, a boy and a girl, to be destined to Mister
Correctional Judge, Dr. Borres.’’ 37 Similarly, the island’s chief, Donato Alvarez,
placed three orders from President Avellaneda: ‘‘send three women between ten and
twelve and a boy about the same age’’; ‘‘from the Indians in deposit, eight girls and a
boy, the strongest, should be sent. All these creatures . . . healthy and strong,’’ as
well as a female Indian ‘‘about twenty years old with a young male child.’’ 38
Claudia Salomı́n Tarquini points out that in 1891, a priest destined for La
Pampa noticed the fear that the Natives felt when they were asked to summon
their families. Some years before, such gatherings had been the opportunity to take
children away from their parents. When the Franciscan priests reached General
Acha in La Pampa, they asked Linconao Cabral to assemble his people to baptize
them:
He tried to do it, but he faced some difficulties; those who had to baptize their
children feared that the godparents would take them away as it had happened in
Sarmiento, years before, taken the children away, which had been a real barbarity.
[A few days after] . . . we saw Major Linconao at the head of the Indians, at least 150
of them. It was deeply moving to see so many Indians, the same that years before had
been everybody’s terror, presenting themselves humble and peacefully, after they
were sure that they would not have their beloved children taken away . . .39

The kidnapping of children was a regular military practice, aimed at weakening
the enemy’s strategies. In 1878, La Nación described a tragic event when Colonel
Olascoaga, ‘‘after taking some [Indian] children, let the Indians kill 30 national
guards . . . abandoning them to the Indians’ outrage and revenge for finding themselves without their women and children.’’ 40 This practice also served to fulfill
the aristocratic pretensions of a large sector of civil society who put pressure on the
military to get servants—a practice that, among certain social sectors, persists
today.
Above all, however, it must be emphasized that the appropriation of children was
justified as being for their own good, to take them away from savagery and favor
their incorporation into the civilized world. Yet incorporation into ‘‘civilization’’
would not be enough to erase the stigma of having been born as Indigenous people.
In this sense, being an Indian child constituted an indelible mark that not only
could not be overthrown, whatever one’s efforts, but also determined, in many cases,
a person’s final, inhuman destiny. Patricia Arenas and Jorge Pinedo reconstruct the
story of a young female member of the Ache people, Damiana.41 In 1896, when she
was two, her parents’ murderers took her and baptized her; at the age of four,
she was handed over to work as a servant while she was studied by Dr. Lehmann145
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Nitsche, head of the Museum of La Plata. Because of her rebellious attitude, she was
pathologized, criminalized, and sent to a madhouse. After she died of tuberculosis at
the age of fourteen, her body was dissected, skinned, and divided in flasks and boxes,
which were distributed between the museums of La Plata and Berlin.42
When groups and families were dismembered, individuals were assigned a
‘‘Christian’’ name, either by the Church or by the administrations of concentration
camps. For example, the baptism records of Tucumán’s parishes are full of Pampa
children who were baptized between 1878 and 1879; while the names of the children
are not mentioned, nor their parents’, nor their places of origin, the names of their
new ‘‘godparents’’ are. Despite a meticulous search, none of these records allowed
the researchers to reconstruct a single lost identity.43
Nowadays, a common topic in the Argentine press and in public opinion is the
famine, extreme misery, and premature death in Indigenous communities, especially
those in the north of the country. Argentine citizens agree that life for these people
is extremely and unfairly tough. In general, it is concluded that those Indigenous
groups that have not already disappeared will do so soon. However, it is less usual
for the social drama be related to territorial expropriation and the social and cultural
disintegration imposed on these peoples by the nation-state.
There is a double process of invisibilization at work, acting on both the history of
those who have been the victims of genocide and the history of the nation-state as
perpetrator.

2. State Policies: Invisibility and Massacres over the
Twentieth Century
Genocide is completed and complemented at the same time by the hegemonic denial
of diversity. Argentine indigenous policies—the hostile as well as the disciplinary—
have been grounded on the idea of Aboriginal extinction.
Nowadays, although there have been important steps forward in the field of
human rights, influenced by the recent judgment of the perpetrators of the last military dictatorship, the state still denies the existence of genocide and the existence
of crimes against humanity with respect to Indigenous peoples. In particular, in the
legal process initiated as a result of the Napalpı́ massacre of 1924, the state refuses
to acknowledge the Qom people as a specific ethnic group, thus precluding the possibility of recognizing genocide—rolling back advances made on this terrain by civil
organizations that support human rights. Moreover, the state’s answer to the Qom’s
attorneys suggests that the possibility of treating the massacre as a crime against
humanity has also been excluded. At the same time, the government promotes education programs to encourage inter-cultural and bilingual education and tolerance.44
This paradox is the result of the symbolic violence that began parallel to the constitution of the national state and its campaigns of military occupation in the late
nineteenth century. Most of the initiatives in ‘‘favor’’ of ‘‘our Indigenous cultures’’
are built on the idea of physical extinction, turning these cultures into an addition
of folklorized elements. Thus, when Indigenous peoples manifest a will to conduct
their own destiny, repression is the norm.
In Part 1 we summarized some cases to sustain our thesis that the policies
toward Indigenous peoples supported by the Argentine state during its process of
consolidation constitute genocide. In addition, the Argentine elites legitimated these
policies in such a way that the subjugation of the Natives and the consolidation of
territorial sovereignty were not open to discussion. In this fashion, the descriptions,
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topics, and ideas of Natives created in that context have persisted in the Argentine
imaginary, even among those who criticize the historical process of subjugation. In
this section, therefore, we will analyze the mechanism that enabled a vast majority
of the population to incorporate these concepts and descriptions as part of an irrevocable ‘‘common sense.’’
Through the concept of symbolic realization, the analysis can also be extended to
the discourse sphere, that is, to ways of talking about this process.45 This enables
us to (1) shed light on the historic and actual consequences of a genocidal policy, (2)
deconstruct the historical process as part of a ‘‘natural’’ evolution and progress of the
Argentine national state, and (3) document how the success of the symbolic realization in the Argentinean case allows the continuity of concrete and material policies to
the detriment of Indigenous populations (e.g., eviction of communities, expropriation
of ancestral lands, legal resolutions that deny the (pre-)existence of the Indigenous
communities) by state and private actors.
One of the key elements of the symbolic realization was, and still is, the education system—consolidated in 1884 by Law 1420.46 Despite changes in plans and
methodologies over more than 120 years, the system still constructs an image of
Argentina as a white and European nation.
In 2006, when the Nucleos de Aprendizaje Prioritario, or NAP (the basic learning
elements and programs that every national primary and secondary school must provide) were renewed, the Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology launched
as a main priority the need to encourage awareness of cultural diversity ‘‘with an
inter-cultural point of view that privileges words and space for Indigenous knowledge,
values, and cultural production.’’ 47 However, a quick analysis of the NAP shows that
the Indigenous peoples are confined to the past. In ‘‘Societies Through Time,’’
the chapter that approaches the historical process of the Spanish conquest, the possibility of studying Indigenous peoples across time is mentioned only in a footnote.
When NAP documents refer to the nineteenth century, they deal with national organization and the economic system but make no reference to Indigenous peoples. In
this way, the NAP reproduces the idea that Indigenous peoples belong to the past
or are long extinct. In other words, the NAP does not seem to have modified the
idea that the Indigenous peoples are the ‘‘ancient Argentineans,’’ displaced first by
a colonial society and then by the massive arrival of European immigrants by the
late nineteenth century, and have nothing to do with present times.
The education system, then, has provided a narrative of the Indigenous peoples
as if they belonged to a chronological pre-history and so did their relation with the
state. The narrative shows not a genocidal process but a ‘‘natural’’ development
of history in which the immigrants ‘‘naturally’’ replace this ‘‘prehistoric’’ population.
In this sense, there is a second mechanism of symbolic realization: the myth of
an immigrant /white nation. The main topic in this narrative Argentinean history is
the immigrant experience and the social and economic changes, and even crises, that
relate to the immigrant:
Between the final years of the [eighteen-]seventies and the beginning of the eighties,
the occupation of the ‘‘desert’’ became a fact, Buenos Aires was federalized, European
immigration was encouraged . . . the limited population of our country by the late
nineteenth century was a limit to economic growth, as it could not provide a sufficient
workforce. The arrival of immigrants sorted out this problem.48

There is not a single mention of the Indigenous inhabitants, a social subject that has
disappeared from the textbooks forever. The Indigenous population is either expelled
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or exterminated. The capitalist development of Argentina becomes the great narrative, the ‘‘official history,’’ and the destiny of the Natives is set aside. Neither their
role as forced laborers nor as part of the army is exposed. This is where the functional topics of extermination and assimilation are grounded.
On the one hand, the extermination of almost every Native is reproduced even in
the discourse of those sectors that consider the ‘‘Conquest of the Desert’’ as genocide;
this is also part of the discourse of those who believe that nowadays there are no
Indigenous peoples in Argentina. On the other hand, the idea of assimilation—that
is, understanding the Natives as peasants, soldiers, national citizens—isolates the
process by which the Natives are drawn to this situation.
Part of the mechanism of symbolic realization is the categorization of some
Indigenous peoples—precisely those who retain the best levels of physical and
cultural vitality and reproduction rates—as essentially ‘‘foreigners.’’ An example is
the Mapuche people, who have historically dwelled on both sides of the Andes, today
divided between Chile and Argentina. The perception of the Mapuche people as
foreigners was a product of the political discourse of the nineteenth century and
was used to legitimate the military campaigns.49 The same assertion of foreignness
is used today to deny land rights to Indigenous people in Patagonia: since the ‘‘true
Indians’’ of Patagonia are ‘‘known’’ to be extinct, Indigenous claimants are assumed
to be either liars or foreigners, which means they have no right to these lands.
While the official education system has succeeded in cementing the idea of
Indigenous peoples’ being relegated to the past, to extinction, or to a folklorized
essence, the images accompanying this process have reaffirmed these arguments.
For example, after the military campaigns of the nineteenth century, a painting
was commissioned from Juan Manuel Blanes, an Uruguayan artist, to celebrate
the heroic event. This painting eventually became the image that springs to any
Argentine citizen’s mind in connection with the ‘‘Conquest of the Desert.’’ In every
successive reproduction of the painting, even that on the 100-peso bill, the image
has been cropped further, leaving the army in the center and deliberately excluding
the Indigenous people.
These mechanisms of invisibilization, together with a discourse of national homogeneity, had different effects on survivors of the genocide. For those who managed to
establish a collective strategy—for instance, regrouping around a chief who had
some capacity to deal with the state to request lands—a condition of maintaining
that collective was the adoption of the dominant culture and language.50 For those
who did not get any land from the state, the process of invisibilization was assumed
as a strategy—especially from one generation to the next—to avoid discrimination.
This process, both imposed and assumed, became worst when land began to be
expropriated and fenced. The advance of private property across the twentieth
century caused a migratory flux from the fields toward the cities. Along this trajectory the Indigenous population swelled the marginal populations of urban areas,
experiencing a new fragmentation and deepening the concealment of their identity.
We must wonder, then, whether every state practice toward the Indigenous
population may be considered genocidal, or whether many practices now operating
on the subaltern are grounded in genocidal practices, in the context of modernity.
In the case of Indigenous peoples, there exists a series of material mechanisms that
cannot be considered specifically genocidal but are nonetheless a product of the relations in place from the genocide onward. That is, some of the practices performed by
the state, the ways in which it has institutionalized its relations with the Natives,
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and, at the same time, the manner in which the latter struggle with, deal with, or
make demands against the state’s hegemonic practices, are all a product of genocide.
The genocide outlines the social spaces that may be occupied by Argentinean society
as a whole.51
Therefore, we cannot conceive of the Argentine state without the Indigenous
genocide, and vice versa. And we can analyze neither the Argentine state’s policy
toward Indigenous communities nor current Indigenous peoples’ agency without
bearing these origins in mind. In this sense, throughout the twentieth century, even
though a policy of ‘‘Indigenous assimilation’’ as part of the citizenry was announced,
state policies continued to perceive Indigenous peoples as inferior, as an internal
Other—once again anchored to the assumptions of extinction and assimilation. The
state tried to discipline a population that, being already marked with exile and
(material and symbolic) violence, was ever turning into a potential threat. In fact,
a double threat: as a real threat, should they react against the successive attacks
(fueled by the imaginary of the savage), and also as a threat to the evidence of an
alleged homogeneous nation.
In this sense, it is important to stress two forms of violence in the twentieth
century: massacres and land expropriations.
In 1924, during the presidency of Marcelo T. de Alvear (a leader of the UCR
party), an Indigenous protest was suppressed by the police of the Chaco National
Territory, resulting in the murder of more than 500 Toba and Mocovi people. The
killing took place on the lands of Napalpı́, a reserve for Indigenous families that
was considered a model. This reserve had been founded by the federal state thirteen
years before, with the aim of incorporating the Natives into the capitalist production
system as workers.52
The overcrowded, unhealthy, and exploitive conditions—working ‘‘from sunrise
to sunset,’’ as a survivor’s daughter expresses it53 —as well as the prohibition
imposed by the provincial governor, Fernando Centeno, forbidding the Indigenous
people to travel to the neighboring provinces of Salta and Jujuy in search of
better jobs, the 15 percent discount on crops harvested by Natives, and the constant
police persecution, generated a protest movement among the communities of the
reserve. In response, the local54 and national press referred to the possibility of
malones—raids—and to the existence of Indigenous murderers and ‘‘fanatical religious leaders.’’ At the same time, the landowners and local businessmen put pressure
on Governor Centeno to bring the conflict to an end.
On 19 July, at 9:00 a.m., 130 policemen and an airplane from the Chaco Airclub
fired from land and air on the Indigenous people who gathered in Napalpı́’s
central square; the survivors were hunted down during the days that followed. The
leaders’ corpses were displayed in a public square in the nearby town of Quitilipi;
the rest of the dead, estimated at over 500, were burned, then buried in common
graves.
In October 1947, during the government of Juan D. Perón, another event took
place that has been silenced through generations and only recently returned to
daylight, since a federal judge is now investigating it under the legal rubric of
genocide. At that time, massive layoffs in the sugar refineries of the Argentinean
northwest resulted in famine among the communities of the Chaco region. Since
their lands had been expropriated, the chaquense communities sold their labor to
the sugarcane harvest. In Las Lomitas, in the west of the province of Formosa,
thousands of Indigenous people gathered around a charismatic priest / healer and a
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traditional chief. Although the meeting was peaceful—the Pilagá people only prayed
and foraged for food—the Argentinean criollos’ paranoia dictated that the dispersion
and the silencing of the Pilagá became a state affair. The federal government sent
the gendarmerie, who shot and bombarded the demonstrators, chasing the survivors
through the jungle for more a month and causing the death of a significant proportion of the Pilagá people—estimates of the numbers range from 800 to 2,000 dead.55
After the brutal repression suffered by the Pilagá in Las Lomitas, the gendarmerie imprisoned some of the survivors who were trying to escape to Paraguay and
transferred them to a state colony in Formosa called Francisco Muñiz. There they
were forced to cut wood for the state-owned sawmill and to sow rice, receiving no
rewards from the harvest. Their living conditions were miserable, and, in addition,
the children were separated from their families and sent to a religious institution.56
After several years the state sent a doctor to inspect the Muñiz colony; he certified
that the colony’s worst problem was famine.57
These are just two cases of physical violence by military/police personnel against
Indigenous peoples. Today, the narratives of similar cases is repeated across interethnic frontiers. In every case, however, discovering the facts is arduous, as pain and
fear nurture the silence, even now, of the survivors of genocide, their descendants,
and the witnesses.
The three types of expropriation that are mentioned below acknowledge the
continuity and diversity of expulsion mechanisms accomplished by individuals—
merchants and businessmen—and large land companies. These agents took advantage of the legal vulnerability in which most Indigenous families were living and
extended their fences over their fields. In numerous cases, state bureaucrats responsible for protecting Indigenous families have allied with individuals to evict those
families from their lands, as in the present case of the Mariano Epulef community
in Rı́o Negro.58
Such actions have worsened during recent years. In the province of Chaco, expropriation by private enterprises has modified property maps; according to the provincial statistics, 3,500,000 hectares of public land in 1994 became 650,000 hectares
by December 2007. It is important to underline the fact that the Indigenous communities have no property deeds and, in most cases, live on the few public hectares
that are left.
A second mechanism of expropriation are evictions promoted by the state under
the banner of ‘‘inconvenience,’’ as for example in the so-called Boquete Nahuelpan,
in the province of Chubut, in 1937. In this case, a community to whom the state
had granted lands in 1908 was evicted in favor of more influential members of
society, who allegedly had better farming skills. The Indigenous people were, in this
case, labeled ‘‘Chilean Indians’’ and were accused of continuing to lead a life of
‘‘savagery.’’ 59
But such evictions are also produced as an outcome of the duality of the state.
Such was the case of the Toba (Qom) colony of La Primavera in Formosa. During
the 1980s, the province granted 5,000 hectares to the Qom, but the federal government continued to distribute public land to private owners—including lands within
the colony. Many Indigenous members of the colony were evicted from their lands.
The third mechanism is related to the quality and quantity of the lands that
are eventually conceded to Indigenous communities. Their low productivity imposes
limits on the people’s means of production as well as on their own reproduction and
continuity in the land.
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The lands given to Indigenous peoples have geographical and political limits
defined by the state that do not respect the productive and cultural needs of the
communities—for instance, places for hunting, fishing, and gathering food, or sacred
places. In general, they are low-priced lands that nonetheless can be expropriated
according to the needs of the market. In fact, the new monoculture economy, based
on small workforce needs and extensive soil exploitation, is once again moving the
agricultural frontier. Simultaneously, there is a growing number of relocations and
evictions of Indigenous communities that yet does not seem to scandalize Argentina’s
citizens.

3. The Concept of Genocide and the Questioning of the
State–Society Relationship
Despite the fact that in the past the academic and juridical communities strongly
rejected considering the use of the term ‘‘genocide’’ to refer to Argentine policies
toward Indigenous peoples, we can now observe that its use, still full of prejudices,
has become widespread. On the one hand, this is the outcome of a leading tendency
in international agreements, forums, and documents to condemn the exploitation
and subordination suffered by Indigenous peoples in the present. On the other
hand, in the local/national arena, it is part of the critical revision of the relationship
between state and society that began with the democratic era after the last dictatorship, and results particularly from the struggle of human-rights organizations and
Indigenous activists to legitimate Native demands as part of the human-rights
agenda. However, there is still a significant gap between acknowledgement and
‘‘visibility,’’ on the one hand, and, on the other, the profound historical revision that
would bring up for debate the historical processes that produced the conditions of
possibility for a ‘‘marginal citizenship’’ to exist.
Since the socio-economic situation of the Indigenous peoples has been brought to
light, the duty to do something about it has been discussed by different agencies and
political projects. The idea of society’s ‘‘moral duty’’ to the Indigenous population
constitutes a debatable ground in which the use of the term ‘‘genocide’’ has central
importance. The term enables us to think about the idea of ‘‘reparations’’ and, in
connection with this, about the questions ‘‘who?’’ ‘‘what?’’ and ‘‘what for?’’
The arena in which these discussions take place is constituted, first, by the
questioning of the historiographic narrative inscribed in the daily geography of
Argentina’s citizens (the naming of streets, cities, squares, and statues that celebrate
battles, national heroes, and governors associated either with authoritarian regimes
or with the oligarchic power constituted by 1880). The ‘‘Official history’’ is identified
as the matrix of validation of the crimes against humanity perpetrated during
the last dictatorship (1976–1983). The debate on this recent history has fuelled the
discussion of the term ‘‘genocide.’’ In addition, discussion of the historical research
behind that ‘‘official history’’ led to some other social practices’ being named genocidal, among them the subjugation and forced incorporation of Native populations
into the nation-state. The debate on monuments and street naming—especially as a
consequence of the writer Osvaldo Bayer’s public campaign—aims to shed light on
the different disciplinary mechanisms imposed on the subaltern classes, many of
which originated in the same regime that undertook the Conquest of the Desert.
Thus, in this matrix, immigrants, Indigenous peoples, and working class are part of
the same group of ‘‘victims’’ of the oligarchic capitalist order.60

151

Genocide Studies and Prevention 5:2 August 2010

Second, emerging from some teachers’ unions and associations, there is an
important reaction against the NAP—mentioned in Part 2—and its exclusion of
Native peoples’ history from the national history. In this way, these teachers are
trying to make visible what it is still absent from the books they have to work with
at school.
Third, there have been specific initiatives of solidarity with Indigenous peoples,
such as the legal actions taken against the state by groups of lawyers on the cases
of the massacres at Napalpı́ (1924) and La Bomba (1947). The Napalpı́ Massacre, in
particular, has achieved the status of an ‘‘epitomizing event’’;61 that is, it has become
part of a public discussion as the concretion of genocide itself. The risk is, then, that
in this case, as well as in the debate surrounding the Roca statues, the debate could
potentially close down to an understanding that Napalpı́ is ‘‘the’’ genocide and that
Roca is ‘‘the’’ perpetrator of genocide. Such an outcome would put at risk the main
learning that these massacres bring to the present: that they should be inscribed
in a major context of nation-building where genocide has been reproduced in history
regardless of the political parties in charge of the administration. As an example, the
massacres of Napalpı́ and La Bomba were executed during ‘‘popular’’ and democratic
regimes led by different political parties.62
Fourth, within academia there is discussion of the applicability of the concept of
genocide. On the one hand, this is the outcome of in-depth research on the historical
processes that led to the constitution of the national state, and especially of its disciplinary mechanisms, which disproved the argument that there had been no specific
state policy with respect to the Indigenous population. On the other hand, there has
been an increase in theoretical and methodological debates that enable us to reflect
on the concept of genocide in different contexts and periods. Finally, there has been
an important process of revision with respect to academic practice, institutional
history, and the constitution of academic disciplines. In particular, the handling of
‘‘anthropological collections’’ has been questioned,63 as has the unauthorized fieldwork carried out by archeologists and anthropologists in Indigenous communities
and the omission of Indigenous history as a subject of study by historians.
Finally, and most importantly, certain inner sectors of Indigenous peoples have,
in the last decade, found in the concept of genocide a representative manner of
making demands on the state and society. The majority of Indigenous claims and
politics have in common a questioning of the historical process of subjugation,
because their demands are not delimited within a present conflict but are the accumulation of successive conflicts in their relations with the state.64
To date, a social and discursive movement has been working toward the installation of the concept of genocide and the need to revise the hegemonic historiography;
at the same time, it has generated a backlash from a set of different actors, however
coincident in their arguments. Denial—those who minimize or neglect the social
practices described in Part 1—argue the extemporaneousness of the concept of
genocide, or of concentration camps or of crimes against humanity, and label the
supporters of this ‘‘other’’ history unscientific and proof-less or supportive of ‘‘dark’’
interests or agents (Marxist-Leninists, terrorists, foreigners, romantics, traitors, political agitators, and so on).
Thus, different sectors have reacted to the possibility of accepting the idea of
genocide. Although ready to accept that there have been ‘‘some mistakes’’ in the
past, they consider that throughout history there have been plenty of such excesses
and that no particular social group should present itself as having more right
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to change what is now a ‘‘collective patrimony.’’ Thus, proposals to widen our
knowledge of our national history are refused in order to sustain a local/national
identity.
Finally, as part of this reaction, the concept of genocide has also been incorporated
within projects of political integration. In this way, the state—federal or provincial—
through its different agencies and offices, has begun to incorporate the use of the
term. The state becomes then self-referent as defender of the victims of genocide
while emptying the identity of the perpetrator. Indigenous peoples, according to
this position, may have been victims of genocide, but the current state bears no
responsibility.

From Genocide to Reparation
The concept of genocide has embedded not only the acknowledgment and the acceptance of a multicultural country but also the idea of ‘‘reparation,’’ in both material
and symbolic terms. This brings on another discussion about how to understand
this ‘‘reparation,’’ because what seems to be the answer to the problem for some
actors means the continuity of the ‘‘genocide’’ for others.
To date, politicians’ projects, whether national or provincial, have tried to
contain the margins of this possible reparation (using various terms). On the one
hand, some sustain the idea of a total extermination and consequently depoliticize
the process and the demands. They incorporate the idea of genocide to argue that
there are no Indigenous persons left, only mixed-bloods and descendants; therefore
‘‘material reparation’’ is impracticable and, in any case, ‘‘unfair’’ and ‘‘arbitrary.’’
On the other hand, and in consonance with international changes in discourse,
the acknowledgment through the constitutional reform of 1994 of the Natives as
‘‘Indigenous peoples’’ (pre-existing the formation of the state) has been a first symbolic reparation, intended to show how modern and respectful the national society
has become. Nonetheless, this ‘‘restitution’’ has collided with the demands of
Indigenous activists, who visualize culturally diverse collective subjects with their
own voices and agendas and assert that there has not yet been a real restitution
that answers their own needs and interests.
This is the basis on which debates and differences are disputed among public
agencies, NGOs, and Indigenous organizations. In particular, both public agencies
and NGOs begin with the idea of a ‘‘common solution’’ for Indigenous peoples
throughout the country, bearing in mind a ‘‘common interest.’’ The Indigenous
organizations, on the other hand, argue that it is not possible to come to a solution within the same state logic of ‘‘making the differences homogeneous,’’ because
the diverse historical processes by which the various peoples have been led to
a homogeneous status of marginal and subaltern citizenship must be taken into
consideration.
In other words, the problem consists of establishing who defines what and, especially, what for. Regardless of the terms we choose to describe the process ( genocide,
respect, reparation, etc.), what is really at stake is the what for. At least, many
Indigenous organizations maintain that the what for still bears the same aim: to
facilitate and optimize the mechanisms of domination and expropriation that, under
the so-called community of interests, settle the ethnic and class asymmetry into a
determined social order.
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Reparation as Restitution of Citizenship
The acknowledgment of multiculturalism and the openness toward diversity in
the last two decades have built and established social places of detention where
individuals set, through active practices, bonds and senses of belonging.65 At the
same time, they have found limits in the official policies that try to determine their
welfare. Today, the concept of genocide is the subject of discussion, although as yet it
is strongly resisted as a concept of historical description. In this way, for example,
when the National Institute Against Discrimination (INADI) reacted against various
expressions of negationism, it passed on a law project to condemn expressions of
denial or minimization of the Holocaust, the Armenian Genocide, and the genocide
by Argentina’s last dictatorship but did not even mention the Indigenous genocide.66
At the same time, during a school inauguration in Santa Victoria Este—a location in northwest Argentina with a vast Indigenous population—President Cristina
Fernández said, ‘‘I ask forgiveness of the Indigenous peoples for the underhand
discrimination hidden behind our state’s inaction,’’ 67 and named the place the
‘‘backyard of the country’s backyard.’’ The government ceremony was intended to
bring closer to a regular citizenship people who have been apparently forgotten
by the nation-state in its welfare gifts. However, active state practices that have
damaged them for over a century were not mentioned.
Reparation, conceived as ‘‘reparation from marginal citizenship,’’ lies far from an
acknowledgment of autonomy and of double citizenship. Its aim is, again, to ‘‘give
back the condition of equals,’’ rendering inner differences invisible in order to make
visible the citizen’s equality—that is, fixing ‘‘one’’ damaged social body. This is the
context in which, since 1983, Indigenous rights have become part of the accusations
against state violence. However, each time the idea of a separate—or, at least,
a more complex and juxtaposed—social body is proposed, similar reactions and
mechanisms of denial arise, pushing to reinstate a homogeneous, hegemonic, and
discrete model of citizenship.

4. Final Words
The debate around the concept of genocide relating to Argentina’s Indigenous policy
has enabled a new arena for debate, where new questions arise. It allows us to think
about whether new changes in the relationships of subalternity can be researched
and to question what has changed or has continued in the structure of power, and
in its material and symbolic conditions, around the construction of policies and practices promoted ‘‘by’’ and ‘‘for’’ Indigenous peoples.
Motivated by these questions, however, it is important to acknowledge what this
process has caused. First, something has begun to change, in that the idea that
the Indians’—now ‘‘Indigenous peoples’ ’’—extinction has ceased to be a hegemonic
assertion. At least there is a necessity to explain what has actually happened. It
may be interpreted either as genocide or through different theoretical answers (e.g.,
the idea of assimilation and mixing), but now in a context in which the faces of real
Indigenous persons have gained presence in the political and public arena. In other
words, ‘‘General Roca’s defenders’’ must now face the fact that there are Indigenous
witnesses and professionals who will contradict their defense.
Second, when using the term ‘‘genocide,’’ there is still the challenge of inscribing
it in a wider process related to the construction of a certain social order. That
is, there is a tendency to replace the term ‘‘massacre’’ or ‘‘excess’’ with the term
‘‘genocide’’ in reference to events of the past, detaching it from its consequences

154

Discussing Indigenous Genocide in Argentina

in the present as an already-overcome historical period. But if we understand
that the social practices carried out against the Indigenous population that we
have described here—concentration camps, the separation of families, deportations,
killings, massacres, forced labor, redistribution of children, material expropriations,
and so on—constituted a genocide, we should also shed light on the fact that these
events were not denounced before and ask why they are still so extremely difficult
for Argentinean society to accept.
The imposed social order has evidently been ‘‘successful,’’ and therefore the
‘‘consequences’’ of the genocide have become constitutive of the society in which we
live. Thus, we need to ask ourselves what has changed, and what has not, in the
historiography and in its questioning of the foundations of the state.
Finally, and as long as we are both scholars and also part of civil society, we
would like to open the question around the changes that could have been produced
in the struggle to control hegemony of representations and self-representations.
Have the criteria for authority changed? Is there any openness toward ‘‘new public
voices’’? Who can cast the first word?
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Pilar Pérez, ‘‘Represión y resistencia: una aproximación a los campos de concentración en
el territorio patagónico a fines del siglo XIX’’ (Paper presented at II Encuentro Internacional Análisis de las Prácticas Sociales Genocidas, Universidad Tres de Febrero,
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Denial of the Reality of State Terrorism
in Argentina as Narrative of the Recent
Past: A New Case of ‘‘Negationism’’?1
Mario Ranalletti
Universidad Nacional de Tres de Febrero, Buenos Aires,
Argentina
This article applies the concept of negationism—from a French basis—to an
analysis of the activities and discourse of groups and individuals who define the
state terrorism applied in Argentina between 1975 and 1983 as a ‘‘war’’ against
‘‘Marxist subversion,’’ in defense of ‘‘Christian and Occidental Civilization.’’
By distorting history and systematically denying the reality of state terrorism,
Argentine negationists try to disguise the vindication of state terrorism as a fight
for the truth and memory. The article is organized in three parts. A brief review of
the origins of this concept and of the negationist current in France is followed by a
discussion of the differences between the concepts of revisionism and negationism.
The gestation and historical evolution of this current are then analyzed and
described; for this purpose, the article deals with some of the principal argumentations and tactics used by the negationists in their media appearances and street
ceremonies: books, magazines, courses, conferences, literary gatherings, so-called
study groups, Web sites, demonstrations, and public commemorations, claiming a
‘‘complete social memory,’’ are employed to instill a revision of Argentina’s recent
past. Finally, the article deals with the current stage of the evolution of negationist
groups.
Key words: negationism, Argentina, state terrorism, historical memory

To Pierre Vidal-Naquet, in memoriam

Introduction
For some, it is only a mental disorder.2 For others, like Pierre Vidal-Naquet, we are
witnessing a current to which no publicity or relevance should be given, either by
criticizing or by arguing against its absurd ideas; with the negationists, there is no
debate of ideas but, rather, a political combat, whose center is Holocaust denial.3
According to Henry Rousso, creator of the neologism, negationism is an ideological
system disguised as a ‘‘true’’ scientific approach.4 Applied to the Argentine context,
this concept allows us to define the activity carried out by certain groups and individuals dedicated to manipulating the past for propaganda purposes—means and
purposes that they share with local Catholicism and extreme right sectors. In no
way or sense do I intend here to establish an analogy, comparison, or parallelism
between the Nazi extermination experience and the experience of Argentine state
terrorism through this extrapolation.5 This extrapolation and use of the concept of
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negationism can, however, be justified as a proposal for discussion and as a theoretical exercise.
Either ignored or underestimated by academics, Argentine negationists constitute an amorphous group of political and cultural agitators, organized in a social
network whose main activity consists of appearing in public trying to impose and/or
question some event of the recent past. These groups or individuals fragment,
mutate, regenerate into new groups or NGOs, and blend into society—in particular,
into universities, the education system, and the legal system. Although there are no
statistics or quantitative data on these individuals, their visibility and number seem
to have been increasing since 1983.
This article is organized in three parts. The first section presents a distinction
between the concepts of revisionism and negationism, followed by a brief review of
the origins of the concept and of the negationist current in France. The second part
analyzes and describes the gestation and historical evolution of negationism in
Argentina, highlighting their first demonstrations, the characteristics of the people
involved in negationist actions, the discursive elements legitimating state terrorism
employed to achieve their objectives, and the relation between all of these elements
and the historical context in which they occur and develop. The third and final
section presents an outlook for the current phase of the negationist venture.

Revisionism Is Not Negationism
Negationists resort to the term ‘‘revisionism’’ in an attempt to contextualize their
actions within the scientific field; but the two views are radically different, both in
their approaches to the object of study and in the aims that lead the researcher. A
revisionist historian, theoretically, seeks to re-examine the past through rational
procedures that follow rules and scientific and academic conventions. Revision, in
this case, consists of a search whose main objective is for knowledge to progress. It
is well known that revisionism has a political side, particularly, within Marxism.
On the other hand, the negationist invents the object of study and produces his or
her sources, disregarding basic premises of scientific research such as re-reading the
existing bibliography, assessing sources, and scientific study of available documentation on the subject of interest. Negationism is limited to distorting available information and knowledge in order to earn the position of truth-possessor in the struggle
for hegemony in representing the past.6 Negationists do not revise; rather, they
invalidate and discredit—with purely ideological arguments—the testimonies of
Nazism’s victims and everything that has been discovered through research about
the systematic extermination of people, groups, and communities carried out by the
Nazis.7 Clearly, this is something more than just a ‘‘battle of words,’’ as Valérie
Igounet writes.8
Normally, the term ‘‘revisionist’’ can have many meanings: ‘‘apologist,’’ ‘‘reactionary,’’ ‘‘nationalist’’ (in the Argentine case). In this article, I take ‘‘revisionist’’ and
‘‘revisionism’’ as synonyms for an attempt to revise the available knowledge on a
subject to contribute further information via scientific research. I do not use
‘‘revisionist’’ and ‘‘revisionism’’ as synonyms for ‘‘negationist’’ and ‘‘negationism’’—a
current use in the Anglo-Saxon world. Pierre Vidal-Naquet’s assertion points to the
difference between a scientific attitude and an anti-scientific attitude.9 It is true that
revisionism can be negationism, but my approach in this section aims to differentiate
revisionism as a scientific attitude on a historical matter from the assimilation of the
terms ‘‘revisionism’’ and ‘‘negationism’’ that dominates studies of these questions in
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the Anglo-Saxon world. This distinction is more frequently made within French,
Spanish, and Latin American academia.
For so-called revisionists, their main difference from negationism is their
rapport with scientific knowledge and its rules. The fundamental principle of all
revisionism—and not in the political sense—is the review of available knowledge.
For example, revisionism promotes debate to confront ideas, points of view, and
approaches and to exchange arguments. A revisionist historian does not discuss
facts themselves but, rather, addresses their interpretation. Another fundamental
difference lies in the distortion of the available knowledge about a subject. The
revisionist does not ignore what he or she already knows about a subject but, rather,
tries to modify the current interpretation by refuting this knowledge based on
serious and scientific research.
For negationism, on the other hand, the goal is to deny the facts. The negationist
tries to use the review of available knowledge on a given topic to deny the reality of
the known facts. Thus, negationism constitutes a deliberate lie for political ends,
which has nothing to do with interpreting the historical evidence, and which has
become an apologia for a criminal political and social regime. The perfect example
is Holocaust denial, which negationists claim is a question of ‘‘free speech.’’

The Origins of Negationism in France
The negationist view arose in the immediate post-World War II period and was
initially a reformulation intended to adapt anti-Semitism, anti-Zionism, and antiCommunism to that context. This fabrication had its origins in the publication
of Nuremberg ou la terre promise by Maurice Bardèche (1909–1998),10 in which
the author, an extreme-right activist, rebelled against the ‘‘unfair’’ justice of the
victorious Allied powers and accused them of fabricating the genocide of the Jews
in order to mask their own crimes.11 This line of ‘‘analysis’’ was boosted by the
diffusion of writings by Paul Rassinier (1906–1967)—ex-pacifist, ex-socialist, and exCommunist—whom negationists consider the first ‘‘revisionist historian.’’ 12 Rassinier
published a work titled Le mensonge d’Ulysse, in which he questioned the veracity
of ex-deportees’ testimonies about the existence and employment of gas chambers in
the Nazi concentration camps. Considered by the experts as negationism’s foundational text,13 Rassinier’s book trivializes the matter of the gas chambers: though
not stating directly that they did not exist, he minimizes their relevance, questioning the prevailing version of history in order to free Nazism from its exterminating
character.
Rejected by every current he had frequented until then, Rassinier became a
‘‘divine surprise’’ for the extreme right. Bardèche, the propagandist Henry Coston
(1910–2001), and the magazines Rivarol and Défense de l’Occident defended and
promoted him as the living testimony of ‘‘truth,’’ ‘‘denied’’ and ‘‘persecuted’’ by the
victorious powers. This is the tone of what is considered the first period of negationism, which extended from 1948 to 1967. Rassinier’s death in 1967 marked the
onset of a new period in the history and evolution of negationism in France; since
then, defense of the Palestine cause has become the core of negationist activism,
exploited to reintroduce anti-Semitism into public debate.
The beginning of the third stage is determined by the so-called affaire Faurisson
in 1978. Robert Faurisson, a professor of twentieth-century French literature at
Université Lyon II, shocked the academic and media worlds by circulating a letter,
addressed to hundreds of figures worldwide, in which he outlined—with ‘‘scientific’’
arguments—his doubts about the purpose attributed to the gas chambers. Initially,
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he succeeded in attracting the attention of major French media—Le Monde, Le
Canard enchaı̂né, L’Express, and the radio station Europe 1—but in the debates
that followed, Faurisson rose from obscurity to a place in the field of Nazism. The
debate abruptly closed, and Faurisson was ‘‘rescued’’ by Bardèche and Défense de
l’Occident, a publication that embraced with enthusiasm Faurisson’s ‘‘revisionist’’
and ‘‘scientifically’’ supported theses. His main argument alleged that there is no
documentation proving that the gas chambers were used to kill people, nor to certify
that Hitler ordered the Final Solution. Faurisson concluded that his assertions were
‘‘good news’’ for humanity, which was thereby freed from this opprobrious event.14
His views prompted widespread condemnation, and he was dismissed from his
university post. Following this incident, the focus of attention moved outside France
with the organization of an international campaign to defend Faurisson in the name
of ‘‘freedom of speech,’’ of which Noam Chomsky was one of the main supporters.15
All this ideological and media agitation met a favorable reception in some
libertarian, extreme-left, and anarchist circles—such as the Anarchist Federation
and the bookstore and publishing house La Vieille Taupe—in which anti-Zionism
tends to be confused with anti-Semitism and underlies Third World and anticapitalist perspectives. For these marginal but vocal groups, the negationist attempt
to rewrite history is a practical way to channel the repressed anti-Semitism of many
of their members.16 It was during this period that Jean-Marie Le Pen’s extremist
National Front, a political party always supportive of and receptive to the negationist view of the world, reached its first peak of popularity in France. The experts
consider Faurisson’s intervention responsible for the radicalization17 and simultaneous stylization of the negationist fundamentals and discourse, relative to the
first steps taken by Bardèche and Rassinier.
One of the last events in this chapter of the history of negationism in France was
the scandal over the doctorate in history obtained by agronomist Henri Roquès
at the University of Nantes in 1985. Roquès obtained his diploma by forging
administrative documents and establishing a biased dissertation committee.18 In his
dissertation—and following Faurisson—Roquès introduces himself as a ‘‘scientist’’
who breaks down and refutes the testimony of Kurt Gerstein, an SS officer captured
and interrogated by French officers. Gerstein’s statements had been taken, until that
moment, as irrefutable proof of the existence and employment of gas chambers in the
extermination of people at the hands of the Nazis. Another salient aspect of Roquès’s
doctoral dissertation was his complaint—he pointed to his own work as an
example—that the ‘‘revisionist school’’ should obtain full admission to the academic historiography. The following year, Roques’s fraud was discovered, and his
diploma was withdrawn—an unprecedented event in the history of French higher
education.19

Argentine Negationism: Characteristics, Origins, and Development
Negationism is a marginal sector of the Argentine political and cultural spectrum.
Several different stages can be identified, each having particular characteristics
with respect to the people involved, the subjects dealt with, and the political and
communicative strategies employed. The shortage of followers is compensated for by
the movement’s important involvement in almost every sphere from which indoctrination or propaganda can proceed: the mass media, the justice system, legal advice,
public and denominational education, bookstores, the Catholic Church, the army,
and the security forces. Books, magazines, courses, lectures, spiritual retreats,
literary circles, study groups, Web sites, marches, masses, media interventions, and
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public demonstrations in the name of a ‘‘complete’’ memory are some of the tools
deployed to convince the audience that researchers’ work on memory and the consequences of state terrorism in fact constitute a campaign to undermine the prestige
of the armed forces. Following this syllogistic reasoning, current judicial proceedings
against military and security personnel, as well as civilians, for their participation in
state terrorism are the result of such a campaign. It is worth mentioning that the
theses and interpretations of the negationist movement are diffused far beyond the
smaller circle of its activists and adherents.
The core of the negationist line of argument consists in defining the state
terrorism applied in Argentina as a supposed war, against ‘‘revolutionary’’ or ‘‘subversive’’ elements. With this distortion of the past—for Argentina, the only war in
the twentieth century was the Malvinas/Falklands conflict—negationists seek to
exonerate the perpetrators of state terrorism from their crimes and vindicate
their actions during the repression of the popular activation20 that the country
experienced toward 1975. Following Faurisson’s example, they seek protection in
the right to freedom of speech, currently adding a demand—apparently devoid of
any particular interest—for completion of memory and information about the recent
past. In accordance with these arguments, local negationists seek to establish themselves as the bearers of ‘‘another’’ version of Argentina’s recent history, ‘‘true’’ and
different from that supported by human-rights organizations, as well as by two
governments (2003–2009), and emerging from several current judicial processes
against individuals involved in the application of state terrorism, characterizing the
latter version with adjectives such as ‘‘false’’ and ‘‘tendentious.’’
Another remarkable feature of the Argentine negationist movement is its ability
to build networks of solidarity and friendship, which are fundamental for diffusing
materials and slogans. In order to achieve this goal, negationists use three main
channels: the Internet, radio, and cable television. Currently, they have shown their
intention to occupy the public space with direct interventions—such as open demonstrations, commemorations included in a settled calendar, and escraches.21
The origins of Argentine negationism should be placed toward the end of the
last de facto government, although some earlier precedents can be pointed out. The
starting point for this way of seeing the recent past in Argentina is the use of
the concept of ‘‘war’’ to characterize the present situation. Such an interpretation
is not exclusive to negationists, as it has been included in the Argentine political
culture since at least 1955.22 The representation of the present as a war implied
an erroneous interpretation of the Argentine reality, used to conceal the growth of
social inequality, on the one hand, and the proscription and persecution of the
majority party, on the other hand, as the causes of the violence that the country
was experiencing.
The last de facto government23 appropriated this interpretation, used it to justify
their existence, and built it to a paroxysm by presenting it as the core of their
political propaganda.24 The military members of the government took the first steps
toward institutionalizing this account of the recent past, structured on the basis
of the notion of war, as the report El terrorismo en la Argentina (‘‘Terrorism in
Argentina’’) testifies.25 In this report, which was widely distributed, particularly at
the level of public education, the de facto government presented ample journalistic
and official information magnifying the growth and combat capacity of several
guerrilla organizations in order to support their interpretation of the contemporary
situation. This first attempt was reinforced by the intervention of the Argentine
Catholic Church’s Episcopal Conference, which, although it defended the idea of
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reconciliation among the Argentine people, confirmed that the country had left
behind a sort of civil ‘‘war,’’ defined as ‘‘the evil of guerilla violence.’’ 26
A short time later, in the context of Argentina’s defeat in the Falklands war 27
and with a settled date for elections, the de facto government continued advancing
in this direction, announcing the so-called Final Report of the Military Junta on the
War Against Subversion and Terrorism, which formed the basis for the ‘‘National
Pacification’’ law (law no. 22.924, passed in March 1983 and published in the Official
Bulletin of 27 November 1983). This regulation declared that every possibility of
criminal prosecution of individuals who had committed crimes ‘‘with terrorist or
subversive motivation or purpose, between 25 May 1973 and 17 June 1982’’ had
expired. The benefits provided by this law extended also to ‘‘every action of a
criminal nature executed on the occasion of or to develop actions aimed at preventing, averting, or ending the said terrorist or subversive activities, whatever its
nature or the injured legal rights may have been.’’ 28
This legislation motivated a new intervention by the Catholic Church through
the Episcopal Conference Standing Committee. This organization issued a document
titled ‘‘Path to Reconciliation,’’ which communicated to citizens the Church’s official
position regarding the defeat of the de facto government: this was not the time to
revise the recent past but a time of reconciliation for all Argentine people. The term
‘‘war’’ was used in this document, but it referred to the war recently fought to
recover the Islas Malvinas (Falkland Islands) from the United Kingdom.
If the military government and the Catholic Church were the first entities
to suggest that state terrorism had actually been a war, the first efforts from within
Argentine society to follow this path came from a civilian association created in
1979, whose purpose was to pay tribute and commemorate the military and security
men who had died in this so-called war against ‘‘subversion.’’ Adopting the name
Familiares de Muertos por la Subversión, or FAMUS (‘‘Relatives and friends of
the dead by subversion’’), this association concentrated on celebrating religious
ceremonies and publishing the newsletter Tributo. FAMUS, dissolved almost twenty
years ago,29 combined negationist propaganda with the vindication of the right to
social recognition of the dead, victims of actions conducted by armed organizations
during the 1970s. Between 1984 and 1985, negationism began to gain visibility as
an opponent group in the dispute over determining the generally accepted account
of the past, with its public demonstrations against investigations into the consequences
of state terrorism and, in particular, its fierce opposition to the trials of the military
juntas that governed the country between 1976 and 1983.30 Subsequently, the
‘‘Nunca Más’’ report, the judgment of the Federal Court concerning former military
juntas’ commanders in chief, the ‘‘Full Stop’’ and ‘‘Due Obedience’’ laws, and the
presidential pardons of 1999 and 2000 reinforced, in different ways, the explanatory
power of characterizing the recent Argentine past as a war.31

Incorporating the Memorial Register in the Negationist Fight:
The Question of ‘‘Complete’’ Memory
In this way and by these means, the representation of the recent past as a ‘‘war’’
managed to solidly settle within the Argentine society, offering the negationists
a context favorable to spreading their theories. The progressive consolidation of a
democratic system in Argentina benefited the emergence of debates about the past
and about state terrorism, in which the notion of ‘‘war’’ was the strong point in
the negationists’ argument. Faced with the progress of judicial investigations into
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the consequences of state terrorism, the negationists were compelled to intervene
to refute stories and memories that did not subscribe to the notion of ‘‘war’’ as the
organizing myth of the recent Argentine past.
Argentine negationism reproduces quite faithfully the French matrix described
above. The Argentine negationists’ approach is similar to that of their French
counterparts; the local impact of authors such as Bardèche, Rassinier, and Faurisson
surpasses that of any other negationist—David Irving excluded. The key here is
the strong presence of French intransigent Catholicism, a true driving force of
French reactionary thought in Argentina, in Irving’s work. The existence of a niche
of extremist activists in this country who also nourish themselves on Mediterranean
reactionary thought is one reason for the dominance of the French model on the
subject, as shown in the work of Sandra McGee Deutsch, Ronald Dolkart, Cristián
Buchrucker, and Daniel Lvovich.32 When faced with voices that conflict with their
own view of the world and their own interpretation of the past, negationists first
act to discredit those statements by labeling them as inventions or as responses to
an implicit or explicit political intent. This was the case in what could be considered
the first local negationism event: the publication and media diffusion of the book
La otra campana del ‘‘Nunca Más’’ (‘‘The other truth of ‘never again’ ’’), written by
Miguel Osvaldo Etchecolatz, a former captain in the Buenos Aires Police Department
and former director of investigations on that force (1976–1977). In 1997, following
the launch of his book at the Buenos Aires Book Fair, Etchecolatz embarked on a
campaign to denounce the final CONADEP report,33 describing it as a ‘‘lie’’ and an
invention of the perpetuators of the ‘‘subversive war.’’ Confined to extreme-right
bookstores, this book had better luck on public television,34 although its impact
created a certain discomfort in the audience and minimized the positive effects
expected for the negationist cause.
This was the trend of what could be considered the first moment of a fully constituted negationism, during which those involved in the implementation of state
terrorism were themselves the principal agents in campaigns conducted to establish
their views about the past within society. With the sanction of presidential pardons35
and the subsequent reactivation of trials and judicial investigations on the consequences of state terrorism, this stage—governed by the direct intervention of
perpetrators and by failed attempts to refute the investigations undertaken into the
consequence of state terrorism—found its closure. Since 2000, the center of gravity
has begun to shift from the invalidation of state terrorism toward a pretended ‘‘duty
to memory.’’
The first sign of this change was apparent in an event that combined the main
characteristics of both stages. An official association of retired military personnel,
the Argentine Army Military Association, decided to publish a large-scale work in
which interventions by those responsible for applying state terrorism were combined
with a strong demand for legal registration of those dead as a result of actions by
guerrillas in the pantheon of those fallen in the supposed ‘‘war.’’ This book, titled
In Memoriam, was first published in 1998 and completed by two more volumes;
it again uses the notion of war, although introducing what was certainly novel:
the idea that the ‘‘war’’ continued and must now be fought on the level of collective
memory, as the chosen title clearly indicated.

The Renewal of Negationist Personnel
This modification in both the communicative strategy and the content of Argentine
negationist discourse is accompanied by another, also significant, whose con166
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sequences and evolution are difficult to measure: a generational renewal in the ranks
of negationism, nurturing young professionals to continue what they preach. The
inclusion of a new, younger cohort of activists—many of them university educated,
and not all of them belonging to the military environment—has given a new boost
to negationist activism.
With respect to discourse content, newer groups and propagandists no longer
work only on characterizing the 1970s as a ‘‘war’’; instead they deal with a variety
of topics: vindicating and/or comparing the memory of guerrilla actions’ victims with
those who suffered under state terrorism; impugning judicial proceedings against
military and security personnel; reconstructing a ‘‘complete memory,’’ a search
for the historical ‘‘truth’’ to confront state manipulation; organizing campaigns to
discredit government officials for their political background; progressively replacing
the term ‘‘subversion’’ with the term ‘‘terrorism’’; and denouncing the political nature
of the current version of 1970s history. Probably the most significant factor in this
new stage of negationism, with respect to its objectives, is the attempt to include
in the national calendar a commemorative day for persons killed by the actions of
guerrilla organizations.
The focal point of negationist efforts during the past decade has shifted toward
the sphere of memory. Their demand is presented as neutral and legitimate, which
is its main attraction for their audience. Thus it could be appreciated in the declaration of principles of one of the ‘‘stars’’ in this new phase of Argentine negationism:
the association Argentinos por la Memoria Completa (in English, ‘‘Argentineans for
a Complete Memory’’). In the ‘‘About Us’’ section of their Web site, they presented
themselves as a ‘‘group of young Argentineans’’ united by a common interest in
1970s Argentine history to connect via the Internet with ‘‘citizens throughout the
country who feel the necessity of expressing their gratitude to those who fought subversion and terrorism.’’ Their eruption onto the political scene took place when they
published on their Web site a letter written by the former general Reynaldo Benito
Bignone, and addressed to ‘‘the youth,’’ in October 2006. In this document, the last
president of the ‘‘national reorganization process’’ called on the new generation to
become modern ‘‘idealists’’ who—just like the revolutionaries of May 1810—would
rise against adversity in order to finish ‘‘what we were not able to finish.’’ 36
This association promoted another figure of the ‘‘new negationist wave’’ in
Argentina: the lawyer Nicolás Márquez, born in 1975 in Mar del Plata, a city in the
province of Buenos Aires. Author of two bestsellers,37 he represents his written work
as an ‘‘objective’’ view on the recent past, free of personal ambition. Márquez has
taken care to attack the condemnation of state terrorism not only in classic local
negationist terms but also by resorting to legal arguments such as impugning
Argentina’s accession to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
which legislates on crimes against humanity.
Those groups that promote ‘‘complete memory’’ have attempted to install in the
national calendar of celebrations a day for ‘‘victim of guerrilla terrorism,’’ to be
observed on 5 October. The chosen date corresponds to the combat between the
army and the guerrilla organization Montoneros, which assaulted the 29th Infantry
Regiment in the province of Formosa. Argentinos por la Memoria Completa called
for remembrance of the ‘‘dead by subversion,’’ a practice repeated since 2001. At
present, it is the Centro de Estudios Legales sobre el Terrorismo y sus Vı́ctimas, or
CELTYV (in English, ‘‘Center for Legal Studies on Terrorism and Its Victims’’),38
that continues the campaign to include the ‘‘National Day of the Victims of
Terrorism’’ on the official calendar. Their campaign consists of mass demonstrations
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in Plaza San Martı́n, a central square in the city of Buenos Aires, with both civilian
and military speakers: the leitmotiv is ‘‘know the victims of terrorism.’’ During the
first week of every October, publicists and militants from CELTYV and Memoria
Completa participate in political media programs—such as Hora Clave, hosted by
journalist and university professor Mariano Grondona—to publicize their activities
and public demonstrations during that week.39 These campaigns receive important
support from La Nueva Provincia, the most important daily newspaper in the
province of Buenos Aires, whose strategy is to reproduce the political and judicial
actions carried out by the associations that seek justice for the victims of state
terrorism. CELTYV tries to be the opposite number of the Centro de Estudios
Legales y Sociales, or CELS (in English, ‘‘Center for Legal and Social Studies’’),
one of the most important human-rights organizations in Argentina and throughout
Latin America.
Another figure who regained visibility in the context of this renewal of Argentine
negationism is the journalist Juan Bautista ‘‘Tata’’ Yofre, director of the Secretariat
of State Intelligence (SIDE) during Carlos S. Meném’s first administration. A series
of books that achieved great sales success, in which Yofre suggests understanding
state terrorism as a ‘‘low-intensity war’’ and an unavoidable response to the violence
carried out by armed organizations, is the outcome of his pen and of his trajectory
through SIDE.40 In his books, Yofre constantly highlights the magnitude of the
violence carried out by guerrilla groups and stresses that it occurred within a constitutional context; his aim is to exculpate General Juan Perón’s last government
and the armed forces with respect to the application of state terrorism as a means
to put an end to the political violence experienced in Argentina toward 1976. His
argument is—conscious or unconsciously—a restatement of the ‘‘theory of the
two demons,’’ which, in Yofre’s case, serves the ends that negationism pursues:
according to his reasoning, state terrorism is converted into a sort of sought and
deserved punishment.41
One of the most recent additions to the ranks of negationism is CELTYV
(mentioned above), presided over by the lawyer Victoria Villarruel. This entity tries
to reproduce the model of its Spanish almost-namesake, the Asociación Vı́ctimas del
Terrorismo (‘‘association of victims of terror’’), which focuses on the consequences of
the actions of the armed Basque group ETA. CELTYV presents its raison d’être and
its activities as a response to the needs of victims of guerrilla violence during
the 1970s; its activities focus on seeking comparability between victims of state
terrorism and victims of actions by guerrilla organizations, particularly with respect
to legal recognition in pursuit of legal reparations. Along with organizing and
sponsoring various commemorative events in honor of those vindicated as their
‘‘own’’ dead, CELTYV provides legal advice and encourages its members to launch
lawsuits against the state demanding compensations for the loss of their relatives
and friends in what they have defined as the ‘‘war against subversion.’’ The activities
of this association corroborate the changes pointed out above: by prioritizing the
definition of terrorism, CELTYV restores the de facto government’s initial characterization, in its report El terrorismo en la Argentina, in assessing repressive state
actions.
Another recent arrival to the negationist dispute—also confirming the trend of
renewal mentioned above—is Leandro Viotto Romano (b. 1985), a young law student
at the Instituto Universitario de la Policı́a Federal Argentina (University Institute of
the Argentine Federal Police) who is linked to national deputy Nora Ginzburg of the
Frente por los derechos ciudadanos (a group detached from the RECREAR party).
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Advising this legislator on commissions on criminal legislation and internal security,
Viotto Romano is the author, among other minor works of the same tone, of the book
Silencio de mudos. La subversión en Argentina (1959–2005) de las armas al poder
institucional y polı́tico (in English, ‘‘Silence of the Deaf: Subversion in Argentina
(1959–2005), from Arms to Institutional and Political Power’’). Following a first selfpublished edition, the book was republished by Dunken and, according to Viotto
Romano, has since gone through five more editions. In this case the negationist
proposal is radicalized, freed from any demand of memory. According to the back
cover of Silencio de mudos, the text
debunks the myth of the 30,000 disappeared, unmasks the real violators of human
rights, and exposes the current Kirchnerist public servants who, in certain circumstances, did not hesitate to rise up against constitutional governments. Other
extreme-left personages such as Hebe de Bonafini and Estela Carlotto are not
excluded from the analysis in this book.42

For a partial list of Argentinean negationist Web sites see Table 1.

Table 1: Some Argentine negationist Web sites
Organization

URL

Movimiento por la Verdadera Historia
(‘‘Movement for true history’’), established
in 2008

http://www.verdaderahistoria.com/
blog/?paged=2

Asociación de familiares y amigos de los
presos polı́ticos de Argentina (‘‘Association of relatives and friends of Argentine
political prisoners’’), est. 2006

http://afyappa.blogspot.com/

Unión de Promociones (‘‘Union of promotions’’), est. 2005

http://www.energyworld.org/UP/

Asociación de Abogados por la Justicia y
la Concordia (‘‘Lawyers’ association for
justice and concord’’), est. 2006

http://www.justiciayconcordia.org/

B1. Vitamina para la memoria de la
Guerra en los ’70 (‘‘B1: Vitamin for the
memory of the war in the 1970s’’), est.
2007

http://b1memoria.blogspot.com/

Comisión de homenaje permanente a los
muertos por la subversión (‘‘Permanent
commission to honor the dead by subversion’’), est. 2006

http://energyworld.org/anita/index.htm

La historia paralela (‘‘Parallel history’’),
est. 2006

http://www.lahistoriaparalela.com.ar/

La botella al mar (‘‘Message in a bottle’’),
est. 2000

http://www.labotellaalmar.com.ar/

La caja de Pandora (‘‘Pandora’s box’’),
date unknown

http://www.lacajadepandoraonline.com/
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Some Preliminary Conclusions
Manipulating the past for political purposes is a long tradition in Argentina.
Revisionists of all kinds have used this resource to captivate their audiences—in
uniform or out of it—particularly in periods of crisis. Nevertheless, what I have
here called ‘‘Argentine negationism’’ goes beyond the boundaries of any revisionism.
During the stage that Argentina is currently going through, the disputes supported
by local negationists are part of their fierce opposition to current efforts at discovering the fate of many detained-disappeared people. Argentine negationism is, in this
sense, an attempt to obstruct the job of judging and punishing the perpetrators of
state terrorism. To reverse the judicial situation of many military personnel and
members of the security forces for their involvement in crimes against humanity
is—currently—the ultimate goal of Argentine negationist activism.
‘‘A small but fierce sect,’’ to adopt a definition by Pierre Vidal-Naquet, Argentine
negationism also tries to appropriate historical description of the 1970s in order
to provide another element that facilitates the exculpation of perpetrators of state
terrorism before society. From a macro-structural view, the epiphenomenon that
local negationism embodies presents itself as a sample of how Argentine society
relates to this past, at the same time traumatic and recent.
For the above-mentioned reasons, I consider that in Argentina, in the case of
misrepresentation of the recent past as ‘‘war’’ instead of state terrorism, we cannot
speak about ‘‘revisionism’’; but we can extrapolate the notion of negationism to
characterize the groups and individuals who argue that in the 1970s Argentina was
waging a war against ‘‘communism’’ and that the government’s crimes against
humanity were committed during this war, or that they did not exist (‘‘It is a lie of
those defeated in the ‘war’ ’’). These groups are not revisionists; rather, those whom I
have called ‘‘negationists’’ do not investigate the past to build their narrative of the
recent past but, instead, use all possible means to install their version of history and
to deny the reality of state terrorism.
The revision of the immediate past implies a job in which historians should
become even more involved. The life and work of Pierre Vidal-Naquet constitute
an example of how to tackle the question of negationism from within the discipline
of history; they also show the professional and political path that we should
follow as historians. Whatever the historical and social context may be, manipulation
and distortion of the past represents nothing more than a political response to a
series of historical problems. Fortunately, the truth is indestructible, in spite of
negationists.43
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antisémite (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1999).
Robert Faurisson, ‘‘Le ‘problème des chambres à gaz,’ ’’ Défense de l’Occident, June 1978,
33–9.
Vidal-Naquet, Los asesinos de la memoria, 92–102.
Igounet, Histoire du négationnisme en France, 457–88.
Nadine Fresco, ‘‘Négationnisme,’’ in Encyclopædia Universalis (2004),
http://www.universalis.fr/corpus2-encyclopedie/117/0/C010139/encyclopedie/
NEGATIONNISME.htm (accessed 2 June 2010).
The dissertation was removed from the history department of a Parisian university and
transferred to the French department in Nantes, where the members of Roquès’s defense
committee were not experts in history, were personally related to the candidate, and, in
two cases, were extreme-right activists. For further information on the affaire Roquès see
Igounet, Histoire du négationnisme en France, 407–20.
For reasons of length, the outline offered here is incomplete. There have since been
other incidents that demonstrate the survival of negationism in France. One of the most
resonant had its epicenter, once again, at the University of Lyon; this time it was a professor of literature and Japanese culture who supported and encouraged anti-Semitic and
negationist research. The French government gave the historian Henry Rousso the task
of investigating this case and, based on Rousso’s report, decreed the dismissal of the professor, who was an important member of the National Front.
This is an incipient discussion within academia, and, in this article, neither the word
‘‘revolution’’ nor any of its derivations is used to characterize the 1970s in Argentina.
Guillermo O’Donnell suggests the category of ‘‘popular activation’’ to define the combination of social protest and armed protest as generators of violence within the framework of
a long proscription (1955–1973) of the majority party in Argentina. Marı́a José Moyano
has reintroduced, expanded, and developed this approach. See Guillermo O’Donnell,

171

Genocide Studies and Prevention 5:2 August 2010

21.

22.

23.
24.

25.
26.

27.
28.
29.
30.

31.
32.

33.
34.

35.
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Compulsory military service (CMS) was in place in Argentina from 1902 to 1995.
Although its abolition was directly linked to the murder of soldier Omar Carrasco,
the prosecution of this case of violence should not ignore the pre-existing opposition movement that developed toward the end of the last dictatorship (1976–
1983). Within the context of a wider debate on the functioning of conscription, in
November 1983 a group of human-rights activists launched the Opposition Front
against the CMS (FOSMO). This article examines FOSMO’s history, which offers
insight into the hypothesis that, under certain historical and political circumstances, human-rights activists can not only contribute to debate but challenge
and limit state violence through a series of political and legal strategies. The
author analyzes the links (people, arguments, disputes) that FOSMO constructed,
first, to question a strongly rooted institution in young men’s socialization (and
highly significant in the building of masculinity); second, to denounce not the
‘‘failures’’ or ‘‘excesses’’ but the logic of the operation and the values and violent
practices that organized it; and, finally, to seek institutional channels to achieve
the abolition of this compulsory system.
Key words: compulsory military service, freedom of conscience, human-rights
activism

Introduction
Compulsory military service (CMS) was in effect in Argentina from 1902 to 1995.1
That is, for almost 100 years, young men aged twenty (after 1977, aged eighteen),
selected by drawing lots and declared physically and mentally ‘‘fit,’’ received a period
of military training through the Armed Forces. Although the abolition of CMS was
directly linked with the murder of soldier Omar Carrasco (which occurred at a
military base in the province of Neuquén on 6 March 1994),2 the active prosecution
of this case of violence should not obscure the existence of a prior opposition movement that began toward the end of the last dictatorship (1976–1983). In November
1983, in the context of a wider debate on the functioning of conscription, a group of
human-rights activists known as the Opposition Front against the CMS (FOSMO)
launched its movement. Unlike other means of evading conscription (through legitimate channels involving military personnel), FOSMO became a political organization
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that built a series of arguments challenging conscription based on the concept of
‘‘freedom of conscience.’’ 3
In this article, I will show how, through the struggle initiated by Eduardo
Pimentel (and focusing on FOSMO), the ongoing agenda of the human-rights movement was expanded. In this line of analysis, FOSMO’s history offers insight into the
hypothesis that, under certain historical and political circumstances, human-rights
activism, through a series of political and legal strategies, can challenge and limit
state violence.4 I will also show that human-rights organizations are not created or
founded but acquire their unique identity through their singular political actions.5

‘‘Freedom of Conscience’’: A Family Decision
During a press conference on 7 April 1983, Eduardo Pimentel, one of founding
members of the Permanent Assembly for Human Rights (APDH), and his family
announced their decision to stop their son Ignacio from complying with the CMS,
protecting themselves through the exercise of the patria potestad—a parent’s right
to custody. The family’s refusal to let their children comply with the CMS was linked
to a broader debate at the end of the Malvinas (Falklands) War and the decline of
the dictatorial regime: between 1982 and 1983, the continuity of conscription was
one of the issues on the APDH’s agenda.
Pimentel said that he had presented a legal document on 2 November 1982 and
an annex addressed to the illegitimate president, Reynaldo Bignone, a few weeks
afterwards on 13 January 1983. Pimentel pointed out that the legal contradiction
between the CMS law, which ‘‘involves the child but not the father,’’ and the idea
that patria potestad refers to a minor’s ‘‘guardian.’’ He also alleged ‘‘religious, moral
and political’’ reasons: ‘‘I teach my children in my family not to kill; so I cannot hand
my son over to people who will teach him that his duty is to kill the enemy, when
the gospel tells us that we have to love them.’’ 6
I intend to exercise the right of patria potestad, but what obliges me in conscience to
act as I do is the right of a responsible parent, and primarily before God and before
men, that comes to us in a divine and natural way. . . Our responsibility as parents
obliges us to be coherent and not to contradict ourselves, to bear witness to our faith
and our thinking . . . How, then, can we combine all due respect for parents and
teenage behavior when he or she sees that such respect has not been respected?
Deciding to kill a man is a serious problem of conscience. If your parents say, ‘‘You
shall not kill,’’ and the state orders you to ‘‘kill the enemy,’’ both of which are imposed
on the youth, what comes next?7

However, Pimentel said, together with these moral and religious reasons, the
legal arguments became an excellent resource to encourage a debate within the
judicial system: ‘‘It is the first time that a case of this kind has been presented . . .
My conclusion, based on Article 275 of Velez Sarfield’s code, is different. It explicitly
mentions patria potestad when deciding whether the child will or will not comply
with the CMS.’’ 8 After this press conference, Ignacio Pimentel was summoned to
the Military District on 18 March, where Colonel Lujan informed him that the
commander in chief had ruled that ‘‘custody’’ extended only to volunteers and not to
those required to comply with the CMS. In light of this ruling, Ignacio was called
to appear for his medical examination and his subsequent enlistment in March.
Eduardo explained that when the order came, the entire family made a decision
and accompanied Ignacio to the regiment:
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When we arrived . . . we had a verbal confrontation with a lieutenant colonel . . . The
point is that after arguing heatedly for about ten minutes, the lieutenant colonel
informs me that they will keep Ignacio. Imagine my reaction. I said, ‘‘You have all
the power to trample on my patria potestad and contradict my decision, but I assure
you this is very serious and I will not give up my struggle.’’ I left the place and
initiated a fast; my wife followed. After two hours, my son called home to announce
that he had been exempted ‘‘owing to a physical problem.’’ I do not really care about
the actual reasons why the ruling military district managed to reach that resolution.
The thing is that they have done it; they have respected my authority as a parent.9

Faced with this ‘‘abnormal’’ case (the appeal to ‘‘custody’’ and ‘‘freedom of
conscience’’), and to avoid a more serious conflict, the military authorities attempted
to use a well-known mechanism to ‘‘exempt’’ Pimentel’s son by declaring him ‘‘unfit’’
during the medical examination. Despite the military authorities’ decision, Eduardo
Pimentel took his case to the prosecutor: ‘‘I am conducting a thorough study of
the subject with two attorneys to determine the reasons for the opposition [to the
CMS]’’ and, by bringing the issue to a non-military environment, let them be
‘‘the judges [who] respond to our questions.’’ 10 In this sense, Pimentel stated, ‘‘It is
a paradox that the patria potestad enables parents to prevent their children from
pursuing a military career but is useless when an entire family opposes a young
man’s conscription.’’ 11 Not satisfied with the outcome of his son’s case, he launched
a movement for ‘‘freedom of conscience.’’ The goal was for his son’s case to have a
multiplier effect—to have a strong political impact rooted in the exercise of freedom
of conscience.
This article assumes that the concept of ‘‘human rights’’ is not meaningful
enough in the abstract and that how this notion is translated in practice depends
on power relations forged in local contexts.12 That is, while human rights is
in theory a self-proclaimed universal value, it is in fact culturally and politically
interpreted and can be modified so that its meaning depends on how the concept
is politically articulated in specific contexts.13 In Argentina, the conformation of
the human-rights movement has not only built a series of demands on the systematic
violation of human rights during the last dictatorship but also played a central
role in defining the term ‘‘human rights.’’ 14 During the first years of Argentina’s
democratic transition, the issue of human rights was intimately tied to the ‘‘problem
of the disappeared’’ during the last Argentine military dictatorship.15
The human-rights movement was a heterogeneous group of social figures that
actively encouraged resistance against the state violence, penal persecution, and
social condemnation generated during the dictatorship. In this way, the movement actively reported and denounced the conformation of the terrorist state16 —
structured by the Doctrine of National Security (DNS)17 —and the kidnappings and
disappearances of people as a repressive modality executed clandestinely by the
military forces.18 One of the acts denounced by the human-rights movement was
the disappearance of conscripts during the last dictatorship: in 1982, the Center for
Legal and Social Studies (CELS) documented the disappearance of more than 100
soldiers conscripted under the CMS. Even though the military authorities explained
the absences as off-duty days, ‘‘releases,’’ absences without leave, or ‘‘away on official
business,’’ applying the administrative procedure for cases of ‘‘desertion,’’ CELS
demonstrated that the missing soldiers had been kidnapped by the military forces
and that most of them were still missing.19
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Pimentel, in his struggle to abolish the CMS and to promote freedom of
conscience, sought to extend the boundaries of what are socially understood as
violations of human rights. Although the complaint was associated with the systematic disappearances of conscripts between 1976 and 1983, Pimentel attempted to
expand the universe of issues and problems that the Argentine human-rights agenda
had to incorporate, analyze, and legitimize for society in a post-dictatorship context.
His struggle can be understood only within the context of the transition to
democracy and the previous experience of the human-rights movement against state
terrorism and its crimes. This movement no longer existed, but it gave citizens
the tools to challenge state violence, together with a series of political and legal
strategies and political experiences to endow it with authority and prestige.
In Argentine human-rights organizations, the figure of the relative was central.
‘‘Putting forward primordial bonds (initially seen as ‘non-political,’ as they are their
own bonds in the private sphere or the domestic arena) managed to legitimize their
spaces in public intervention.’’ 20 In this sense,
the dictatorship claimed a family discourse intended to assign parents an individual
responsibility for the safety of their children—whom the terrorist state itself was
killing and making disappear—privatizing in this way families’ responsibility to
safeguard and control their children. By positioning and referring to themselves
as ‘‘relatives,’’ the human-rights activists politicized their family bonds with the
victims.21

In the case of the struggle Pimentel initiated, we also see a father invoking the
status of relative to legitimize his claim, appealing to freedom of conscience as a way
to prevent his son from complying with the CMS. However, in this case the person
who began this conflict was a male parent; by contrast, the majority of relatives initiating human-rights organizations have been women, self-defined as ‘‘mothers.’’ 22
This is because, until 1985, patria potestad was the right of men or, in the case
of women, the right of single mothers and widows.23 However, other factors may
explain the appeal of the father’s position, which gave rise to new meanings and
resistance methods. This strategy was also part of the previous experience of the
human-rights movement, which had succeeded in appropriating, giving new meaning
to, and rejecting the traditional family model in the discourse of the last dictatorship.24 This model—in which the family was the basic unit of the nation, and the
nation was conceived of as the ‘‘big family’’—linked the social structure to the
biological order, giving natural characteristics to roles and social values:
The concept of the nation as a family . . . led to a definition of the political relationship
between the state and citizens as family members, so that citizenship rights and
duties were replaced by filial obedience. The official discourse painted citizens as
immature children who needed the guidance of a firm father. This nation-family
model followed the traditional Catholic model . . . [in which] the father is the head of
the family and the mother is the one who both nourishes the family and safeguards
traditional values.25

Pimentel added that the appeal to this series of moral values also questions the
foundations of the armed forces’ family model. Máximo Badaró, in his research on
the National Military School (NMS), explains that ‘‘the use of the family metaphor
allows us, in turn, to invoke a model of social relations that positions the Army as
the ‘protective father’ or ‘guardian’ for the whole of Argentinean society.’’ 26
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The military family that is recreated in the NMS is a patrilineal family in which
children must obey and imitate the father. The freshman enters a model of social
organization that represents positions associated with the figure of a father who holds
the power to transmit knowledge and punishments and with subordinate positions
associated with the place of the children.27

So it was the ‘‘father’’ and ‘‘the guardian of your children,’’ and not a mother’s
place, that gave Pimentel the authority and prestige to challenge compulsory
conscription while opening up an area of dispute to explain what that role meant
socially.
As noted in subsequent reports to Pimentel, the arguments against the CMS’s
requirement were enriched by the Christian interpretation of violence, the defense
of the family, the patria potestad, and a series of anti-war and pacifists arguments:
‘‘Through acts of war, the youth are taught a kind of historical linkage. This occurs
in the majority of educational, military, and non-military institutions . . . In Christianity, which is my faith, but also before and after, these anti-war testimonies have
taken place.’’ 28 Another issue was the criticism of the inculcation of a male warrior
mentality:
Therefore, military institutions should be integrated with people with vocation. I
do not say professionally, because this professional definition includes concepts of
military effectiveness that I reject. What I want is a guardian of weapons; the soldier
should guard the weapons, not to kill but to prevent from killing, to prevent their use
and for the prevention of injustice, such as we suffer today.29

However, rather than ‘‘conscientious objection,’’ Pimentel preferred to call his
son’s and his family’s attitude ‘‘freedom of conscience’’: ‘‘The freedom of the young,
and of the family. I have relied on this family right, which is a basic state institution,
recited as such, but unknown regarding the facts . . . This family institution has to be
effectively recognized.’’ 30 He later wrote that
freedom of conscience, conscientious objection, enshrined by the Second Vatican
Council, ‘‘everyone should consequently follow their conscience,’’ tells us that we
cannot obey any order, and much less so those concerning murder. Thus, the CMS
law is immoral according to Vatican II and commits an outrage against human
rights.31

Once the Pimentel family’s decision had been made public, other parents
and young people followed their strategy. Stojan Tercic, father of Alejandro, communicated his decision not to authorize his son’s compliance with the CMS to the
illegitimate president, protecting himself with the exercise of patria potestad. In
the letter he sent to the de facto president, he argued, ‘‘According to my conscience
and exercising the patria potestad, I have decided not to allow my son Alejandro to
answer the call for conscription. My decision is based on the belief that the CMS is
opposed to God’s law, which says ‘Thou shall not kill,’ and there is no law above
God’s law.’’ 32 Fernando Angel Portillo, father of a young man from the 1965 military
service cohort, sent a letter to the constitutional president, Raúl Alfonsı́n, explaining
his opposition to his son’s compliance with the CMS, based on the principles of the
Constitution, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and ‘‘my Christian conscience’s mandate.’’ 33 At this point, and with the constitutional authorities in office,
Portillo was the fourth father to appeal to patria potestad to prevent his son from
complying with the CMS.
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FOSMO: From Family Decision to Political Struggle
Thanks to the impact that these cases acquired, on 13 November 1983, after
the presidential elections of 28 October (the constitutional government was to take
office on 10 December), FOSMO was constituted—conceived as a ‘‘pluralistic and
ecumenical’’ institution seeking to concentrate persons and celebrities, groups
and organizations, whose purpose was to fight for the abolition of the CMS. To
replace the requirement of military service, they proposed ‘‘substitute activities,
such as a social or civil service controlled by other sectors of the state and not
by the armed forces.’’ 34 These would have the advantage of offering new ways to
socialize and ‘‘shape’’ Argentine youth in the light of the new ‘‘problems’’ that the
country was facing. Santiago Kovadloff, philosopher and member of FOSMO, argued
in favor of an ‘‘optional service’’ and enumerated the benefits of implementing this
new system:
An adult . . . is one who, in essence, is already in a position to decide what is good and
what is not good for him. He should not be deprived of the opportunity to comply with
the CMS, if desired. But there is no reason to force him to do it . . . If any obligation
must now govern civilian and military conduct, it is that of acquiring, primarily, a
substantial republican training in order to enable them all equally to consolidate the
democratic demands of today.35

In FOSMO’s founding document, the first area of dispute was the interweaving
of violent practices involving what the CMS had accomplished and its relationship
with the male morality of war that, during the twentieth century, had permeated
Argentinean society. While denouncing the soldier’s subjugation to a ‘‘regime of
severe discipline with physical, mental, and moral violence’’ by military personnel
(with no real chance of repelling the arbitrary and humiliating acts of which he is
the object), FOSMO questioned the adoption of a ‘‘military mentality, with a different and even opposite code of values to the rest of society,’’ that led to an ‘‘obsessive
cult of military values.’’ However, far from denouncing the violence as an excess or a
problem of the people in charge of the institution, they criticized the ‘‘structural
character’’ of the institution, whose purpose was to ‘‘intervene in the social body’’:
CMS’s characteristics do not arise as a consequence of the institution’s malfunctioning. On the contrary, they are the result of one of the main aims that was assigned
to it at the time of its creation in 1901. Indeed, those who designed the current
system assigned the CMS two main functions: one, to constitute a school for the
citizenry’s morality, turning the army into ‘‘a powerful instrument to create public
morality’’; and the other, to act as an antidote against cosmopolitism in a society
composed of immigrants and the children of foreigners.36

In a document published by FOSMO, Pedro Vendramin, another member,
analyzed the CMS’s creation in 1901. He quotes Mariano Demarı́a, a congressional
representative, in reference to a talk at the Military Academy in 1915 by Manuel
Carle: ‘‘The officer feels that the nation has entrusted him with ‘the redemption of
the uneducated, ignorant, and evil conscript, who is an Argentinean at birth but
barbaric with respect to his condition, which is a threat to social stability and a
threat to our culture.’’ 37
In fact, it targeted the cabecita negras,38 the indigenous populations, and the children
of immigrants. It was about straightening out ideas or injecting nationalism to
supposedly stateless people or to the children of European exiles like anarchists. And
so, generation after generation, thousands of conscripts joined the army or navy—the

179

Genocide Studies and Prevention 5:2 August 2010

air force appeared much later [in 1950]—and, in this way, military society counted on
the military service requirement to keep young people within its grasp, in order
to teach them a value system that threatens civil institutions and the values of
the people and that leaves the Constitution defenseless, and to provoke a series of
seditious acts aimed at overthrowing several governments.39

Soldiers were not ‘‘simple civilians who had to be instructed in warfare but
foreigners who had to be nationalized, barbarians who had to be civilized. This
‘nationalization’ really only served to tame them, discipline them through different
violent practices, ‘subdue the soldier’ (a phrase repeated in the barracks), by teaching
discipline with ‘non-pedagogical’ methods, military training, long walks, physical
punishment . . . , automatic responses, loss of personal identity, uniforms. . . .’’ 40 The
slogan ‘‘subordination and courage’’ should be interpreted as ‘‘subordination to the
whims of the uniformed professional’’ and denounced: this progressive loss of rights
permeated the ‘‘violent methods’’ which were applied to soldiers and led to the
deaths of some conscripts. Another FOSMO member, Alfredo Grande, highlighted
the fact that FOSMO’s work was no longer to seek exceptions to the rule but, rather,
to modify the rule, and invited others to join this movement: ‘‘You will fight for your
child, but not just for him.’’ 41
Because the CMS was actually a long-term bureaucratic institution, with its own
structures, constitution, and organization for its members, norms, and rules,42 what
the FOSMO wanted to do was to reveal the continual management that conscripts
had to put up with, whether under a dictatorship or in a democracy. They thus
demonstrated that from the beginning, the compulsory military system had the
effect of normalizing military discipline throughout society, so that the punishments
delivered in the barracks were seen as a normal part of military discipline:43
Control over time and movement helped to discipline bodies during long waiting
periods that encouraged a false immobility, forced marches, fast runs, the rigid
schedule that deliberately cuts the most intimate times; the acceptance and approval
of nonsensical orders that block critical thinking are the procedures imposed by every
military hierarchy.44

FOSMO’s Opposition
This active movement involving the CMS generated various forms of opposition to
FOSMO. For example, Edward Siutti wrote a letter to the editor of the newspaper
Tiempo Argentino in March 1984:
I think like my sons’ father and like my father’s son that to die to defend a piece of
my country, regardless of who the ruler is, however small and insignificant it may
be, is perhaps the best death which any well-born man can claim. Of all the opinions
the only one worth highlighting is that of Eduardo Pimentel . . . Not only is he, and
I give good value and weight to what I say, a coward, but from his cowardice a
coward’s family discourse emerges, and he intends to make it public, urging the
youth, who are already confused, to the most ignoble desertion . . . Peace is a major
achievement, but not at the expense of honor. And for a true patriot, national honor
and one’s own honor are the same thing.45

As this excerpt shows, the authorized position from which to defend the CMS was that
of ‘‘my sons’ father and my father’s son,’’ a ‘‘well-born man’’ (a man who could aspire
to a ‘‘heroic death’’ in battle). A man—even the father of sons—who opposed conscription was a ‘‘coward,’’ a man whose masculinity was deeply questioned. Eduardo
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Pimentel wrote a lengthy letter, published in the same newspaper, in which he took
a clearly anti-war stand and highlighted the naturalization of military socialization
among Argentine youth: ‘‘My principles are different. I do not kill and will not kill
any man . . . War is a crime, every war is unjust, and those who cause it are
criminals.’’ 46
Members of civil society strongly questioned the human-rights movement when
it began to focus on the treatment of conscripts, who continued to be tortured and
degraded and who had become the objects of state violence even under democratic
government. This opposition arose because the movement dared to challenge a
strongly rooted institution, in existence for more than eighty years, that also
represented a highly meaningful experience for significant sectors of society. Since
its creation in Argentina, large proportions of society considered conscription a rite
of passage into male adulthood through the inculcation of a warrior mentality. At
the same time, it played a role in the sense of belonging to—or exclusion from–the
Argentine nation. Being a ‘‘man’’ and (therefore) being an Argentinean citizen (hypostatized in the fetish of having a libreta de enrolamiento, an identification card
for men) were conditions that had been obtained by fulfilling the ‘‘duty’’ of military
service (having first been declared ‘‘fit’’). By surviving and living through this
experience, one obtained this dual status.
However, other sectors in society made concerted efforts to avoid military service:
to ‘‘escape’’ the draw, to be declared ‘‘unfit’’ in the medical examination, or to become
conscientious objectors (e.g., the Jehovah’s Witnesses). Others tried to pay off
military and medical authorities to make exceptions or be declared unfit, or to ease
their way through military training through friends or close connections with
military personnel. Among other reasons, conscription had become a space where
soldiers were often used in a domestic capacity by the military—giving rise to the
term ‘‘co-lim-ba,’’ short for corre–limpia–barre (‘‘run, clean, sweep’’); state violence
was naturalized or was considered ‘‘a waste of time.’’
Thus, questioning this ritual was tantamount to challenging the virility of those
who fell under criticism. This was so because, as Henrietta Moore stresses, Western
discourses about sexuality and gender construct women and men as different types
of people. In Western cultures, Moore writes, ‘‘male sexuality and persons of
the male gender are portrayed as active, aggressive . . . and powerful; while female
sexuality and persons of the female gender are seen as essentially passive, powerless, submissive, and receptive.’’ 47 These powerful dual discourses permeate society,
and those who question them can be accused of not fulfilling the roles, attitudes,
and daily socially constructed (self-)representations assigned to men and women.
This explains the disparagement of Pimentel: being catalogued as a ‘‘coward’’ was
synonymous with being passive, weak, submissive, and feminine.
Against this active debate, the commander-in-chief of the Army published an
annex to the Revista de Educación Militar in which he posited that the war for
‘‘our’’ Malvinas Islands (in which a volunteer army had faced a conscripted army)
had raised the issue of ‘‘replacing our current conscription system with a volunteer
system to fill the ranks’’ for the armed forces, politicians, and society to consider.
It was felt that the mandatory system had worked ‘‘with particular effectiveness’’
for eighty years and that it maintained its ‘‘validity’’ and was suited to ‘‘modern
principles.’’ His final conclusions harshly questioned those who opposed the CMS:
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(e) In light of the analysis of global trends, the references that are currently heard
from those who are promoting the merits of volunteer services . . . are far from
real.
(f ) The experiences of some countries that have opted for voluntary service . . .
highlight the breakdown of discipline, the high costs that the system involves,
and, in particular, the danger that citizens lose interest in national defense.
It does not appear logical or desirable for our country that its adoption be advocated
under the exclusive influence of a ‘‘Malvinas Syndrome’’ at this time.

While recognizing that not ‘‘everything must be kept as it is’’ and that there were
‘‘many aspects that can and must be improved,’’ the article damned those who
criticized the operation of the CMS:
Finally, on a subject in which everyone feels empowered to express opinions and value
judgments, today, more than ever, the old proverb holds: ‘‘speak little about what
you know and nothing about what you do not know.’’ 48

The Launch: ‘‘Every war is unjust’’
On 6 August 1984 at 5 p.m., the thirty-ninth anniversary of the Hiroshima bombing,
the members of FOSMO held a demonstration at the Plaza de los dos Congresos to
‘‘abolish the CMS.’’ It was the launch of FOSMO at the doors of the Congress. The
slogans read ‘‘For freedom of conscience’’, ‘‘For the right of families to educate their
children’’, and ‘‘For the demilitarization of society’’, ‘‘For more food for the world and
fewer weapons of war.’’ Clearly, FOSMO did not define themselves as conscientious
objectors but were fighting for ‘‘freedom of conscience’’; they appealed to the right of
the family to challenge the CMS and consolidated their pacifist and anti-war stance.
This was the pillar on which the opposition rested.
The main speaker was Eduardo Pimentel, who also presented the main points of
the petition49 that would be read before the National Congress:
We, the Opposition Front against the CMS, have adopted the abolition of the CMS as
our only goal. And for several reasons: because the CMS upholds the institution
of slavery, and this cannot be, because it has been abolished. We call for its abolition
because we want the freedom of conscience to be respected, the freedom of each
person. The liberty of parents who have borne men to educate them as their conscience commands and not as mandated by the politicians in power; this is real, and
this is what I demand: ‘‘no one, no instrument, warlike as it may be, is going to tread
on my rights.’’ 50

On 9 August, three days after the demonstration, Eduardo Pimentel died at the
age of sixty-one. Three of his sons took up his struggle. That is, a father’s struggle
for freedom of conscience was ultimately inherited by three of his children. In its
Bulletin of October 1984, FOSMO wrote to the then president,
We are on the same path, the path Eduardo Pimentel began when he turned his back
on his two sons’ call for conscription. And we will follow that path. Although some
think that Eduardo cannot guide us any longer, they are wrong. The true guide is an
idea, generous and just ideas. Beyond death, they shall live. In those who make these
ideas their own, developing them and taking action. In this regard, we have all been
their children and will continue to be.
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The Deaths of Conscripts
One of the first members of FOSMO was Eudoro Palacio, whose son Mario Daniel, a
conscript of the 1964 cohort, died on 24 April 1983 in the Artillery Regiment Los
Polvorines at the age of eighteen. The army’s official version was that he died from
‘‘non-traumatic cardiac arrest resulting from liver and kidney failure,’’ but his
companions had a different version: ‘‘He died after a savage beating at the hands of
several officers. He was tortured, according to witnesses, and received no medical
treatment.’’ 51 For FOSMO, however, Mario Daniel’s case was not the only one to
be analyzed; it was incorporated into a broader complaint about everyday CMS
routines: ‘‘Physical abuse in the CMS is the rule rather than the exception,’’ as
some claimed, ‘‘and the deaths of soldiers’’ were rarely made public.
But nobody can tell us that these are accidents or the defects of a system that needs
correcting. We hold that all the deaths and violence are the inevitable result of
the system. The inevitable result of the need to ‘‘bend,’’ to teach young soldiers
‘‘subordination and courage.’’ The inevitable result that occurs when some young
men do not accept humiliation or gratuitous violence, or when their bodies just do
not tolerate that particular way of ‘‘making us men.’’ 52

In Vidas Precarias, Judith Butler discusses the characteristics of a particular
form of violence, that which targets ‘‘unrealistic lives.’’ Butler suggests that in
certain social contexts and under certain historic conditions, certain deaths are
more painful than others, while other lives that are far from protected are more
vulnerable. This invisible and naturalized type of violence is aimed at a set of lives
that are not considered worthy of attention or worth preserving. The violent termination of such lives does not leave traces, because such deaths are not socially recognized
as losses and therefore do not merit an obituary or public mourning, since they do
not fit the dominant cultural framework of ‘‘human.’’ 53
If the possibilities of publicly authorized mourning reveal the rules that produce
the ‘‘human,’’ this differential distribution of grief makes it possible to render
invisible the effects of state violence.54 That is, there is a relationship between
the violence that puts an end to these lives, the definition of a universe of beings
recognized as ‘‘human’’ (and some others that are not), and the prohibition of public
mourning. Butler seems to say that extreme violence by the state, quiet, natural, and
even desired, can legitimately be exercised against those who have previously been
stripped of their status as ‘‘human’’ (or as ‘‘citizens’’?).
In this line of analysis, grief is not only the means by which a life becomes,
or stops being, a life to remember painfully but, at the same time, gathers and
recreates the national political community as it reveals the ties that bind us to
others and that make us who we are. Butler argues that we are constituted by
those deaths that we remember painfully, as well as by the deaths that we repress,
those faceless anonymous deaths that make up the gloomy background of our social
world.55 For her, the challenge lies in recognizing the vulnerability and suffering of
others (unevenly distributed throughout the world) and in taking collective responsibility for these lives and those deaths.
Butler constructs a national community with differential rights, lives, and deaths
that are more or less worthy, bodies that are more protected and those that are vulnerable to state violence. However, as we see in the Eudoro case, Butler’s argument
opens the door for activism and social mobilization: it removes the anonymity of
these deaths by means of a political struggle. FOSMO’s battle for public recognition
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of those unreal deaths made grief public; it proved itself as an effective mechanism
to expand the boundaries of citizenry and the meaning of ‘‘human’’ (and, in that
movement, the category ‘‘human rights’’).

The Bill
Despite this extensive debate, FOSMO’s mobilization, and the electoral promises of
the Radical Party, there was little change in the functioning of the CMS between
1983 and 1984. The Executive Power (EP) sent Congress a bill proposing an exception to the CMS where compliance was ‘‘incompatible’’ with ‘‘clear imperatives of
moral conscience and religion.’’ Those exempted would be required to carry out
some form of civil/community service for no less than one year under the coordination of an ad hoc committee.
Accompanying the EP’s proposal, FOSMO sent Congress a document containing
another bill on ‘‘conscientious objection,’’ based on their analysis of the official proposal. FOSMO’s members argued that ‘‘conscientious objection is not ‘just a state
of morally valuable affairs’ (as the message that accompanies the project . . . states),
but a strict moral right of citizens as stipulated in the Constitution. . . .’’ The FOSMO
document contained a significant systematization of the arguments opposing the
CMS and a refinement of the civil/community service proposal:
Conscientious objection does not intend to repeal the CMS but to repeal its compulsion, at least with respect to those for whom this service creates a serious conflict of
conscience. It is about solving legitimate subjective situations that are covered in the
spirit of the Constitution, of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and of
the Treaty of San José de Costa Rica, of which our country is a signatory.
Conscientious objection seeks not a privilege but justice, the exercise of a right. It
is not a dispensation of a public charge but a substitution of the content. Instead of
military service, a no less arduous civilian service, and, never lacking in our country,
as in any nation in the world, a field to serve for the purpose of a common good.56

The matching of the two types of service was intended to avoid ‘‘all kinds of discrimination’’ and ‘‘any action which may appear punitive’’ by the military; on the
other hand, it was also intended to ‘‘ensure . . . that it would not be used fraudulently
to evade constitutional duties.’’ Thus, ‘‘conscientious objection’’ and ‘‘civil service’’
would ‘‘benefit the social community and the citizens themselves.’’ 57 In an interview
with the newspaper La Voz, Defense Minister Horacio Jaunarena stressed that from
1983 the number of conscripts in the combined forces had been reduced (from 70,000
to 35,000),58 as had the probationary period for new conscripts. The ‘‘decompression
of the international situation due to the diminishing possibility of impending conflicts does not mean that we are defenseless,’’ Jaunarena said, ‘‘but it allows us to
plan our defense in a more orderly and rational way.’’ 59
However, it opposed the idea of an army composed solely of professional soldiers:
‘‘In an economic situation like ours it is very difficult to build a fully professional
armed forces . . . Personally, I believe that our CMS can be improved and that before
moving from one system to the other, it is necessary to carry out a good analysis of
recruitment costs.’’ 60
The EP administration sent Congress the CMS exemption bill on 20 August
1984. Five years later, the newspaper Nuevo Sur questioned the EP’s decision to
‘‘freeze’’ any modification of the CMS that might ‘‘irritate’’ the military.61 This situation was even more paradoxical: on 10 March 1988, the Argentine state voted for a
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resolution by the UN Human Rights Commission that called for states to recognize
‘‘conscientious objection’’ as a legitimate exercise of the right of freedom of thought,
conscience, and religion ‘‘and recommended the elaboration of a law including ways
to participate in civil service.’’ 62
Between 1984 and 1989, bills to regulate changes in the CMS multiplied, but all
met the same fate: they were not debated in Congress. The initiative was taken up
by the Christian Democrats’ congressional representative, Alberto Aramouni; he presented a bill on 21 June 1988 that contemplated a ‘‘community and alternative social
service.’’ This bill was opposed under pressure from the Ministry of Defense, however, which also blocked a debate of peronista Carlos Ruckauf ’s bill on the temporary
reduction of the CMS.63 A senator from the Radical Party, Antonio Berhongaray,
sought the Army’s opinion on a proposal he had presented that would exempt
‘‘conscientious objectors.’’ According to the newspaper Página 12, hours before the
Defense Committee issued an opinion on this project, Lt. Col. Ricardo Emilio
Degiampietro—the ‘‘link’’ between the Army and Congress—went to Berhongaray’s
office with a three-page top-secret report, unsigned and typed on paper without
letterhead.64 A partial list of arguments against those who opposed the CMS was
published in the newspaper:

e The pseudo-religious arguments are fallacious.
e The fulfillment of citizens’ military obligations is not only not opposed to but
fully reconciled with the Catholic faith.
e The proposal reflects an ideological view that works against the interests of
the Republic.
e Unfortunate are those whose social conscience is being undermined by
ideologues who, under the guise of pacifism, seek to disarm societies
materially and spiritually so they can be conquered by evil atheistic ideologies
that promote disarmament . . .
e Holding positions that lead to national vulnerability, particularly if they are
mediated by national legislators, would signify ‘‘treason to the nation’’ and be
an affront to the memory of all those who shed their blood for it.
e We should ask ourselves what the fate of our country would have been if its
finest sons, in the darkest hours of the Republic, who came to live or die for,
had allowed for conscientious objection.
e It would imply the subordination of an essential and indispensable
requirement—the CMS—to a quite subjective fact (‘‘a supposed deep
religious, philosophical, or moral conviction’’) that is impossible to confirm.
e Those who favor the objections should be reminded of the words that
Boabdil’s mother pronounced after the fall of Granada to Christian troops
led by Catholic monarchs in 1492: ‘‘Weep like a woman for what you could
not defend as a man.’’ 65

This situation revealed how strongly some members of the military corporation
resisted implementing any changes to the CMS and, in particular, their unwillingness to recognize the issue of ‘‘conscientious objection’’ as a collective and political
way to circumvent the CMS. Understanding that FOSMO’s goal was not to protest
‘‘excesses’’ but to question the very logic of the way this institution functioned, the
military corporation once again resorted to gendered language to challenge criticism
and legitimize their interests66 —‘‘Weep like a woman for what you could not defend
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as a man’’—portraying women as signifying weakness (crying) and men as warriors
(who know how to defend themselves from foreign enemies).

The Portillo Case
Fernando Portillo, among the first members of FOSMO, had tried to prevent his son,
Alfredo, from complying with the CMS by invoking the patria potestad. According to
Fernando, he had heard that his friend Eduardo Pimentel had presented an appeal
to prevent his children from complying with the CMS. He sent a letter to President
Raúl Alfonsı́n justifying his decision:
We do not emphasize the religious aspect; our principle is a moral one. We resist our
children’s being instructed in the use of weapons and prepared to kill fellow human
beings, whatever their religion. That is why we rely on Articles 275 and 276 of
the Civil Code, which clearly express . . . that children cannot leave home to enter
the military without parental consent. The following stipulates that if the children
leave the parental home, authorities can be asked to send them back.67

Following his father’s letter to the president, Alfredo Portillo received a letter
summoning him to appear at the offices of the Military District of Buenos Aires
under penalty of punishment. He did not do so. Once the administrative decision to
enforce the CMS was noted, Portillo’s case was sent to the judicial branch; five years
later, the Supreme Court ruled that there was no constitutional basis for his refusal
to comply with the CMS, even ‘‘reasons of conscience or deep conviction,’’ but
recognized his right to do so without bearing arms.68 This decision sparked an
intense debate. Alfredo’s parents were ‘‘dissatisfied’’ with the court ruling:
We are unhappy because we believe that no one can be forced in a civilized society . . .
[Instead,] it would be more beneficial to serve the country by carrying out a service
to help others. . . . Complying with the CMS is objectionable from every point of view,
although it tries to appear to be an act of serving the country . . . We propose a great
national debate, in which all of the sectors involved can participate.69

This ruling was not only widely discussed in the media but also aroused great
dissatisfaction among the military authorities. Brigadier General William Walter
alerted Defense Minister Horacio Jaunarena that ‘‘this ruling seriously worries
the heads of the Armed Forces General Staff, as it has made individual freedom—
specifically ‘freedom of conscience’—prevail above the common good of society,’’ and
predicted that ‘‘if similar cases were to happen in a chain reaction in a not-so-distant
future, the military service that citizens provide according to Law 17,531 would be
significantly affected.’’ Finally, Walter asked the defense minister to instruct the
attorney general, Andrés D’Alessio, to have prosecutors use ‘‘any means necessary
to prevent the recurrence of a ruling like the above.’’ 70
Taking the same position months after the Supreme Court ruling, in July 1989
Colonel Auditor Raúl Edgardo Semberoiz published an article on conscientious
objection in the Revista Militar.71 He questioned those who ‘‘opposed the obligation
to bear arms in defense of the country based on the fact of belonging to the Catholic
religion.’’ According to the objectors, conscription ‘‘could lead them to violate the
commandment ‘thou shall not kill’ ’’ based on ‘‘freedom of religion and conscience.’’
Semberoiz argued that ‘‘individual rights . . . should be legally protected as long as
they do not affect the common good, order, and public morality. In this way, these
requirements should be privileged to the detriment of the right that is temporarily
restricted.’’ He referred to conscientious objectors as ‘‘deserters’’:
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Allowing precedents like that of this young deserter . . . to start gaining ground in
Argentine justice could leave the inhabitants of the nation . . . absolutely defenseless,
causing serious harm to the good and order of the community, which must not be
attacked by external or internal dangers from an army of young people ‘‘armed’’ with
only a court ruling wrapped around their hands.72

In asserting a need to avoid precedents that could have a multiplier effect,
Semberoiz acknowledged the existence of a broader political movement behind
Portillo’s struggle that sought to modify the rule and not simply to achieve exceptions. One of his arguments was that military training for ‘‘defense’’ was an important element that, along with others, met the ‘‘goal of deterrence’’ and contributed
to ‘‘deterring attacks or aggressions of any kind’’: ‘‘We could say that people are
taught to use weapons to prevent deaths and not to produce them.’’ Unlike the rest
of the exceptions set out in the law, which are ‘‘more precise and easy to prove,’’ the
‘‘legitimacy’’ of conscientious objection ‘‘is not even legally recognized.’’
It is precisely this: there is no doubt that every time an objection based on religious
grounds is made, the content and scope of this foundation will have to be assessed,
because it is not easy simply to accept, as in this case, any fanciful interpretation of
a biblical text.73

Semberoiz argued that, unlike the ‘‘free examination’’ that the Protestant religions
allow, the ‘‘Word of God’’ for Catholics should be ‘‘interpreted according to the
dictates of the Holy Doctrine.’’ Here he stressed what he described as ‘‘an absolute
consistency from antiquity to the present’’: ‘‘The Catholic Church clearly explains
the commandment ‘Thou shall not kill’ and admits the existence of self-defense
[against the unjust aggressor] and a just war which obviously requires the use of
weapons.’’ Therefore, Semberoiz concluded,
it is not logical or consistent or honest to invoke the Catholic religion to escape
from the obligation to bear arms . . . The Church should submit the petitioner to an
ecclesiastical tribunal to determine whether the explicit codes of canon law and the
implicit rules of Christian dogma have been violated.74

Concluding Remarks
In this article I have reconstructed the history of FOSMO, an organization created in
1983 to fight Argentina’s compulsory military service and uphold the exercise of
freedom of conscience. I have shown how Eduardo Pimentel’s decision to prevent his
son from complying with the CMS (based on the exercise of patria potestad) spearheaded a broader movement that built a network of citizens, parents, and youth;
and how, at the same time, it set up a rich conceptual, political, and legal structure
to challenge the military conscription system and proposed the implementation of
civil/community service as an alternative. Although originally based on moral and
religious grounds, the arguments against the CMS garnered support and were mixed
with Christian views on violence, the defense of the family, and the patria potestad
and with arguments against war and for peace that appealed to human-rights discourse. The appeal to the courts, however, was a way to stave off punishment, and
it set a precedent by taking the struggle against conscription outside the military
sphere.
The experience of FOSMO also shows how the universe of issues and problems of
the human-rights agenda has been incorporated, expanded, analyzed, and legitimized
for society in a post-dictatorship framework. FOSMO showed how, from its historic
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origins through its day-to-day operations, the CMS had ‘‘nationalized’’ subaltern
groups through a series of disciplinary practices and the inculcation of a warring
male morale.
FOSMO’s struggle met with strong resistance because it challenged a strongly
rooted institution that promoted the socialization of youth (and was highly significant in building their masculinity). The system’s critics focused not on its failures
but on the logic of operation, values, and practices that organized it. In this sense,
FOSMO’s struggle jeopardized the ability of the military power apparatus to shape
youths par excellence. This helps explain the strong resistance to the implementation
of a law contemplating conscientious objection or even the possibility of performing a
form of national service without weapons.
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Máximo Badaró, Militares o ciudadanos. La formación de los oficiales del Ejército Argentino (Buenos Aires: Prometeo, 2009), 129 and 130.
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Editor’s Introduction
The second part of this issue of Genocide Studies and Prevention presents an essential article on the debates in the UN Security Council in 1994, which determined
whether or not to intervene in the Rwandan Genocide.
Karel Kovanda, who was the Czech Republic’s ambassador to the Security
Council during these debates, provides an insider’s account of the fascinating
and troubling discussions. The Czech Republic was a newly independent nation in
1994, and Kovanda participated in the debates as a non-permanent member of the
Security Council.
Kovanda’s discussion relies on internal documents from the Czech Foreign
Service as well as on his own private notes and published information. He lays out
the step-by-step evolution of the Rwandan tragedy and notes how the UN Secretariat
was receiving, and passing on to the Security Council, insufficient and biased information, while NGOs had more accurate accounts of what was taking place. For the
most part, he demonstrates that the Security Council spent most of its time focusing
on the war between the Rwandan government and the Rwandan Patriotic Front
(RPF) and paid little attention—about 20% of its time, he estimates—on UNAMIR.
It took weeks, according to Kovanda, for the Security Council to finally come to grips
with the genocide. Kovanda notes that he was the first to employ this term publicly
at an official UN meeting.
Kovanda’s discussion exposes the inner working of the Security Council during
a time of crisis. He also describes the mechanisms that, as he notes, ‘‘ play a role
in the day-to-day workings of the UNSC, such as the role of the UN Secretariat,
informal consultations, groupings of UNSC members,’’ and many other considerations. Kovanda’s insider account exposes the weaknesses of the Security Council
and the reluctance on the part of many members to forthrightly confront an ongoing
genocide. As such, it may be taken as an important point of departure for analyses of
potential reforms that are necessary to make genocide prevention a reality.
Herb Hirsch, Virginia Commonwealth University
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The Czech Republic on the UN Security
Council: The Rwandan Genocide1
Karel Kovanda
Deputy Director-General of External Relations, European
Commission, Brussels
The Rwanda civil war that in 1994 degenerated into a slaughter of the country’s
Tutsi, amounting to genocide, was possibly the world’s most devastating bloodbath of the 1990s. In 1994, the newly formed Czech Republic took up its place
as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council; Karel Kovanda was
the Czech Ambassador at the time. Drawing on internal documents of the Czech
Foreign Service and on his own private notes, as well as on a wealth of published
information, Kovanda details in this personal memoir the step-by-step evolution
of the Rwandan tragedy as he and his delegation perceived it, and the Czech
reaction to it. He repeatedly highlights the information gap: on the one hand,
insufficient and biased information provided by the UN Secretariat; on the other
hand, the detailed, accurate, and timely information his delegation received from
NGOs. Kovanda estimates that during the first weeks, the Security Council gave
perhaps 80% of its attention to the civil war between Rwandan government forces
and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and 20% to how to handle the difficult
position of UNAMIR, the peacekeeping operation then on the ground in Rwanda.
Only after weeks of delay did the Security Council even start to come to grips with
the ongoing genocide—a term that Ambassador Kovanda was the first to employ
publicly in an official UN meeting. While focusing on Rwanda proper, Kovanda
also explains and describes the sometimes little-known mechanisms that play
a role in the day-to-day workings of the Security Council: the role of the UN
Secretariat, informal consultations, groupings of Security Council members, and
so on.
Key words: Rwanda, genocide, Czech Republic, UN Security Council

Introduction
Apart from its five permanent members, the UN Security Council (UNSC) has
ten non-permanent ones, elected by the UN General Assembly for two years—five
one year, the other five the following year. In the autumn of 1993, a sharp electoral
battle involved the Czech Republic: after only a few months as an independent country (following the division of Czechoslovakia on 1 January 1993), the Czechs were
fighting for UNSC non-permanent membership against Belarus. In June 1993 I
assumed the position of Czech Ambassador—Permanent Representative to the UN,
and was directly in charge of our electoral campaign.
In the event, we won the elections, in October 1993, together with Argentina,
Nigeria, Oman, and Rwanda. These five countries would be joining the five other
non-permanent members, carryovers from the previous year: Brazil, Djibouti, New
Zealand, Pakistan, and Spain.
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A lot has changed in the work of the UNSC since the 1990s: by and large, its
work has become more scripted and formal. But as the Czech Republic joined the
Security Council in 1994, managing its work was a matter for its president. He or
she scheduled and chaired the public, formal meetings that we know from TV. In
addition, however, the president organized and chaired so-called informal consultations of the UNSC. It was actually these consultations that occupied most of the
president’s time and demanded most of his or her energy. At the time, they took
place almost daily, sometimes even several times a day; they were held behind
closed doors, in a separate chamber of the UN Secretariat to which non-members of
the UNSC, never mind journalists or other members of the public, had no access.
But it was precisely during these informal consultations that everything, even the
smallest matters, was decided. Everything that later saw the light of day at formal
meetings (except for the actual statements of countries, formally called the ‘‘explanation of the vote’’) would be agreed here beforehand. This was where the text of every
document, often down to the shade of meaning of every word in every UNSC resolution, every presidential statement, was negotiated, even fought over—usually by
experts, that is, diplomats specializing in the given subject matter, but from time to
time by ambassadors themselves. In this forum, ambassadors would also discuss a
variety of other issues that never ended up being debated publicly. This was where
the Security Council did its real work, whereas its formal meetings, then as now,
resembled a theatre piece with proceedings scripted in advance.
The office of president rotates monthly, following the name of the country, in
English alphabetical order. The president occupies the seat at the head of the oval
conference table, and on the first of every month, the 15 UNSC members move one
seat to the right. In December 1993, the top seat—the presidency—was occupied by
China. Consequently, in January 1994, the chairmanship fell to the newly elected
Czech Republic. And straight away, in January, we got a foretaste of what was to
happen in Rwanda several months later.
I will return to these January matters. The critical chapter of this story,
however, started only three months later, in April 1994. That month, the Security
Council was chaired by Ambassador Colin Keating of New Zealand.

UNAMIR
During the first week of April, we were dealing with situations in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, a permanent fixture on the UNSC agenda; with issues in Georgia,
Iraq, El Salvador, and Israel; and with the Libya–Chad relationship. Another of the
many questions was that of extending the mandate for one of the numerous peacekeeping operations (PKOs) that the UN had stood up in various parts of the world,
namely the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR).
A civil war among various factions had been underway in Rwanda for several
years already.2 In the autumn of 1993, the UNSC decided to organize this peacekeeping operation, which was to oversee the fragile truce between the antagonists.
The UNSC had agreed to create it on 5 October 1993, in its Resolution No. 872.3
UNAMIR was to promote the rapprochement of the belligerent parties. One party
consisted of the Rwandan government institutions, headed by President Juvénal
Habyarimana, and their armed forces, both military and paramilitary. Most of these
were Hutu. They were opposed by the so-called Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), consisting of the minority Tutsi people.4 The hard core of the RPF consisted of Tutsi
who had escaped Rwanda for neighboring Uganda in 1959, when an earlier wave of
interethnic slaughter engulfed the country. Still, in 1993, under pressure from the
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international community, both parties managed to sign a series of agreements,
the Arusha Accords (named for Arusha, Tanzania, where the accords were signed).5
UNAMIR was to keep an eye on the parties’ actually fulfilling these agreements.
UNAMIR was not very big, and its members were lightly armed; their mandate
was rather weak. All this followed from the view of the UN Secretariat (with which
the Security Council agreed at the time) that the toughest part was to get the parties
to actually reach an agreement; putting it into effect was not expected to be too
much of a problem. But just a few short months after authorizing the formation
of UNAMIR, we were arguing as to whether and under what circumstances its
mandate should be extended.
Arguing over the conditions of extending a mandate had its own well-established
framework: Will we agree to a shorter or a longer extension? Should we threaten to
end the operation if the antagonists refuse to cooperate? The UN Secretariat recommended extending the mandate by six months, but the United States, for example,
wanted the shortest possible extension—they’d be happy with one month, perhaps
two, OK: let’s make it three. It took a lot of work for the UNSC to finally agree, in
resolution 909/1994,6 on a four-month extension, with a proviso that after six weeks,
we would evaluate how the situation in the country was evolving. The date was 5
April 1994.

The Air Crash
For the Security Council as a whole—and this was definitely true for the United
States—the issue of PKOs was singularly affected by a major debacle in Somalia. In
October 1993, some six months before the events I am leading up to, the United
States lost eighteen of their soldiers there, and the whole nation was enraged at
TV shots of the soldiers’ bodies being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu
to the exuberant joy of bystanders. From that moment on, the United States was
particularly perspicacious when it came to PKOs in general, and particularly those
in which they participated themselves. The post-Somalia discussion culminated in
Washington in Presidential Directive No. 25, which specified US policy concerning
these operations and outlined certain criteria that would guide the decision as to
whether to support this or that UNSC PKO and whether or not to participate.7
Madeleine Albright has written that its objective was to ‘‘to put America squarely
on the side of strengthening UN peacekeeping operations,’’ but ‘‘with the understanding that . . . we would henceforth make the chain of command clearer and insist
that such missions be . . . preceded by a significant period of consultations with
Congress.’’ 8
In the event, Rwanda was to become the test case for how solid this policy was;
for on 6 April, only a day after the give-and-take over extending UNAMIR’s mandate
ended, news arrived about a catastrophe at the airport in Kigali, Rwanda’s capital.
Two presidents lost their lives in a plane crash: Juvénal Habyarimana of Rwanda
and Cyprien Ntaryamira of Burundi.
It wasn’t clear what had actually happened: one wondered, did the plane crash,
or was it shot down? Was it an accident, or an assassination attempt? To one person,
however, the answer was completely clear, before any investigation was so much
as launched: Rwanda’s permanent representative to the UN, Ambassador JeanDamascène Bizimana. Coincidentally, Rwanda, like the Czech Republic, was a new
member of the UNSC, never mind that the country was engulfed in a civil war and
that it was the subject of the UNSC’s close attention. Bizimana had no doubts—and
made no bones about his opinion—that what had occurred was an act of terrorism
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in which the RPF was the ultimate villain. Ambassador Jean-Bernard Mérimée
of France also argued from the very first moment that the event was a terrorist
attack. (The identities of those actually responsible for the plane crash were, to
my knowledge, never determined, although responsibility of the RPF cannot be
excluded.)

Information
The UNSC receives its information from the UN Secretariat, the apparatus that
resides in that enormous matchbox which we all recognize from any number of
images as the main UN building in New York, and which is headed by the secretarygeneral of the UN (UNSG). At the critical moment, the Egyptian Boutros BoutrosGhali was UNSG. The Secretariat, in turn, receives reports from its own people in
the field. Information gathered in this way would be elaborated as formal Reports of
the UNSG, which constitute the basis for any discussion of the UNSC, on any issue,
of any territory.
At the critical moment, there were two people in Rwanda directly subordinated
to the UNSG. One was his so-called special representative (SRSG), the highest
civilian UN official in the country, a certain Dr. Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh, formerly
the foreign minister of Cameroon. I never knew much about him; for example, he
never showed his face in New York to report personally to the Security Council,
which was the standard practice of other SRSGs the world over. I had heard, however, that he was close friends with President Habyarimana, and one might well
have wondered about his objectivity.
The other UN official who fed the UN Secretariat with information was the
Canadian General Roméo Dallaire, commander of UNAMIR.9
Thus, it was on the basis of information from these two officials that the UN
Secretariat prepared its Rwanda reports, which, in turn, served as the bases for
UNSC deliberations. The Czech delegation, like those of a number of smaller countries, didn’t actually have in hand any information apart from these reports. The
nearest embassy we had (and have to this day) was in Kenya, and Czech diplomats
there had precious little opportunity (or reason) to report first-hand from Rwanda. Of
course, major powers had their own additional sources of information, aside from the
UN Secretariat’s briefs. Of the UNSC members, both the United States and France
actually had their own embassies in Kigali.

Early Czech Involvement
From the Czech point of view, PKOs were important, particularly where our own
soldiers or observers were involved. But although during the 1990s Czech personnel
had been stationed in various places in Africa, including Angola, Mozambique,
Liberia, and Somalia, none were stationed in Rwanda as part of UNAMIR. Rwanda
was on the periphery of Czech interests; we had no historical interests, no economic
interests, no interests connected with our own personnel there.
I didn’t understand the Rwandan situation very well. After all, several civil wars
were going on in Africa at the time. Nevertheless, my very first public statement in
the UNSC coincidentally concerned precisely this topic, inasmuch as, in January
1994, the UNSC was deciding on the first extension of UNAMIR’s mandate. The
matter was rather foreign for the Czech Republic, and, personally, I didn’t study it
carefully either. Rereading the statements of other UNSC members,10 one gets the
sense that no one, certainly not me, had any foreboding of the horrors that were to
engulf the country within three short months. In fact, before I took up the UNSC
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presidency in January, I had followed well-established custom by starting off with
a round of individual consultations with every other UNSC member, inquiring as
to how each evaluated the situation in various hot spots of the world; with respect
to Rwanda, I reported the findings as follows: ‘‘According to most of the delegations,
the peace process is progressing rather well. Nigeria sees positive signals that offer a
chance to resolve the conflict without major delays and take it off the Council agenda
altogether.’’ 11

Forebodings
And yet some—although beyond the UNSC circuit—did have their forebodings. One
of them was Claude Dusaidi, an RPF representative working the corridors of the
UN, who would share his views of Rwanda developments with all who would listen.
As early as 7 January, he paid me a visit, not as the Czech Ambassador, for we
really were too insignificant—certainly as far as matters in Rwanda were concerned—
but as the January UNSC president. He explained that the fulfillment of the Arusha
Accords was in jeopardy. President Habyarimana had, for example, refused to form a
provisional government, which the accords foresaw for December 1993, and instead
had prepared a list consisting exclusively of his own people, completely disregarding
the views of other political forces. I informed the Czech Foreign Ministry, as well as
my colleagues on the Security Council, about Dusaidi’s visit; informally, I also distributed a letter that he gave me, simply by passing copies around the table.12
Another person who had a horrific premonition—or, rather, horrific information—
was General Dallaire. On 11 January 1994 he sent a certain critical telegram from
Kigali, in which he described what he had learned from one of his sources: that
Hutu paramilitary militias were gathering weapons and compiling lists of Tutsi in
order to kill them all off at a suitable moment. Dallaire asked for permission to
intervene, for example, to take over illegal weapons storage areas.13
The Security Council never learned about this telegram. And the UN Secretariat
did not give Dallaire the go-ahead to intervene.
The Dallaire telegram is generally considered a key juncture, an opportunity for
the international community to forestall the Rwanda catastrophe. If only we had
known . . . A number of journalists have asked me over the years whether the
UNSC would have acted differently, if it had known . . . It serves as an impulse
to reflect about ‘‘alternative history.’’ But even though such reflections are usually
barren, one might quite soberly say this much: If the Security Council had been
familiar with the telegram, it would at least have had a chance to do something. At
least a chance.

A Detour: The Story of the Dallaire Telegram
But the Security Council was not familiar with the telegram. The telegram itself had
a peculiar fate. The UN Secretariat—either the Department of PKOs, headed at the
time by Kofi Annan, or the Department of Political Affairs, headed by Marrack
Goulding, a British official—had obviously underestimated its significance, and did
not inform the Security Council about it.14 ‘‘Such situations and alarming reports
from the field, though considered with the utmost seriousness by United Nations
officials, are not uncommon within the context of peace-keeping operations,’’ wrote
Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his foreword to the UN’s Rwanda sourcebook.15
But much later, long after the catastrophe was over, the UN Secretariat realized
that they perhaps should have mentioned the telegram to the Security Council:
in his foreword to the sourcebook I’ve been quoting, Boutros-Ghali averred that
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Chinmaya Garekhan, his special advisor, informed the Security Council on 12
January ‘‘on the reports that had been received from UNAMIR.’’ 16 I found this
strange: after all, I had chaired the Security Council during that time, and was sure
that I would have remembered discussing such a telegram, or even receiving information about it, if only because my meeting with Mr. Dusaidi a few days earlier
had sensitized me to the Rwanda problématique.
In December 1995, as my tenure on the UNSC was drawing to a close, I therefore wrote a letter to the UNSG. I noted that I remembered the matter differently,
and how should we explain that we have such different recollections of the circumstances of that fateful telegram? The UNSG invited me to a meeting but held his
own. Mr. Garekhan, an Indian who regularly represented the UNSG at informal
Security Council consultations and conveyed to the Security Council on his behalf
information, was present as well. He made the point that ‘‘for better or worse, no
reports are written from informal consultations,’’ so it would no longer be possible
to ascertain what actually happened. We ended up agreeing to disagree, simply
noting our differing recollections.17
However, reports from Security Council consultations are indeed made. It is well
known that the UNSG has his people write fairly detailed and unsparing minutes: if
someone makes a stupid comment, that’s how it is described. These are confidential
reports, however, strictly for the needs of the UNSG and his immediate entourage,
and only rarely do they seep out beyond this narrow circle of UN officials.18 Thus,
in his discussion with me, Garekhan was not quite candid as far as the existence or
not of such reports is concerned.19 And as for the substance of the matter, when an
independent commission dealt with the failure of the Security Council in Rwanda, it
criticized the Secretariat for not having informed the Security Council.20
One wonders, of course, how the Secretariat itself perceived the situation in
Rwanda. As I have pointed out above, it was receiving two sets of reports, one from
General Dallaire and one from the SRSG. When these two lines of reporting disagreed (and they allegedly disagreed fairly frequently), the Secretariat and the
UNSG were inclined toward the reading their ‘‘own’’ man provided. In a personal
conversation in April 2004, General Dallaire told me that ‘‘they simply took me first
as a soldier, and second as a fellow who’s in Africa for his first time and doesn’t
understand anything.’’

Murders in Rwanda, Uncertainty in the Security Council
Let’s return to events in April 1994. As soon as the two presidents perished in the
plane crash, a terrifying wave of murders of Tutsi erupted throughout Rwanda. It
was not spontaneous, it was not coincidental, it was not chaotic; this was a wave of
systematic murder, carefully prepared in advance. Just as General Dallaire had predicted, it followed lists of names, addresses, Kigali license plates of Tutsi-owned cars,
using weapons that Hutu had been accumulating for some time. The most awful
behavior among Hutu was exhibited by the Presidential Guard and by specific organized militias and groups, the worst of which was the paramilitary Interahamwe.
Within twenty minutes after the crash, roads in Kigali were blocked. Interahamwe
personnel checked documents of passengers in all vehicles, and those whose documents were marked ‘‘Tutsi’’ were dragged out and killed. Several thousand Tutsi
were murdered within the first few hours.
As the world eventually learned to its horror, this wave of murders (called
‘‘work’’ by Hutu officials) continued unabated for days and entire weeks. It was significantly spurred on by the firebrand broadcasts of Radio-Télévision Libre des Mille
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Collines. Tutsi were being murdered, but—especially during the first few days—so
were moderate Hutu politicians, including those who were to form the Arusha-agreed
government, including the prime minister–designate, Agathe Uwilingiyimana.
At the same time, the front in the civil war moved. The RPF—naturally—did not
intend to stand with folded arms and stick to the Arusha-agreed truce while armed
Hutu were slaughtering their fellows. In my report to Prague, I described the activation of the supposedly demilitarized Tutsi as ‘‘very disturbing,’’ 21 which indicates
just how little I understood the situation in its first moments. On 7 April, the Security
Council issued a Presidential Statement 22 that emerged from the workshop of
France and non-aligned UNSC members. It expressed its ‘‘regret’’ over the plane
crash and ‘‘the ensuing violence.’’ It ‘‘strongly condemned’’ attacks against government officials, against ‘‘many’’ civilians, and, ‘‘in particular,’’ against UN personnel.
It appealed to all sides in the conflict to ‘‘maintain the positions they held before the
incident’’ (i.e., before the plane crash) and ‘‘in particular to respect the cease-fire.’’
These last formulations were directed against the RPF and against the Tutsi, but I
clearly didn’t realize that at the time.
In the following days, the Security Council met, and met, and met again, but
didn’t manage to come to an understanding of the situation. On 8 April, I conveyed
to Prague information from the Secretariat: ‘‘the situation is unclear.’’ 23 The Security
Council didn’t understand the Rwanda situation—or didn’t want to understand it?
The UN Secretariat didn’t forward much information. Great Western powers seemed
to have only a cursory interest in Rwanda.24 There is no doubt that they had their
own information ahead of time. Two of them had embassies in Rwanda, and the
Secretariat shared the contents of the Dallaire telegram with France and the United
States (but only with them, and with Belgium). I had the intense feeling that the
Security Council was rudderless. Usually, the role of the Security Council’s intellectual leader, the one who could ‘‘see around the corner,’’ was played by the UK’s
ambassador, Sir David Hannay. On this occasion, however, he didn’t have much to
go on: as I learned much later from a British Foreign Office official, he was allegedly
receiving virtually no instructions from London (Britain had never had an embassy
in Kigali before August 1994) except to follow the lead of French diplomacy.
It appeared as though permanent members of the UNSC were giving the wave of
murders a wide berth, as though they didn’t want to dirty their hands with it. After
all, this was a domestic matter, not an international conflict, wasn’t it? And domestic
matters, civil wars, tribal conflicts and ethnic cleansing, as well as dictatorial
regimes, suppressing basic human rights, and the like—none of this was in the
mandate of the UN Security Council. The Security Council dealt with international
peace and security; what didn’t have an international dimension didn’t belong on
the UNSC’s agenda, at least not technically.
One worry we did have: not the murderous rampage against the Tutsi, but the
fate of foreigners in Rwanda and the role of UNAMIR. During the first hours of
the bloodbath, berserk units of the Rwandan government army also butchered ten
Belgian paratroopers who had been guarding the prime minister–designate. ‘‘Our
boys’’ thus faced a clear danger, and there was not much UNAMIR, with its small
numbers, light equipment, and weak mandate, could do. What to do about this?
Strengthen UNAMIR? Withdraw it? Reduce it? And while France sent in a humanitarian mission to pull out foreigners (without making the slightest effort to protect
their Tutsi collaborators or other people close to them), the Security Council spent
endless hours discussing the UNAMIR problem.
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It was a problem indeed: UNAMIR was a peacekeeping operation, but the
soldiers had deliberately been given a weak mandate and were only lightly armed.
It might have been difficult for them to defend themselves against groups of
murderous Hutu running amok and probably on drugs. And UNAMIR was paralyzed
by the fate of their murdered Belgian comrades.

The Belgian Withdrawal
This incident formed the basis for the Czech evaluation of the situation as well. As a
result of its losses, Belgium decided on 12 April to pull out its entire contingent from
UNAMIR. The Belgian troops were the best of the lot, and had the best weapons.
I got a call from Prague from Dr. Ivan Bušniak, who had taken over my previous
job as director general for bilateral relations with Europe and North America. He
informed me that Mr. Willy Claes, the Belgian foreign minister, had telephoned
the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs and ended up talking to Ivan—coincidentally,
neither the Czech foreign minister nor any of his deputies was available at the time.
Claes informed Ivan about the Belgian pullout and recommended the withdrawal of
the entire UNAMIR contingent.
Ivan was surprised that the Belgian minister would stoop to talk to a ‘‘mere’’
director general, a post two levels below his own. But this only indicated just how
important this conversation was for Claes. I later learned that he called Argentina
(another non-permanent UNSC member) as well, and I suspect that he called all
UNSC member states. From the Czech point of view, the opinion of Belgium was
of paramount importance: this erstwhile colonial power was linked with Rwanda
by a thousand ties.25 Who better to understand the situation in the country than
Belgium? I felt we could do much worse than follow Belgium’s advice. Only later did
I come to understand that Belgium’s concern was not Rwanda, or UNAMIR, but
rather camouflaging the precipitous withdrawal of their own contingent and the
consequent weakening of UNAMIR.

Groups of UNSC Members
The situation in the Security Council was further obfuscated by the membership of
Rwanda itself. The very fact that Rwanda was elected to the Security Council, or
even that it had put itself forward as a candidate, was bizarre, given the civil war
raging in the country, of which the Security Council was seized. That’s the way the
UN works, though, in many instances: non-permanent seats on the Security Council
are reserved for individual regional groups of member states, according a requirement that is partly written, partly based on custom, and once the African regional
group of members decided to support Rwanda’s candidacy, there was not much
anyone could do about it.
Ambassador Bizimana of Rwanda was a Hutu, and the situation was clear to
him: everything was the fault of the Tutsi. Bizimana participated in the dealings
of an informal yet very influential so-called Non-Aligned Caucus (NAC), which met
behind closed doors before every session of informal consultations and coordinated
its approach. At that time, other members of the caucus included Djibouti, Nigeria,
Oman, and Pakistan. These countries continued to focus on the situation as they had
known it during previous months—that is, on the civil war. Few gathered that in
addition to the civil war between government forces and the RPF (the end of which
was supposed to have been spelled out in the Arusha Accords), a completely new firestorm had erupted behind the line of conflict, that is, the mass slaughter of Tutsi
who had nothing to do with the civil war. I recall that for Salim al-Khussaiby, the
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ambassador of Oman, an extremely friendly giant of a man, the key to stopping the
slaughter amounted to restoring the cease-fire between the government forces and
the RPF; he failed to realize that such a cease-fire would have helped only the
Hutu, who would have one less worry on their minds while massacring the Tutsi,
whereas the RPF would in effect be betraying their people if they did not seek to
come to their rescue as fast as possible. On another occasion, Salim complained
about ‘‘various individuals’’ who are tolerated in the UN corridors even though they
have nobody’s mandate to do anything—having in mind none other than Claude
Dusaidi, the RPF representative, the very person who had informed me during my
term as UNSC president in January 1994 about the problems besetting his country.
Salim’s inspiration was clear: these comments didn’t germinate in his own head but,
clearly, echoed the arguments that the ambassador of the Rwandan Hutu government must have been spreading among the non-aligned.
France played a particularly strange role. It had great influence over non-aligned
members, both via Ambassador Bizimana of Rwanda and via Roble Olhaye, the
ambassador of Djibouti. This very poor country on the Horn of Africa allegedly
hosted French advisors directly in its Foreign Ministry, and on several occasions
the French permanent representative, Jean-Bernard Mérimée, took the side of the
murderers, overtly or covertly. One can only guess what was behind French policy.
President François Mitterrand and his wife, and their relationship with the Hutu
President Habyarimana, no doubt played a role.
French fears that Rwanda’s membership in the Francophonie could be jeopardized
played a role as well, inasmuch as the RPF Tutsi, who had spent decades in Uganda,
spoke English. Yet I found it downright grotesque to hear Ambassador Olhaye, of all
people, saying, ‘‘Those RPF people, why, they don’t even speak proper French!’’
First, I would never consider anybody’s language as an appropriate basis for making
political decisions; and, second, I found it quite strange for such a scurrilous comment to come from Olhaye who, though from Francophone Djibouti, was never heard
to utter a word except in English. Again, this argument did not come from his
own head.
Apart from the permanent members and the non-aligned, there was a third
group of Security Council members, ‘‘the leftovers,’’ who were neither permanent
members nor part of the NAC, and were therefore called ‘‘non-non.’’ In 1994, the
Czechs were part of this group, together with Argentina, New Zealand, and Spain.
(I don’t recall whether Brazil joined the non-aligned or the ‘‘non-non.’’) When it
came to Rwanda, however, this group was truly non-aligned, truly not involved.
None of us had any great-power ties with Rwanda, nor a colonial past, nor were we
afraid to criticize its government, as was the case among the non-aligned, where
solidarity, including false solidarity, often reigned supreme. And, unlike many nonaligned countries, we had no reason to fear that our criticism of the situation in
Rwanda could boomerang against our own domestic policies; none of us had a Biafra
in our recent history. In the following weeks it was precisely these countries, the
‘‘non-non’’ Security Council members, who pronounced themselves most clearly on
the Rwanda tragedy.

Better Information!
What then should the Security Council have done? On 10 April I wrote to Prague
that the trickiest discussion would concern the question of whether the Security
Council should even continue to be involved with Rwanda. The argument in favor
of involvement, I wrote, was ‘‘the alleged responsibility that the UNSC bears for
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Rwanda (or for its innocent civilian population)’’ and the argument that the situation
there jeopardized the security of neighboring countries.26 Others would argue
against involvement, on account of ‘‘this being a domestic matter of a country which
the UNSC should not get involved with.’’ 27 Four days after the plane crash, after
four days of slaughter, the matter still wasn’t clear to me, and I still wrote about
‘‘alleged’’ responsibility. This was the classic Security Council stance: getting involved in the domestic affairs of a country had once before not paid off—in Somalia.
If the conflict at hand didn’t have an unmistakable international dimension, we
should leave the locals to fight it out amongst themselves, even if in the process
they were to kill themselves off completely. In Rwanda, meanwhile, the number of
dead had reached the tens of thousands.
We were not receiving much information from the Secretariat, and such information as we did receive was not accurate. Day after day, as the slaughter in Rwanda
continued, we were dealing with the situation there only very superficially. According to the Secretariat, what was happening in Kigali was ‘‘armed combat among
various factions.’’ 28 What was really happening I realized only from an opinion piece
in the New York Times by Frank Smyth of the NGO Africa Watch.29
I hadn’t known of Africa Watch before, but it was one of the Helsinki Watch
family of organizations, which I knew well: during the Communist era, Helsinki
Watch had been very involved in defending Czechoslovak dissidents. There was
therefore an a priori reason to trust the Africa Watch folks. But, more importantly,
Smyth’s article had an internal logic. Suddenly I had a eureka! moment; suddenly
the scales fell from my eyes. Everything started making sense: both events in
Rwanda itself and how to interpret the attitudes of individual UNSC members. Ten
days had elapsed since the plane crash. The Security Council, meanwhile, was still
in the throes of worry about the UNAMIR soldiers and the partial interests of some
of its members, and continued to ignore the ongoing carnage.
Smyth argued that the slaughter was not accidental but managed. He explained
that President Habyarimana had ruled through his Akazu clique and that slaughtering their opponents was the only way they could hold onto their twenty-one-year-old
rule. Akazu needed weapons, but domestic legislation prevented Belgium, the old
colonial power, from exporting weapons to war-torn countries; France, however, had
begun military cooperation with Habyarimana in 1975. France was concerned with
maintaining la francophonie in Rwanda. In addition, the presidents of the two countries (Habyarimana and Mitterrand) were friends. And France had assisted Rwanda
in making a major arms purchase from Egypt—during the very period (1977–1979), as
I learned later, when Egypt’s Foreign Minister was none other than Boutros-Ghali.
Smyth was mentioned as the author of a study on arming Rwanda that had been
published several months earlier.30 And suddenly I understood the peculiar game
played by France in the Security Council, as well as the foot-dragging of the UN
Secretariat (i.e., of Boutros-Ghali) in presenting the full picture of the horrors that
were unfolding in Rwanda.
Seeking further information, I contacted Africa Watch directly and thus met
one of the world’s leading specialists on Rwanda, the late Alison Des Forges. We
became fast friends, and in subsequent months she became the source of accurate,
dependable information about the situation in the country. There was a chasm of
difference between her information and that of the UN Secretariat. I therefore
decided—for educational purposes, one might say—to invite her to explain the
situation to some of my colleagues.
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And so it happened that on 18 April 1994, the Czech Mission to the United
Nations hosted a very unusual meeting during which ‘‘small countries,’’ nonpermanent UNSC members, had an opportunity to learn from reliable and extremely
well informed, albeit informal, sources about the causes, origins, and course of
the Rwanda catastrophe. Alison herself recalled this meeting as a quite extraordinary opportunity for her as an NGO representative to communicate directly with
diplomats working on the UNSC.31
According to Alison’s information, the murder mill in Rwanda was to start up
again, in full force and even more intensively, on 8 May. She hoped that the UNSC
would decide to send in soldiers who could protect and save the remaining Tutsi. I
stripped her of the last illusions she may still have had concerning the UN’s abilities
when I pointed out that even if the UNSC were to decide on such an operation the
following day, it would take weeks, even months, before member countries would
offer contingents, before an operation could be organized, before it could actually be
deployed in Rwanda. It broke her heart. Some of her friends were still in hiding in
Kigali, and only a miracle could probably help them now.

The Security Council on UNAMIR
On 11 April, the Secretariat informed us that they were preparing a ‘‘long-term’’ study
of UNAMIR’s future. The alternatives would be based on developments in-country.
These developments would either show improvement, in which case UNAMIR could
stay and monitor the fulfillment of the Arusha Accords, or they would deteriorate
further, in which case it would be ‘‘necessary to revise’’ UNAMIR’s mandate or even
reconsider its very presence in the country.32 UNAMIR was on the agenda daily.
A few days later I reported to Prague that ‘‘a large part of the discussion . . . was
devoted to variants of UNAMIR’s activities in the country.’’ 33
At the time, the secretary-general presented two alternatives: either, in the case
of a cease-fire, to maintain a slightly smaller UNAMIR that would see to its terms
being kept, or to pull out the greater part of UNAMIR, leaving only its commander
with 200 to 300 soldiers. During the discussion, I was intrigued by the argument of
Ned Walker, Ambassador Albright’s deputy: ‘‘If we were to decide now, the US would
be for a withdrawal.’’ I understood clearly: ‘‘If we don’t decide now, we’re deciding to
stay in the country,’’ I observed—and that’s how the matter ended up, for another
few days, at least.34
The UNSG promised ‘‘a special report’’ on UNAMIR; it reached us on 21
April, more than two weeks after the slaughter had started.35 Yet even this
report—unbelievable though it may sound—still saw UNAMIR’s main role not in
stopping the carnage but in attempting to enforce a cease-fire between the army of
the ruling Hutu and the RPF. After the withdrawal of the Belgian contingent and
dispensable members of other groups, the number of soldiers and observers in
Rwanda had decreased from 2,500 to some 1,700.
This time around, the UNSG offered three alternatives. One of them, a total
withdrawal of UNAMIR, he didn’t recommend at all; it was perhaps introduced only
for the sake of logical completeness, so to speak. The second repeated one of his
alternatives of 14 April (i.e., leave only a small force in the country, now limited to
270 soldiers).
The third suggestion was quite different, however: it was a suggestion to radically
beef up UNAMIR, by no fewer than several thousand soldiers, and to equip it with a
new mandate, under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. I am still uncertain where this
proposal emerged from, who or what might have inspired the UNSG to face the issue
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in such a radical manner. Did someone’s conscience wake up, perhaps? Or was it a
foil to prove that nothing really could be done?
Chapter 7? This represented a definite shift. Operations that the UNSC organizes
in various countries are run either under Chapter 6 or under Chapter 7 of the UN
Charter. Chapter 6 assumes that the international operation takes place in accordance with the wishes of local authorities, for example, on the invitation of the
host government. No big problem here. (UNAMIR was originally organized under
Chapter 6.) Chapter 7 comes into play in much more complicated situations: the
local authorities may not agree with the operation, or perhaps there actually are
no effective local authorities, and so on. Given the nature of the situation, Chapter
7 operations are usually more dangerous, and peacekeeping under this chapter
requires a more robust mandate and different rules of engagement. Additionally,
from the point of view of international law, such operations, begun willy-nilly,
amount to interference in the domestic affairs of the ‘‘host’’ country.
Years later, I reread this proposal. It was very good, even earth shattering. If
implemented, it would have been the only proposal that could have changed anything.
An operation under Chapter 7 could not only have arranged for monitoring some kind
of peace (nonexistent in Rwanda, under the circumstances) but also allowed for an
intervention in the country, whether or not the country’s rulers (whoever they might
be) wished it.
The proposal had only two ‘‘minor’’ flaws. First, it would have been absolutely
impossible to find ‘‘several thousand’’ additional UNAMIR soldiers. According to his
own evidence, the UNSG had personally telephoned dozens and dozens of heads of
state and government in search of additional soldiers—to no avail. Salim Ahmed
Salim, president of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), tried to recruit soldiers
as well, as did President Museveni of Uganda, an RPF ally. And even if the soldiers
were found, it would take months before they could be organized and sent, equipment and arms would have to be found somewhere else, and someone would have
to arrange for their transport. Meanwhile, the slaughter continued daily.
The second problem was with Chapter 7 itself. At least one delegation was
always extremely reluctant to use this measure when a domestic situation within a
country was at stake—which decidedly was the case with Rwanda. This delegation
always hesitated to allow the international community to intervene in a country
over the head of the local government, and was always alert to the possibility of
creating a precedent that at some point—who knows?—might be turned against its
own authorities. This was the delegation from China, with its UNSC veto power.
The UNSG’s report thus didn’t satisfy many people. The non-aligned nations
would gladly have strengthened UNAMIR; the United States would have preferred
a complete pullout. UNSC Resolution 912, which was finally adopted on 21 April,36
resolved the situation ambivalently. Only the 270 soldiers mentioned in one of the
UNSG’s alternatives were to stay in the country; the rest were to be withdrawn,
but only to somewhere close by, in East Africa, as a sort of over-the-horizon reserve.
It was the worst decision the Security Council could possibly have taken. Not
only did we not decide to strengthen UNAMIR, we ended up weakening it to the
minimum militarily acceptable (i.e., capable of self-defense) force. Among other
things, we thereby handed over to the killers perhaps thousands of civilians whom
UNAMIR was still able to protect at the time. Our soldiers in UNAMIR were
appalled. General Henri Kwami Anyidoho of Ghana, Dallaire’s UNAMIR deputy
commander, couldn’t understand this decision: ‘‘Was the world going to abandon
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Rwanda? Was it because the operation was in a typically developing country or more
pointedly on the ‘dark continent’?’’ 37

The Czech Position Evolves
Meanwhile, my own interventions during Security Council consultations were ever
sharper. On 20 April I wrote to Prague, ‘‘More alarming information has reached
us from Human Rights Watch, according to which 100,000 people have been
slaughtered already. Interpreting the warfare exclusively as tribal is terrific oversimplification.’’ 38 I argued even with my friends—such as the otherwise extremely
capable and decent Ambassador Emı́lio Cardenas of Argentina—who in the context
of Rwanda used the expression ‘‘humanitarian catastrophe.’’ The UNSG talked about
a ‘‘firestorm of mass killing.’’ A few days later, the UNSC president, New Zealand’s
Ambassador Colin Keating, received a representative of the French NGO Médécins
sans frontières (MSF), who reported that shortly before their meeting, government forces and the Presidential Guard had broken into the MSF hospital in Butare
and murdered all its Tutsi personnel, then returned and murdered all the Tutsi
patients.39
I understood the situation (finally!): this was not a ‘‘humanitarian catastrophe,’’
or even simple ‘‘killings,’’ no matter how massive; this was the deliberate extermination of one ethnic group. On 25 April, I wrote to Prague,
This is a matter of clear genocide committed by governmental and presidential units
of the Hutu against the Tutsi. No matter how one turns the numbers around, there
were perhaps 1.2 million Tutsi before the war, of which at least 100,000 have been
slaughtered. The regional organization (OAU) takes into account the stability of the
country or the legitimacy of its government: it tries to effect a cease-fire, and holds
both parties at the same level. Is this not as if we had wanted Hitler to reach a truce
with the Jews? (The comparison is not perfect but the proportions coincide.)

And, most importantly, I alerted Prague, our ‘‘non-non’’ group wanted to consult as
to whether there might not be some other way for the Security Council to react than
by simply pulling out UNAMIR, ‘‘of which at this moment only 450 men are left in
the country.’’ 40
On the following day we received a letter from Claude Dusaidi, RPF’s representative in the UN, titled ‘‘Genocide in Rwanda.’’ 41 Dusaidi pointed out that the
Rwandan government’s goal was not victory over the RPF but, rather, the extermination of the Tutsi. And, among other things, he demanded the creation of a
war-crimes tribunal.
At about this time, I called Ambassador José Ayala-Lasso. This Ecuadorian
diplomat had been appointed the UN’s first high commissioner for human rights—
coincidentally, on 5 April 1994, the very day of the plane crash. He had been worried
about Rwanda; I urged him to go to the country as soon as he could. In the event, he
visited on 11 and 12 May and talked to all sides. Even he, however, in the report
published on 19 May, still described Rwanda as ‘‘a human rights tragedy,’’ avoiding
the word ‘‘genocide.’’ 42

The Czech Draft Presidential Statement
On 28 April, my delegation began a fairly daring battle to get the Security Council,
which effectively continued to ignore the slaughter of the Tutsi, to make some meaningful statement. In an interview at the time I pointed out that 80% of the attention
that the Security Council had devoted to Rwanda concentrated on the fate of our
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blue berets and the remaining 20% on the civil war. We had said nothing about the
slaughter, and at a certain point I realized that we would be a laughingstock around
the world if we did not finally come out with a statement on this topic. So I prepared
a draft Presidential Statement on the issue.
The Security Council issues two principal types of public documents. One is the
resolution, which is subject to voting; the other is the presidential statement. Though
they are called ‘‘presidential,’’ these statements are in fact issued by the entire
Security Council. They are not legally binding, and thus don’t have the same weight
as resolutions; however, precisely because they are not voted on, their adoption
requires consensus: all UNSC members must agree to every word of the text.
The Czech draft Presidential Statement43 was unusual, intentionally and consciously. We deviated from customary usage in several respects. We took note of
information that the Security Council had been receiving from the UNSG, but
we also, and specifically, appreciated information received from generally highly
regarded NGOs. This was unheard of: on the one hand, we were intimating that the
secretary-general had not been informing us sufficiently broadly, and on the other
hand (this was more of a technical matter), we were referring to documents that
had not been blessed by the UN’s document registration system.44 Yet we were very
attached to the references to NGOs, because our most valuable and most trustworthy
information originated with Africa Watch, Amnesty International, the International
Committee of the Red Cross, and MSF, whereas the UN Secretariat did not furnish
much of value.
Our draft warned the so-called interim (Hutu) government of Rwanda of its
responsibility to rein in all military and paramilitary elements responsible for the
ongoing brutalities. In particular, however, our draft contained the following formulation: ‘‘The Security Council reaffirms that the systematic killing of any ethnic
group, with the intent to destroy it in whole or in part, constitutes an act of genocide
as defined by the relevant provisions of international law.’’
‘‘The Security Council,’’ we continued,
points out that genocide cannot be condoned or tolerated, let alone justified, under
any circumstances: not by civil war, not by the death of a leader, whatever suspicions
surround it, not by past history. The Council further points out that an important
body of international law exists which deals with perpetrators of genocide.

As I had expected, we didn’t achieve any immediate success, but some reactions
still surprised us by their sharpness. I was taken aback, for example, by the reaction
of the British ambassador, Sir David Hannay, who observed that such a presidential
statement would turn us ‘‘into a laughingstock’’ and that in these matters ‘‘we should
leave the leading role to the African group.’’ The French ambassador, Jean-Bernard
Mérimée, argued in turn that according to his information, brutalities were committed
not only by Hutu on Tutsi but also by Tutsi on Hutu. In reaction, I carefully analyzed
the sources of our information (after all, the French MSF had only recently met with
the president of the Security Council) and why I trusted these organizations, and
invited him to elaborate similarly on his information about alleged Tutsi atrocities
and to clarify its origin. He never reacted to this invitation. (This was yet another
small stone fitting into the mosaic of suspicions I had developed concerning France’s
policy on Rwanda.)
Ibrahim Gambari, Nigeria’s ambassador, then further muddled the outcome of
our draft statement—though probably unintentionally, seeing that he was one
of the most decent ambassadors on the Security Council, and my good friend. He
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informed us about a meeting the previous day of the African Regional Group in the
UN, which dealt with Rwanda. On basis of that meeting, he proposed his own draft
presidential statement, which sought a sort of African solution, including, among
other things, the involvement of the Central Organ for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution that apparently functioned under the umbrella of the OAU. I
had never heard of this Central Organ (which in and of itself didn’t mean much),
but in addition, it didn’t seem to have a very successful track record. These Nigerian
ideas struck me as a chimera; they would not have led to anything sensible, and,
unlike our draft, they didn’t even characterize the situation in Rwanda as genocide.45
The ensuing discussion combined reactions to both drafts. The effort that
informed ours—namely, that the UNSC should finally dare to describe the Rwanda
slaughter as genocide—was watered down; those who rejected that designation completely found it easy to focus on the African draft.
As the discussion progressed (still on 28 April), Colin Keating, president of the
Security Council for April as ambassador from New Zealand, attempted to blend the
two texts so that we could issue some presidential statement at all, of any kind. By
this time, more than three weeks had elapsed since the beginning of the holocaust,
and hundreds of thousands of people had been massacred. We argued for hours on
end over every sentence, every word. And when it appeared that all the negotiations
and all the arguments were going nowhere, Colin played his final trump card: his
delegation rewrote the draft presidential statement, as it had emerged at that
moment, into a draft UNSC resolution.
This was an absolutely brilliant maneuver. Unlike a presidential statement, a
resolution didn’t require unanimity. And so, if the Security Council was unable to
agree on a presidential statement, the New Zealand delegation, supported by other
friendly delegations (including, naturally, the Czechs), could present a draft resolution, possibly with even tougher language. Those who didn’t like it could vote against
it—and at least show their true colors. And even if any of the permanent members
ended up vetoing the resolution, this would indicate the unbelievable—that a holder
of the UNSC veto power was in agreement with genocide!
A technical comment needs to be made here. Any draft resolution or presidential
statement is first issued by the Security Council internally, in blue (as opposed to
black) ink. Such drafts are discussed as ‘‘texts in blue.’’ The actual document can be
issued only twenty-four hours later. Even during these final twenty-four hours, the
Security Council (or the co-sponsors of the text) can agree to some final changes, if
necessary. This possibility, however, is used quite rarely.
Now, Colin timed his maneuver for the last possible moment. Only two days
remained of New Zealand’s presidency. Colin came out with his move just before
midnight on 28 April. His draft resolution would have got the required twenty-four
hours ‘‘in blue’’ by midnight on 29 April—and he would still have time to convene
a public, official meeting of the Security Council for 30 April, the last day of New
Zealand’s presidency, and have this draft voted on.
A draft resolution thus hung like the sword of Damocles over the heads of
the hesitant members. Even so, negotiations were very complex. We were already
completely exhausted when we fought over the last remaining issue—namely, how
to apportion the blame for the continuing catastrophe between the Hutu and the
Tutsi. The debate featured two clear-cut opinions: France, for example, wanted to
divide the blame ‘‘equally,’’ whereas New Zealand, the Czech Republic, and several
other delegations saw the carnage as unambiguously the work of the Hutu extremists.
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Battered by the long hours, Security Council members might even have been
prepared to accept some not completely repugnant formulation, if only to be able
to retire—by now it was long past midnight, in the early hours of 29 April. I don’t
recall the final formulation we thought we had reached, but when Colin asked
whether we could all agree to it, it was quiet around the table. For a long moment
it seemed that the negotiations were over. Eventually, though, I couldn’t help myself:
the text still put too much weight on some spurious guilt of the Tutsi. It was as
though the Jews were being responsible for their own extermination by the Nazis.
I spoke up—the language still wasn’t acceptable to me. Like-minded colleagues,
especially from the ‘‘non-non’’ group, sighed in relief: they didn’t like the proposed
language either. This last skirmish then ended up with language improved even
a little further, thanks to the chiseling skills of the British ambassador. ‘‘Attacks
on defenceless civilians,’’ we ended up agreeing, ‘‘have occurred throughout the
country’’—this formulation was a concession to those who wanted to share out
the blame equally, but at least it spoke about ‘‘the country’’ and not about tribal
or political ‘‘groups.’’ But the sentence continued—‘‘especially in areas under
the control of the armed forces of the interim government of Rwanda,’’ that is, the
Hutu. So in the end we attributed blame where it belonged.
Not surprisingly, not a word remained about the work of and information from
NGOs that the Czech delegation had stressed in our original draft. I wrote to Prague
that China and Oman were particularly loath to allow for a precedent of the Security
Council’s reacting to information from NGOs.46
The word ‘‘genocide’’ was not mentioned either. At least an oblique reference
to genocide appeared, though, as the statement recalled that ‘‘killing of members of
an ethnic group with the intention of destroying such a group in whole or in part
constitutes a crime punishable under international law.’’ This crime, of course, is
the one called genocide—even though the word itself was not used in the text. New
Zealand’s draft resolution, ‘‘in blue,’’ which had been held in reserve, went into the
archives, and the presidential statement initiated by my delegation was accepted,
albeit rather too watered down for our taste.47
The Czech presidential statement initiative that New Zealand, in the president’s
chair, crocheted through the negotiations was our most intensive effort to influence
the Security Council’s deliberations on Rwanda. It was also the only occasion during
our two-year stint on the Security Council when the Czech delegation by itself
initiated a text of any document. Even though we did not succeed, or at least not
without the text’s being greatly watered down, I consider this to have been one of
the most important of our efforts in the Security Council. It is not very well known,
because the Security Council holds its consultations behind closed doors and its
‘‘internal matters’’ only seep out. This draft, and Czech public statements at formal
Security Council sessions, presented the overall view of our country, one that eventually received broad international recognition.

Genocide—The Expression
And so we found out yet again, the hard way, while discussing this presidential
statement, that the word ‘‘genocide’’ was taboo in the Security Council. Nobody
used it publicly, however clear it was that this was exactly what was taking
place. Nobody used it because using it would have legal repercussions. Genocide is
forbidden by the international Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (UNCG) of 1948; and, in addition, the UNCG confers a duty to
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punish génocidaires. The United States, always weighing ever so carefully the legal
implications of any step, did not intend, or did not wish, to act on this duty. Its
representatives argued that in the case of Rwanda one could at most talk about
‘‘acts of genocide,’’ but not about genocide as such. I have never understood the
distinction between the two.
This US position evoked a certain echo in Czech diplomacy as well. During a
nighttime ride through the streets of New York, Alexandr (‘‘Sasha’’) Vondra, at the
time first deputy to Foreign Minister Jozef Zieleniec, suggested that I moderate
my statements concerning Rwanda. He had just arrived from Washington and was
perhaps conveying the reaction of the US administration. I simply opened the daily
paper and pointed out one article after another on the ongoing atrocities. The
newspapers had a clear picture of the situation, and so did I. Sasha didn’t insist,
and I moderated nothing.
On the one hand, the Security Council’s inability to come to grips with the situation was caused by the blinders worn by some countries had (the American ‘‘acts of
genocide,’’ the difficulties that some Third World countries had in view of their own
policies toward minorities). On the other hand, for many of us, the Rwanda events
fell so dramatically out of the normal curve of nations’ possible behaviors that one
instinctively refused to believe them. Fifty years after the term ‘‘genocide’’ was first
introduced into the glossary of international politics, as a consequence of the Shoah,
and twenty years after the holocaust launched by the Khmer Rouge, it was hard
to admit that we were dealing not with a historical category but with an acutely
contemporary one, not with a one-off event but with a recurring one.
Apart from that, I detected a soupçon in some of the remarks, along the lines of
It’s easy for you Czechs to point fingers when you are not obligated to deal with any
consequences. Are you perhaps going to send your soldiers to Rwanda? This, of
course, was a cheap argument; if it were true, it would imply that smaller countries
have no business at all sitting around the Security Council table. And, in addition,
while the Czech Republic had no soldiers in Rwanda, it had deployed them in a
long list of other difficult and dangerous places; if we had none in Rwanda, it was
more a result of the random selection of where our soldiers went than of a deliberate
policy of avoiding that country.
The fact that for weeks on end nobody publicly used the word ‘‘genocide’’ was, in
my view, symptomatic of the complete collapse of the UN Secretariat’s responsibility
and of the Security Council’s impotence. In the end, I became the first official to
use the expression publicly, in a public session of the UN Security Council. (During
informal consultations, behind closed doors, several of us had been using the term
for some time now.)
The opportunity to make the point in public arose on 5 May 1994. A UNSC
session had been convened to deal with Mozambique, but I managed to insert a
reference to Rwanda into my remarks: ‘‘Different countries of the cone of Africa
south of the Equator,’’ I said,
are facing an exceptionally broad array of political circumstances at this moment.
On the one end of the spectrum, there is the hell of Rwanda. My delegation is
appalled by the situation in that country and has been shocked by the fact that
neither the Security Council nor the UN Secretariat has so far managed to describe
the massacres in Rwanda with the only word that fits them—namely, genocide.48

And the word was out in public, for what it was worth.
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Resolution 918/1994
The presidential statement of 30 April was better than nothing, but the Security
Council still hadn’t started working on a resolution that would not only comment on
the Rwanda massacres but also do something about them. Eventually, such a resolution was adopted—but not until May. The first public, official, formal meeting on
Rwanda took place only on 16 May. On that occasion, I started my own statement
forcefully: ‘‘The crocodiles in the Kagera river and the vultures over Rwanda have
seldom had it so good.’’ The ambassador of Djibouti, sitting to my left, snickered.
They are feeding on the bodies of thousands upon thousands of children, women,
hundreds of whom were pregnant, and men who have been hacked to death during
the past six weeks by what has turned out to be a most vicious regime.
The massacres include 4,000 killed in Kibeho; 5,500 butchered in Cyahinda; 800
assassinated in Kiziguru; 500 slain in Rukira; 2,500 slaughtered in Kibungo; another
4,000 have been murdered in Shangi, a parish in the Cyangugu prefecture, and 2,000
in Mibirizi, also in Cyangugu. This is the same Cyangugu where for several weeks
now, many thousands have apparently been trapped for weeks on end in a stadium
without any relief. Surely one wonders whether the dead are not better off than the
living.

By now, the Djibouti ambassador had long stopped snickering.
I hadn’t finished.
So we have some 200,000 Tutsi lives lost [this was the number offered by the secretarygeneral], out of a total population of about one million—20 per cent of all of Rwanda’s
Tutsi. Each one of us can figure out how many lives such a percentage would represent in his own country, for his own people. This situation is being described as a
humanitarian crisis as though it were a famine or perhaps a natural disaster. In the
view of my delegation, the proper description is—genocide.49

It was a chilling presentation, perhaps the strongest I ever delivered in a public
session of the Security Council. For one thing, it was the first public presentation on
Rwanda (consultations having been closed to the public) where I had the opportunity
to present our overall evaluation of the situation. I spoke about the slaughter being
executed by the Hutu on the Tutsi and about the impropriety of trying to hypothetically ‘‘spread the blame around,’’ an approach for which there was no evidence. (This
was an oblique attack especially against the occasional arguments of France.) I spoke
about the conceptual difference one must make between victims of war, albeit a civil
war, and one-sided sacrifices of civilians far behind the front line. On the other hand,
I refused any ‘‘collective guilt’’ of the Hutu and pointed a finger specifically at the
butchers of the Presidential Guard and government military and gendarmerie units,
all of which had been linked with former president Habyarimana. I also drew attention to the inflammatory Mille Collines radio station.
In conclusion, I reviewed the evolution of the Security Council’s approach over
the previous six weeks: first the absolute shock, when we hesitated even to believe
the overall horror of the ongoing massacres; then the worry for our own units,
after the ten Belgians lost their lives; then the courage of UNAMIR, which, in
unbelievably uneven circumstances, managed to save at least the bare lives of at
least a few tens of thousands of desperate souls in Kigali. I saluted their courage,
as well as the NGOs, ‘‘which have done so much to apprise us of the true nature of
the conflicts in Rwanda.’’ This, in turn, was an oblique criticism of the Secretariat for
not informing the Security Council well enough.
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At this meeting, the Security Council approved Resolution 918/1994 (co-sponsored
by the Czech delegation), which directed the return of UN units to Rwanda.50 After
six weeks of horrors, we had finally managed to decide to boost UNAMIR’s troop
strength up to 5,500 and to strengthen its mandate. Even that was not easy: as I
wrote to Prague,51 the Security Council found it taxing to deal with the views of the
United States, who were very wary of the operation’s failing. They feared that in a
situation where neither party agreed with sending UNAMIR in and neither was prepared to abide by a cease-fire, the danger was dramatically increasing that UNAMIR
would find itself in the midst of a bloody conflict, as in Somalia. And so, while the
United States were prepared to contribute up to one-third of the costs of this operation, the perspective of possible victims decreased the chances that the US Congress
would agree to this financing.
Disregarding the opposition of one of its members, namely Rwanda itself, the
Security Council decided to impose an arms embargo on the country. The resolution
was voted on in parts—an exceptional measure, used very seldom, in situations
when this or that member objects to just this or that paragraph of the draft. The
representative of Rwanda objected specifically to Part B, which imposed the arms
embargo.
That the Rwandan (Hutu) government would even take part in this session, after
six weeks of incessant slaughter, bordered on the grotesque. It was attended by the
Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (!) of the murderous Hutu
‘‘interim government,’’ a certain Jérome Bicamumpaka. Colin Keating, New Zealand’s
ambassador, subjected him to scathing sarcasm and expressed his astonishment that
we had even allowed him to take up Rwanda’s place on the Security Council.52
The representative of Rwanda, said Keating, ‘‘does not represent a State. He has
no legitimacy and is merely the mouthpiece of a faction.’’ (The representative in
question is now facing responsibility for his part in the genocide at the Arusha
international tribunal.)

The Hurricane Abates
A few days later, the secretary-general sent his people to Rwanda to prepare the
new phase of UNAMIR’s activity. (The delegation consisted of his deputy, Iqbal
Riza of Pakistan, and Canadian Major-General J. Maurice Baril, Kofi Annan’s
military advisor for PKOs.) The Hutu regime in Kigali, meanwhile, was teetering on
the brink, but it still had the strength to massacre people. The regime still controlled
the capital, but its airport was now under RPF control. (At about this time, SRSG
Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh pulled out of Rwanda. He was to visit several African
countries and request their good offices in resolving the Rwanda conflict. One might
say, none too soon! More recently, he has apparently given testimony at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda—in defense of the alleged génocidaires.)
Toward the end of May, the RPF and the Rwandan government forces (RGF)
started talking, under the auspices of the UN, for the first time since 6 April, when
the slaughter commenced. It still wasn’t over, though, and during their first meeting,
the RPF demanded an end to the massacres. The RGF allegedly asked their units
and the militias to be ‘‘more tolerant’’ of the Tutsi, but as late as 28 May they
nevertheless massacred some 500 Tutsi who had sought shelter in a cloister north
of Kigali.
The UNSG issued another report on Rwanda on 31 May. No longer could he
be mealy-mouthed. Here he confirmed our own information about the breadth and
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depth of the cataclysm that had engulfed Rwanda: ‘‘There can be little doubt that it
constitutes genocide,’’ he confirmed, more than three weeks after I had first publicly
used this expression in the Security Council.53 ‘‘My delegation,’’ I said subsequently
in a Security Council meeting, ‘‘is troubled that it has taken so long for the Secretary
to use this description in his reports, on which the Security Council bases its work
heavily.’’ 54

Dénouement
In June 1994, three months after it had first swept the country, the tsunami of
murders finally began to ebb. The greatest merit for this goes to the RPF, which
had continued its civil-war offensive (and seldom has a war been more civil than
here) and was crushing the Hutu forces. One might say that throughout the country
the RPF was liberating the miserable remnants of Tutsi who had not been murdered;
but, in fact, day after day they were faced with further and further evidence of the
terror of extremist Hutu.
In these circumstances, France made an offer to the Security Council: it would
undertake its own operation, allegedly to alleviate the humanitarian situation
further by attempting to protect the endangered civilian population. It wasn’t clear
why France had suddenly become so solicitous, and various reservations and
objections were voiced both in the Security Council and beyond. These doubts, rather
exceptionally, found expression even during the vote on the French draft resolution,
from which Brazil, China, New Zealand, Nigeria, and Pakistan eventually abstained.
In my temporary absence, the Czech delegation didn’t figure that anything could go
wrong with the French initiative, and ended up supporting Resolution 929/1994,
which authorized Operation Turquoise.55
Only after some time did we understand what France had been up to. It became
clear that France was very anxious about the unstoppable advance of the RPF and
greatly feared for its protégés among the Hutu leadership. Operation Turquoise
thus, in essence, blasted the way for the Hutu génocidaires to escape from the country, mainly to the neighboring Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). A number of
French soldiers were apparently shocked when they realized, upon arriving in the
country, who it was they were supposed to protect.
The murders didn’t end even during this operation, though. In the south of
the country—for example, in the forests and caves of the Bisesero region in Kibuya
province—Tutsi had for weeks and months been fighting and resisting Hutu inroads,
in an uneven struggle, without arms and eventually without food.56 (Bisesero is
today one of the main symbols of Tutsi resistance, as I witnessed during my 2004
visit to the Kigali genocide memorial on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the
holocaust.) After the French arrived, multitudes of Tutsi fell into a trap: believing
that they would now be safe, many descended from the mountains, only to be
murdered by the Hutu, as late as June 1994. Only about 1,000 people survived in
the area, where some 50,000 had originally sought refuge. One cannot say that this
was France’s intention; but there is no doubt that they went to Rwanda to protect
the Hutu, not out of any great regard for the Tutsi.
A minor concluding comment: in July, Ambassador Bizimana, representative of
the Hutu, made his last appearance in the Security Council. Long before then,
he had stopped speaking up in informal consultations, apparently on the advice of
the French themselves. Now he disappeared from New York, along with the contents of his delegation’s bank account.57 For a while, Rwanda’s seat fell vacant. On
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2 September 1994, it was taken up by Ambassador Manzi Bakuramutsa, representing the new Tutsi-led government.

What about the génocidaires?
The RPF ended up defeating the Hutu militarily. The Hutu administration—the
so-called interim government, the government’s military, the Interahamwe, various
militias, Radio-Télévision Libre des Mille Collines—were all escaping the country.
Masses of ordinary people were also crossing the borders to Tanzania and the DRC.
I watched on television the slowly moving masses with their cattle-drawn wagons.
They did not give the impression that their lives were threatened, that they were
facing a clear and present danger. This is not to say that murderers among them
had nothing to fear, nor to exclude the possibility that a great proportion of Hutu,
perhaps even the majority, took part or were forced to take part in the slaughter.
The TV images, however, left the impression of an orderly exodus, an exodus probably
organized by the Hutu extremist wing. The days and weeks that followed only
confirmed this impression.
The Hutu exodus amounted to an export of Rwanda’s problems. Refugee camps
in neighboring countries turned into ulcers on the body of Central Africa. There
were concerns for the refugees themselves, that is, for their living conditions, for the
possibility of return, and so on; in addition, though, the camps were under the strict
control of the Hutu militias, who forcibly prevented from returning even those who
wanted to go back, and could have gone back, to Rwanda. The militias, defeated in
the civil war, continued to spread disturbances from beyond the borders. Based in
the refugee camps, they ‘‘continue to spew hatred against . . . their intended victims
who got away. They preach hatred, operate incendiary radio stations, keep an iron
hold over the rest of the camp population, prevent ordinary people from going back
to their homes and fields, throttle efforts of humanitarian operations—indeed, they
are possibly preparing for a renewal of the war,’’ as I argued in the Security Council
in November 1994, months after a degree of order had been established in Rwanda
itself.58
For the new Rwandan government, now headed by RPF politicians, these refugee
camps represented a constant security threat. Their chieftains spread their toxic
influence throughout Central Africa, and one can say that a number of the area’s
problems since, especially in the DRC and in Burundi, stem from unsettled accounts
with the perpetrators of the Rwandan Genocide and the consequent security concerns
of the Tutsi government in Rwanda.
One task remained for the Security Council: to arrange for the settling of
accounts. In early June, when even the secretary-general had come around to
describe the events in Rwanda as genocide, I said in the Security Council that one
doesn’t use the word ‘‘holocaust’’ lightly.
But today, as we commemorate the 50th anniversary of D-Day, we reflect upon the
Second World War as a war directed against a regime which became anathema to
the civilized world precisely because of it having unleashed a holocaust. The regime
in Rwanda has been attempting to do something similar—with machetes instead of
gas chambers; with the notorious interahamwe, comparable to the SS; with [specified
political parties] comparable to the Nazi party. It was precisely to forestall the
re-emergence of such regimes that this Organization, the United Nations, was created
almost 50 years ago.
Genocide is a crime, and, to state the obvious, where there is a crime there are
criminals.59
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Three weeks later I elaborated,
The conflict in Rwanda has led to massive and systematic violations of a whole series
of international agreements and conventions—including, to name just a few, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the Convention on the
Rights of the Child, and—it goes almost without saying—of international humanitarian law . . . Provisions of the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory
Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity may well be applicable to
the circumstances of Rwanda.60

How to deal with the criminals? Their crimes violated the basic principles of
international law. The logic of the matter would require that the Security Council
react in a way parallel to its reaction to the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and
that it create another ad hoc tribunal—something RPF’s Claude Dusaidi had, after
all, called for at the end of April. And this is exactly what the Security Council
decided to do, in its Resolution 955/1994.61 The lion’s share of the merit for reaching this decision—as, indeed, in so many other aspects of resolving the Rwandan
catastrophe—goes to the New Zealand delegation.62
These ad hoc tribunals were the only possibility available for international
settlement of war crimes or crimes against humanity, given that any project of an
overall, generic international criminal tribunal was at the time still in its infancy.63
I pointed this out in the Security Council. The decision to establish a specific tribunal
for Rwanda, I observed, ‘‘might signify a breakthrough in creating mechanisms that
would impose international criminal law . . . New concepts of international criminal
law have been developed—war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and
so on—while rules of procedure have remained quite underdeveloped since the
Nuremberg trial.’’ 64
Punishment is one thing, justice is another, and national reconciliation is something else again. ‘‘The Tribunal,’’ I said in the Security Council,
might become a vehicle of justice, but it is hardly designed as a vehicle of reconciliation. Justice treats criminals whether or not they see the error of their ways; but
reconciliation is much more complicated, and is certainly impossible until and unless
the criminals repent and show remorse. Only then can they even beg their victims for
forgiveness, and only then can reconciliation possibly be attained.65

Yet remorse, regrets, never mind repentance, were clearly not something one could
expect from the Hutu génocidaires—certainly not from those who had left the
country and were mobilizing against the Tutsi from across the borders.

In Conclusion
The Rwandan Genocide took place in 1994, but it is still a live matter in Central
Africa. The flight of the Hutu génocidaires to neighboring countries broadcast the
seeds of Rwanda’s catastrophe far and wide. Neighboring Burundi, which I visited
twice during my tenure on the UNSC,66 is engulfed in a Tutsi–Hutu rivalry as
well.67 The eastern part of the DRC has turned into a theater of an unclear and
terrifically bloody war that over time has involved several other African countries,
from Uganda to Angola and definitely including Rwanda. Permanent concerns for
the security of their fellows have led current Rwandan leaders to hard-to-understand
adventures in the DRC. One talks about a ‘‘thirty-year war’’ in Africa; one talks
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about millions of dead victims, of which Rwanda itself lost perhaps 800,000 (we will
never know the exact number). One can say without stretching the point that some
of the roots of Central Africa’s current warfare grow out of the carnage in Rwanda.
Who sows the wind, reaps a whirlwind.
The United Nations has reflected on its role in this catastrophe. After he was
elected UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan established a committee that analyzed in
detail the entire role of the organization, its Secretariat, and the Security Council.68
Important participating countries have also examined their positions and policies.
During his visit to Rwanda, US President Bill Clinton expressed regret for his
government’s policy during the genocide.69 Senate hearings took place in France,
and Belgian parliamentarians also examined their country’s role. In her memoirs,
Madeleine Albright discusses her lack of information and the incorrect US evaluation of the situation, which attempted to fit Rwanda into a template derived from
elsewhere. She sums up the US role thus: ‘‘The lessons we thought we had just
learned in Somalia simply did not apply in Rwanda. Somalia was something close
to anarchy. Rwanda was planned murder. Somalia counseled caution; Rwanda
demanded action.’’ 70
The position of the Czech Republic in this crisis was a principled one, and we
followed it as best we knew how. During the 1930s, British Prime Minister Neville
Chamberlain didn’t want to commit his country to the cause of Czechoslovakia
(threatened at the time by Nazi Germany), ‘‘a small far-away country which no one
knows.’’ For us, Rwanda, too, was a small far-away country we hadn’t known much
about; but it was precisely our historical experience with the Western diplomacy of
the 1930s that obligated us to act differently.
Czech positions derived from one of the key principles of Czech foreign policy—
respect for human rights. New Zealand was even more active than we were, probably
because of their much longer diplomatic experience and the legal mind of Colin
Keating, their superb ambassador and former justice minister. But even years later,
the role of the Czech Republic and Czech statements and positions in the bog of
those months look good. Our standpoints, our formulations, our initiatives, are to
this day quoted in most publications that deal with the role of the Security Council
during that period.71 We are remembered in Rwanda, and whenever diplomats from
the Czech Embassy in Kenya visit the country, the role of the Czech Republic on the
UN Security Council in 1994 is recalled with gratitude.
For me personally, Rwanda was a key formative personal, diplomatic, and
political experience. It strengthened my realization of how indispensable it is to act
in accordance with one’s own internal moral compass, in accordance with the basic
principles one adheres to, even if they cannot always be defined simply or briefly.
Diplomatically, since Rwanda (and since the Srebrenica carnage that the Security
Council dealt with in 1995), I have been fully conscious of the need to stand up
against any danger of extermination of any people, anywhere. And politically, the
red line beyond which one simply cannot make further compromises became even
clearer.
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In European African studies, these two peoples are usually discussed as ‘‘tribes,’’ though
differences between them are really not the same as those between actual tribes. These
distinctions, however, are not the subject of this essay. Kapuściński, Heban, explains the
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UN and Rwanda, 170–201.
UN and Rwanda, 251–52.
Technically, PDD-25 was not issued until 3 May 1994, but US diplomats followed its
guidelines for months before that. Its actual text is confidential, but a summary and discussion of it can be found on the Internet through the Federation of American Scientists,
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd25.htm (accessed 9 July 2010). See Barnett, Eyewitness
to a Genocide, 139, for a discussion of its influence on US decision making.
Madeleine Albright, Madame Secretary: A Memoir (New York: Miramax Books, 2003),
147.
Dallaire has written about his tragic Rwandan experience in Roméo Dallaire, Shake
Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda (Toronto: Random House
Canada, 2003).
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published in its entirety. This telegram, too, is missing from the UN and Rwanda sourcebook. The telegram itself and the background to the information it contains are extensively treated in L.R. Melvern, A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda’s
Genocide (London: Zed Books, 2000), 91–92.
I never understood the role of Marrack Goulding, at the time under-secretary general for
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‘‘Tjekken der taler Boutros-Ghali imod,’’ Information [Copenhagen], 7–8 December 1996.
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The Horseshoe Table (New Delhi: Pearson Longman, 2006), 236–56.
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Genocide in Rwanda (New York: United Nations, 1999), 26.
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Summary No. 59/94, file no. 2437/94, 8/4/94.
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deal with it.
Summary No. 60/94, file no. 2438/94, 10/4/94.
Summary No. 61/94, file no. 2469/94, 11/4/94.
Frank Smyth, ‘‘French Guns, Rwandan Blood,’’ New York Times, 14 April 1994.
Frank Smyth, Arming Rwanda: The Arms Trade and Human Rights Abuses in the
Rwandan War (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1994). Smyth’s report was published
in January.
Des Forges, ‘‘Leave None to Tell the Story,’’ 639.
Summary No. 61/94, file no. 2469/94, 11/4/94.
Summary No. 65/94, file no. 2546/94, 16/4/94.
On 15 April, the US delegation received instructions to inform the Security Council that
the US favored ‘‘full, orderly withdrawal of all UNAMIR personnel as soon as possible.’’
The instruction continued, ‘‘Our opposition to retaining a UNAMIR presence in Rwanda
is firm. It is based on our conviction that the Security Council has an obligation to ensure
that peacekeeping operations are viable . . . and that UN peacekeeping personnel are not
placed or retained, knowingly, in an untenable situation.’’ Albright, Madame Secretary,
150.
UN and Rwanda, 262–65. The document itself, S/1994/470, is dated 20 April, but it
reached the Security Council one day later.
UN and Rwanda, 268–69.
Ibrahim A. Gambari, ‘‘Genocide in Rwanda: Shame on the World,’’ review of Henri
Kwami Anyidoho, Guns over Kigali: The Rwandese Civil War—1994 (Accra: Woeli,
1994), West Africa Magazine, date unknown. Gambari was at that time Nigeria’s
ambassador to the UNSC. I have his review only in manuscript.
Summary No. 69/94, file no. 2603/94, 20/4/94.
Summary No. 72/94, file no. 2657/94, 25/4/94.
Ibid.
Attached to Summary No. 73/94, file no. 2674/94, 26/4/94.
See document E/CN.4/S3/3 in UN and Rwanda, 285–90.
This draft statement was never officially published; it remained a working document.
The text itself is reproduced in the Appendix to this essay. It was made available to
participants at a May 2004 conference on the tenth anniversary of the Rwandan
Genocide, organized in London by Never Again and the Imperial War Museum. That
was the only occasion I am aware of when it was distributed in its original English
beyond the confines of the Security Council.
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‘‘An African Perspective,’’ in The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st
Century, ed. David Malone, 512–20 (Boulder, CO: Lynn Rienner, 2004).
Summary No. 76/94, file no. 2721/94, 29/4/94.
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ex-U.N. ambassador, who vanished after genocide, resurfaces in Alabama,’’ Washington
Post, 4 April 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/02/
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UN Doc. S/PV.3453, 7.
UN Doc. S/PV.3388, 3–4.
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For Colin Keating’s recollections of the Rwanda events, with his evaluation of lessons
to be learned, see Colin Keating, ‘‘An Insider’s Account’’ in The UN Security Council:
From the Cold War to the 21st Century, ed. David Malone, 500–511 (Boulder, CO: Lynn
Rienner, 2004).
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I spoke on Burundi in the UNSC on 28 August 1995; see UN Doc. S/PV.3571, 4–5.
See Report of the Independent Inquiry.
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Ferroggiaro, ed., The US and the Genocide in Rwanda 1994—Evidence of Inaction: A
National Security Archive Briefing Book (Washington, DC: National Security Archive,
2001), http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB53/press.html (accessed 29 June
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Atlantic Monthly, September 2001.
Albright, Madame Secretary, 154.
See, e.g., Des Forges, ‘‘Leave None to Tell the Story,’’ 638–39; Melvern, A People Betrayed,
152; and Barnett, Eyewitness to a Genocide, 134, as well as references derived from these
sources.
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Appendix: Draft Presidential Statement on Rwanda, Proposed by the
Czech Delegation to the UNSC on 28 April 1994
The Security Council is absolutely appalled and horrified over continuing reports of
indiscriminate slaughter of innocent civilians in Kigali and various other localities in
Rwanda. It notes that according to reliable reports, transmitted to the Council by the
Secretary-General in his Special Report (S/1994/470), the current wave of killings
was started by unruly members of the Presidential Guard, joined by elements of the
Rwandese Government Forces (RGF), over which the interim Government, established
on April 8, had failed to establish its authority. Unruly RGF soldiers were also
responsible for the brutal murders of Mrs. Agathe Uwilingiyimana, Prime Minister,
and several other ministers, of the provisional Government that stemmed from the
initial implementation of the Arusha Accords, as well as for the deaths of 10
members of the Belgian contingent serving with UNAMIR.
In addition to information available from the Secretary-General, the Security
Council has considered information available from well-respected NGOs. All this
information points to one thing: the horrors of Rwanda’s killing fields have few
precedents in the recent history of the world. The Security Council reaffirms that
the systematic killing of any ethnic group, with intent to destroy it in whole or in
part constitutes an act of genocide as defined by relevant provisions of international
law.
The Security Council points out that genocide cannot be condoned or tolerated,
let alone justified, under any circumstances: not by civil war, not by the death of a
leader, whatever suspicions surround it, not by past history. The Council further
points out that an important body of international law exists that deals with perpetrators of genocide.
The Security Council warns the interim Government of Rwanda of the responsibility it bears for immediately reining in and disciplining all elements of the RGF
and of the Presidential Guards responsible for the brutalities. The Council calls
upon the interim Government of Rwanda to assure that any group, organization,
movement, militia or individual under its control should cease and desist from all
acts of genocide against any part of the population of Rwanda. The Council also calls
upon the interim Government of Rwanda to investigate all acts of genocide and to
severely punish those responsible for their commission. The Council furthermore
expresses its hope that forces that are currently engaging the RGF and the Presidential Guard will not resort to comparable countermeasures.
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Chris Hedges, Empire of Illusion: The End of Literacy and
The Triumph of Spectacle. New York: Nation Books, 2009.
Pp. 232, cloth, $24.95.
Reviewed by Herb Hirsch, Professor of Political Science, L. Douglas Wilder School of
Government and Public Affairs, Virginia Commonwealth University; Co-Editor,
Genocide Studies and Prevention

At first glance, a book that is a critical analysis of US culture might appear not be
relevant to the study and prevention of genocide. This would be a profound mistake.
Chris Hedges’ analysis is not only applicable but important. Hedges, author of the
National Book Critics Circle–nominated War Is a Force That Gives Us Meaning
(2002), has given those who consider themselves genocide scholars much to think
about and to apply to their concerns. With the possible exception of chapter two,
‘‘The Illusion of Love,’’ he digs into modern American culture and casts a critic’s
glare on what is wrong and how it might eventuate in possible violations of human
rights or even genocide. By way of reviewing his argument, I will attempt to spell
out these connections.
Hedges is uniquely qualified for his journey through the depressing explication of
the illusions of modern American society. A senior fellow at the Nation Institute and
a former foreign correspondent in Central America, the Middle East, Africa, and the
Balkans, he previously wrote for the New York Times.
Hedges concentrates on the mechanisms used to divert individuals from confronting the political, economic, and moral realities that surround the modern citizen.
Instead, he argues, reality is disguised by rituals of denial and entertainment spectacles. In a very real sense, the connection to genocide is not difficult to advance:
similar rituals are used by states wishing to deny that they have perpetrated or
allowed others to commit genocide. We will see how this works as we advance
through the complexities of Hedges’ argument.
The book begins with an over-long introduction, fourteen pages, that compares
contemporary American culture with professional wrestling—both are characterized
by ritual and spectacle and devoid of content. A culture of ‘‘celebrity’’ dominates, and
‘‘real life, our own life, is viewed next to the lives of celebrities as inadequate and
inauthentic’’ (19). It is no stretch to note that this type of diversion also draws attention away from the realities of life in other parts of the world and from what the
United States is or is not doing in response to human-rights crises elsewhere. A
culture focused on ritual and celebrity has no room for more substantive—and, one
might add, depressing—realities. If, consequently, the US citizen is so diverted, it
is highly unlikely that he or she will in any way pressure the US government to be
concerned. This means, of course, that important issues remain on the periphery
of consciousness and that, therefore, they are not on the agenda and will not be
addressed.
But, Hedges argues, there is no reason to worry, since this celebrity culture provides expiation for whatever guilt may exist. Since, as portrayed in US culture, those
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who win are the ‘‘Best and the Brightest,’’ it follows that ‘‘those who lose deserve to
be erased. Compassion, competence, intelligence, and solidarity with others are
forms of weakness’’ (30). The losers are ‘‘responsible for their rejection. They are
deficient’’ (30). Here we find a ready-made rationalization for allowing crimes against
humanity, war crimes, and genocide to proceed unimpeded and, in many instances,
unrecognized, as the media do not cover them and the population does not care
about them.
Hence, as Hedges writes, ‘‘celebrity culture plunges us into a moral void. No one
has any worth beyond his of her appearance, usefulness, or ability to ‘succeed.’ The
highest achievements in a celebrity culture are wealth, sexual conquest, and fame. It
does not matter how these are obtained’’ (32). This focus masks the problems within
US society and diverts attention from problems anywhere else. In fact, Hedges
accurately notes that ‘‘the fantasy of celebrity culture is not designed simply to
entertain. It is designed to keep us from fighting back’’ (38). Apathy and ignorance
feed the majority values of the culture, and we become not victims or perpetrators
but bystanders. We watch everything. Not only do we sit and observe ‘‘reality’’
television: we sit and observe Darfur and the Congo as well.
It is often argued that education will overcome these obstacles to consciousness,
the ignorance of diversion. Hedges points out, however, that ‘‘honest intellectual
inquiry, which is by its nature distrustful of authority, fiercely independent, and
often subversive’’ (89), has become a rarity. Corporate hierarchy has become the
dominant educational model, and business ethics dominate the modern university:
‘‘We have bought hook, line and sinker into the idea that education is about training
and ‘success,’ defined monetarily, rather than learning to think critically and to
challenge’’ (95). These are the new primary values of the American educational
establishment. The ‘‘bottom line’’ triumphs over any concept of morality or ethics,
and critical thinking is not only banished but becomes a threat to the profit motive.
Learning must be utilitarian, as defined by this culture and not by any notion of
humanitarian action. As for education as the panacea, Hedges concludes that ‘‘most
universities have become high-priced occupational training centers’’ (109). Education,
in such an environment, has become ‘‘a flight from conscience’’ (11), and a flight from
conscience dooms large portions of humanity to suffer, with no recognition that
anything is wrong. Hedges goes even further, noting that
the single most important quality needed to resist evil is moral autonomy. As Immanuel
Kant wrote, moral autonomy is possible only through reflection, self-determination,
and the courage not to cooperate. Moral autonomy is what the corporate state, with
all its coded attacks on liberal institutions and ‘‘leftist’’ professors, have really set
out to destroy. (112)

Absent these qualities, there is no danger to the status quo and no possibility that
pressure will be forthcoming to confront the human-rights violations taking place in
remote (at least, remote from the United States) part of the globe.
Hedges concludes with a discussion of the ‘‘Illusion of America.’’ By this he
means that the myth of the United States is out of line with the reality. Our selfimage, reinforced through the process of political socialization, political rhetoric, and
self-absorption, is obsolete. ‘‘Our nation has been hijacked by oligarchs, corporations,
and a narrow selfish, political, and economic elite, a small and privileged group that
governs, and often steals, on behalf of moneyed interests’’ (142). These interests have
no interest, so to speak, beyond money, and, Hedges argues,
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in the name of patriotism and democracy, in the name of all the values that were
once part of the American system and defined the Protestant work ethic, [have]
systematically destroyed our manufacturing sector, looted the treasury, corrupted
our democracy, and trashed the financial system. Seeing this plundering we remained
passive, mesmerized by the enticing shadows on the wall, assured our tickets to
success, prosperity, and happiness were waiting around the corner. (142)

Manipulated into passivity, diverted from reality and unable to see what has taken
place, American citizens have lost the habit of democracy, the determination to take
action to improve their own and others’ well-being. Political will is not only absent in
situations where genocide is being committed but has virtually disappeared from
American society. The process of divergence has been so successful that it probably
is the case that most US citizens have a difficult time recognizing their own selfinterest, let alone the self-interest of the nation. The rabble-rousing discussion
of health care is a perfect example. How there can be any debate over whether to
provide health care for the 32 million people currently uninsured is baffling. Health
care should be considered a right, and providing it for those currently without health
care or the means to access it should be an honorable undertaking, as should
stopping violence where innocent people are being slaughtered. Yet, as Hedges
continually points out, the world has changed, and this perspective appears to have
been driven out of Americans’ cultural value structure, to be replaced by apathy and,
if the present public discourse be any measure, hostility.
In this last chapter, Hedges adds more detail to his view of the decay of American
culture. The economic decline and the reasons behind that decline—in particular,
corporate domination of American political and social life—have, according to
Hedges, caused Americans to lose the ability to distinguish between morality and
immorality and to support action to combat evil—or to even recognize its occurrence.
‘‘The government,’’ he writes, ‘‘stripped of any real sovereignty, provides little
more than technical expertise for elites and corporations that lack moral restraints
and a concept of the common’’; ‘‘cultures that cannot distinguish between illusion
and reality die’’ (143). Or, more appropriately for this discussion, allow others to
die, unable or unwilling to distinguish between events that actually call for active
intervention and interventions in the pursuit of corporate or national interest. So,
no intervention in the former Yugoslavia, in Rwanda, or in Darfur—but invasions of
Iraq and Afghanistan. The United States has become a culture characterized by
‘‘war and rampant militarism’’ (144), and Hedges cites the usual statistics on US
military spending, bases around the world, and arms sales to make his point. This
leads, in Hedges’ persuasive argument, to a kind of national psychopathology that is
transferred from the modern corporation to the nation-state. Hedges borrows the
typology of psychopathology from Joel Bakan’s book The Corporation: The Pathological
Pursuit of Profit and Power,1 providing this checklist of psychopathic traits:
Callous unconcern for the feelings of others;
Incapacity to maintain enduring relationships;
Reckless disregard for the safety of others;
Deceitfulness: repeated lying and conning of others for profit [or for your own
interests];
Incapacity to experience guilt;
Failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behavior [as in failure
to abide by international law]. (163)
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It would not be difficult to note how US policy conforms to these traits, and this
raises an interesting question: Is it possible for an entire nation-state to manifest a
version of psychopathy?
Hedges appears to conclude that this is, indeed, the case. The decaying culture,
he writes, ‘‘turns alienation and anxiety into a cheerful conformity. It turns a nation
that wages illegal wars and administers off-shore penal colonies where it openly
practices torture into the greatest democracy on earth’’ (190). And yet, despite
his pessimistic (some might say ‘‘realistic’’) analysis, Hedges’ conclusion sounds
as though it were derived from some of those hucksters preaching motivation and
happiness as he posits that, somehow, love must triumph over evil.
While that is certainly a result to be devoutly wished for, it is scant consolation
for the victims of human-rights disasters—both historic and contemporary. For
them, more concrete action and more direct confrontation with the forces so disturbingly described by Hedges must be the order of the day.
Finally, what may we conclude about the relationship between Hedges’ argument
on the decline of American culture and the prevention of genocide? For a start, a
society that is incapable of assessing and confronting its own internal problems, a
society that cannot organize the political will to confront problems that are perhaps
leading to the demise of its domestic culture, is clearly not a society with the means
or the will to confront international issues in far-off places. If, as Hedges argues,
America is diverted by ritual and celebrity, plagued by a declining educational and
political structure that allows the decision-making process to be captured by corporate
elites, it cannot be an America that will be in the forefront of defending human
rights around the globe in places such as Darfur or the DRC. To expect otherwise, if
Hedges’ analysis is accurate, is to engage in our very own version of missing the
reality of twenty-first-century international politics. It has in fact been demonstrated
over and over again that those of us interested in protecting and advancing human
rights must depend on those nations and groups not so hell-bent on the pursuit of
celebrity, money, and power.

Note
1.

Joel Bakan, The Corporation: The Pathological Pursuit of Profit and Power (New York:
The Free Press, 2005).
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Hrayr S. Karagueuzian and Yair Auron, A Perfect Injustice: Genocide
and Theft of Armenian Wealth. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction
Publishers, 2009. Pp. 203, cloth, $39.95 US.
Reviewed by Uğur Ümit Üngör, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Centre for War Studies,
School of History, University College Dublin

Between 1895 and 1955, Ottoman Armenians suffered enormous loss of life and
property as a result of pogroms, massacres, and other forms of mass violence. The
1915 Armenian Genocide can be seen as the zenith of this process of decline and
destruction. It consisted of a series of genocidal strategies: the mass executions of
elites, categorical deportations, forced assimilation, destruction of material culture,
an artificially created famine, and, last but not least, collective dispossession. The
state-orchestrated plunder of Armenians immediately pauperized the victims; this
was at once a condition for and a consequence of the genocide. The Young Turk
political elite launched this process of societal and economic transformation in order
to establish a Turkish nation-state with a robust economy under ethnic Turkish
dominion. As part of this process, the ethnically heterogeneous Ottoman economic
universe was subjected to comprehensive and violent forms of ethnic homogenization. The redistribution of Armenian wealth—including shops, farms, churches,
cash, jewelry, precious metals, fields, factories, and schools—was an essential part
of this process. The genocide ripped apart the fabric of urban, provincial, and
national economies, destroying market relationships and maiming economic patterns
that had endured for many centuries.1
The field of Armenian Genocide studies is rapidly developing. The publication
of several important monographs in the past decade has opened up new ground
with respect to the organization of the mass violence, the international context of
imperialism, the national context of ethnic homogenization, and various rescue
efforts.2 But so far there exists no detailed treatment of the expropriation of
Ottoman Armenians as a component of the genocide. This highly significant aspect
of the event still needs to be properly understood.3 In A Perfect Injustice: Genocide
and Theft of Armenian Wealth, Hrayr Karagueuzian and Yair Auron aim to fill this
gap by exploring the confiscation of Armenian life-insurance policies by the Young
Turk government. From a broader thematic perspective, the authors tackles two
important questions in genocide research: How are victims of genocide dispossessed?
How do third parties behave in this process of plunder? Their book provides an
interesting but fragmented discussion that has both merits and shortcomings.
A Perfect Injustice consists of ten short chapters addressing some of the key
debates around Armenian life insurance. Chapter one is an overview of Armenian
history from the late nineteenth century to the period of the genocide. Chapter two
demonstrates that on the eve of the genocide, thousands of Armenians bought life
insurance from various European and American companies. Chapter three gives an
overview of the insurers’ counterclaims against Armenian claims for restitution, and
chapter four highlights how the Young Turk regime attempted to collect the benefits
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from these life-insurance policies after it had murdered those insured. Chapter five
charts how insurance companies held Turkey liable for the deaths of their policy
holders and pressured their foreign ministries to pursue this agenda. In chapter
six, the authors develop a legal argument, using the 1915 sinking of the British
passenger ship Lusitania as a ‘‘mini-precedent,’’ while chapter seven discusses
the realpolitik of ‘‘dollar diplomacy’’ in the wake of the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne.
Chapter eight poses the question of whether Armenians’ unclaimed life-insurance
policies are still recoverable. Finally, chapters nine and ten explore the 1915 and
1916 deposits to the Reichsbank, distinguishing two separate deposits, the latter of
which, they argue, was of confiscated Armenian money. A conclusion rounds out the
volume.
This book has many merits. It includes quotations from the letters, legal texts,
and protocols of various insurance companies that lift the veil on how the companies
behaved toward their Armenian clients when the latter were being persecuted and
murdered. Karagueuzian requested undisclosed documents from New York Life
(NYL) on the company’s transactions with Ottoman Armenians, and even received
copies of some of them. NYL’s internal correspondence demonstrates that the
company knew of the Armenians’ fate but willfully prevaricated toward the public
to avoid incurring losses. For example, on 20 November 1922 NYL vice president
Thomas A. Buckner wrote to the US secretary of state, Charles E. Hughes, that
‘‘much of this insurance . . . was written upon the lives of subject peoples, such
as the Armenians and others who have, during the years since the outbreak of the
European War, been subjected to massacre and illegal killing and fatal exposure’’
(25)—demonstrating clearly that NYL was aware of the mass killings of Armenians.
He later added that ‘‘we believe the Turkish Government is, and should be held
responsible’’ (34). The position of British insurance companies created a Kafkaesque
nightmare. The companies categorically rejected Armenian claims, because the
British government banned ‘‘payment of a policy on the life of an enemy [in this
case, any citizen of the Ottoman Empire] during the war’’ (34).
Karagueuzian and Auron argue that after the Armenian Genocide, the position
of the insurance companies was one of self-interest; in the authors’ words, it
‘‘combined petty corporate greed and self-serving corporate politics’’ (73). The
insurance companies and banks merely sought compensation for the financial losses
resulting from the Young Turk government’s criminal sequestration policies. They
were also wary of their reputations and of their competitive positions with respect
to other companies. The insurance companies pressed their countries’ foreign ministries to hold the Ottoman government liable for the financial damages they had
sustained. Therefore, the authors also rightly raise serious questions about Calvin
Coolidge, US president from 1923 to 1929, who only three months after leaving office
became a member of NYL’s Board of Directors.
Even almost a century later, the insurance companies continued to perpetuate
their policies, seeking to exploit every conceivable legal loophole to evade payments—
including unreasonable pretexts such as Armenians’ failure to pay their premiums
after they were deported and their relatives’ inability to supply death certificates.
Ultimately, in 2005, both New York Life Insurance Co. and AXA S.A. agreed to pay
multi-million-dollar settlements to the descendants of genocide victims. What is
remarkable is that these companies initially stonewalled such requests and categorically denied all charges; only after realizing their legal vulnerability did they change
tack and grudgingly admit that the Armenians were entitled to compensation. In
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other words, they never took a principled stance on the murders of their clients,
and they proposed only minimal compensation. Ultimately, these two insurance
companies paid less than 2 percent of their total debts on pre-genocide life-insurance
policy benefits to the victims’ heirs.
The authors also clear up confusion about an important controversy, that of two
considerable wartime deposits to the Reichsbank in Berlin: the 1915 German and
Austro-Hungarian gold deposit to the Ottoman Empire’s account and the 1916 Young
Turk gold deposit to the Ottoman account. Karagueuzian and Auron argue convincingly that these were two distinct deposits: the former a loan from the Ottoman
Empire’s allies to their wartime ally, and the latter most likely looted Armenian
assets, funneled by the Young Turk dictatorship to the Reichsbank’s Ottoman
account. Only thorough research into the records of the Reichsbank and the Ottoman
Bank, however, can conclusively resolve this question.
All of these qualities speak for the book. But it suffers from drawbacks as
well, beginning with its straightforward, at times emotionally involved style and
unrefined vocabulary. C’est le ton qui fait la musique: the authors use an all-toofamiliar popular discourse of ‘‘evil’’ perpetrators committing ‘‘unspeakable’’ acts,
rather than attempting to understand the problem. They seem to have thrown to
the wind Jacques Sémelin’s caution that genocide researchers need to distance themselves from legal and moral approaches to genocide. There is considerable insipid
repetition as well, especially on denial by states—which is repeatedly condemned
but never really problematized. In addition, four major drawbacks mar the general
presentation of the book: questions, argumentation, comparisons, and assumptions.
The authors seem to have asked the wrong research questions at the outset.
Instead of inquiring how third parties conducted their businesses during a period
when their clients were being persecuted, they use the available documentation to
establish ‘‘guilt’’ on the part of the Young Turk government. Too often the authors
take polemical issue with denialist arguments, for example in chapter four, when
discussing the Young Turk regime’s bizarre wartime claim that Armenian lifeinsurance policies should be paid out to the regime (48). This chapter is a missed
opportunity: instead of getting to the bottom of this captivating event, the authors
prosecute the perpetrating elites. Similar missteps are made in chapter ten, which
begins with the Young Turks’ 1916 gold deposit to the Reichsbank but then takes
an inexplicable turn to discuss the political continuities evident in the Young Turk
regime.
At times, too, the argument rambles. The authors’ piling up of evidence to implicate the Ottoman minister of finance, Cavid Bey (121–3), is not convincing. It is clear
that Cavid Bey was probably deeply complicit in Young Turk economic crimes. But
the methods of using historical evidence are not applied adequately. Another
instance is chapter five, which promises to discuss the insurers’ defense against
Armenian claims but is in fact a rather rash and undifferentiated treatment of
Young Turk violence. The authors’ blanket indictment of Germany (125–7) does not
make much sense either: it relies on arguments from authority and on outdated and
discarded scholarship that has been criticized and deconstructed in recent studies.
The many comparisons and parallels drawn in the book are not unproblematic
either. The authors assert an equivalence between the Shoah and the Armenian
Genocide, often deploying legal arguments to buttress a claim that post-Holocaust
norms and practices of restitution apply to the Armenian case, too. The references to
the torpedoing of the Lusitania on 7 May 1915 are perhaps misplaced as well. These
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events are really of a different nature and magnitude. Comparisons are legitimate,
and can be fruitful, but they need to be preceded, first and foremost, by thorough
research on the Armenian case.4
The book also includes several debatable assumptions. The authors uncritically
use the ‘‘Ten Commandments’’ (6, 18–9), the alleged December 1914 Young Turk
plan to implement the Armenian genocide, which historians have identified as a
forgery. Similarly, they write that ‘‘the ease with which the perpetrators of the
Armenian Genocide escaped retributive justice seemed to have impressed the Nazi
leadership as they were contemplating a similar initiative towards the Jews’’ (99)
and, later in the text, claim that the Nazis were ‘‘influenced by their knowledge
of the Armenian Genocide’’ and ‘‘were greatly encouraged’’ by it (137–8). In fact,
however, there is no real evidence for this assertion of a direct connection between
the Armenian Genocide and the Shoah. The authors also err in suggesting that
it would be ‘‘futile’’ to expect the discovery of Ottoman state documents attesting
to the Young Turk government’s plunder campaign (117); in fact, research into the
Ottoman archives in Istanbul demonstrates that a huge official paper trail exists.5
Despite these reservations, A Perfect Injustice is a step in the right direction
and, if used carefully, a reasonable addition to the literature. The findings of
Karagueuzian and Auron make grim reading on the abandonment of victims, but
they are nevertheless useful for the study of third parties during genocidal processes.
What is the role and place of victim dispossession in genocidal processes? Which
strategies tend to be adopted by transnational organizations with professional or
financial ties to genocide? These questions merit attention in future research.

Notes
1.

2.

3.

4.

For a comprehensive introduction to this theme see Mehmet Polatel and Uğur Ümit
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Kim S. Theriault, Rethinking Arshile Gorky. University Park:
Penn State University Press, 2009. Pp. 288, cloth. $90.00 US.
Reviewed by Sara Cohan, Education Director, The Genocide Education Project

I was twenty-eight years old when I visited the Whitney Museum for the first time.
I immediately dashed to see the beloved painting The Artist and His Mother by
Arshile Gorky. As I stood in awe in front of the painting, my eyes wandered to the
museum placard. It read ‘‘Arshile Gorky, American Artist.’’ My heart stopped. It
felt like as if the wave of genocide denial so often experienced by those of Armenian
descent had crashed against that wall of the Whitney—erasing not only Gorky’s
heritage but my own. A scholar in the field would have known what to expect. At
the time, I was young and unprepared for this experience. How could Gorky be just
an ‘‘American’’ in the eyes of the Whitney, without the slightest hint of his origins or
experiences?
The Artist and His Mother cannot be understood without understanding that
Gorky was a survivor of genocide—a displaced person who had lost his mother and
his homeland. Negating the context of the artist’s life left a sterile painting representing only an aspect of Modernist art. Since this time, the Whitney has created a
slightly more appropriate placard for the work, but attaching Gorky’s identity to his
work on museum grounds is still a battle mirrored in the political arena of genocide
denial. In April 2010, this was clearly at issue when the Tate Modern Museum in
London hosted the current exhibit of Gorky’s work and indicated in the brochure
that labeling Gorky as a survivor of genocide is a contested point.
In her recent book Rethinking Arshile Gorky, Kim Sevart Theriault, associate
professor of art history, theory, and criticism at Dominican University, eloquently
reveals the impact of the Armenian Genocide on Gorky’s paintings and life. She
provides a new lens through which to understand the artist and how the trauma
he experienced led him to become a visionary artist. Theriault’s analysis makes
it impossible for serious scholars to ignore the fact that Gorky’s work reflects the
experiences of a man traumatized by genocide.
Theriault’s work accomplishes two tasks. First, she provides a brilliant analysis
of Gorky as a cutting-edge artist of the 1930s and 1940s, applying art theory and
criticism to the full range of his works. Second, she places Gorky in the context
of his experiences as a survivor of genocide, aptly articulating the impact of posttraumatic stress disorder on his art and life.
Theriault uncovers the aspects of Gorky’s life that have remained in the shadows
in the world of art criticism. Gorky’s art—not just The Artist and His Mother—is
explained from the perspective of an artist traumatized by genocide and trying to
exist in exile. In the field of genocide studies, artworks created by various survivors
have been a part of the academic canon; the art of Armenian Genocide survivors
has remained on the margins for lack of serious intellectual evaluation. Rethinking
Gorky fills this void.
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Gorky’s art chronicles not the events of the Armenian Genocide but the psychological devastation that infects the survivors of genocide. Theriault illustrates Gorky’s
struggle to reinvent himself constantly by moving to America, changing his name,
marrying, and studying Western Art. Despite his efforts at concealment, his identity
and experiences seep through his paintings. On canvas, the nightmare he endured
is revealed. As part of his attempt to adapt to his new home, he tried to paint in
a European tradition, but his early studies in Van inspired his style as well. His
studies and experiences laid the foundation for his pioneering work as an abstract
expressionist. His work was applauded in the art world, and he took the stage as
a great American painter; the fact that his Armenian heritage greatly influenced
his work was effectively masked. It would take decades for art historians to begin to
truly evaluate Gorky’s work and acknowledge all the aspects of his life and training
that influenced his art.
Rethinking Gorky is truly a breakthrough publication. It firmly places Gorky as
both an artist of note and a sage who tells us, in vivid images, about the brutal
impact of genocide on the survivor. Theriault’s book offers scholars of art history
and genocide studies a foundation for understanding both Gorky and his art in
the right context—as a survivor of the Armenian Genocide. Theriault has unveiled
his abstract images and rebuilt his memory, constructing a new view of one of the
greatest artists of the twentieth century.
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las presas polı́ticas de la cárcel de Villa Devoto durante la última dictadura militar
argentina (1976–1983)’’ (Historia Crı́tica, 2010; ‘‘Pabellones de la muerte: los lı́mites
difusos entre la represión legal y la clandestina’’ (Entrepasados, 2009); and ‘‘ Sentidos
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